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ABSTRACT

Nigeria's political economy has straddled the ideological divide between socialism and
capitalism. The country producesoil,andatsome point in its existence, it embarked on
robust state involvement in the economy. This was marked by the acquisition, or
establishment,of numerous state enterprises. Over the years, the performance of these
enterprises was found to be dismal, and as part of the overall reform of the economy,
Nigeria has joined the global trend toward reduction indirect state ownership of
enterprises. Indeed, it has embarked on massive divestment of state interests in once
publicly owned firms. Besides the universal rationale of efficiency, one of the objectives
of the privatization exercise in Nigeria is the attraction and retention of foreign
investments. This work examines the direct and indirect linkage between the
government's divestiture of its interests in firms, on the one hand, and foreign
investments in the country ,on the other hand.

The study is divided into seven chapters. Chapter 1 reviews the political and economic
history of Nigeria, to set the background and context that necessitated the introduction of
the reform package of which privatization is just an aspect. {;hapter 2 isa discussion of
various natures of state involvement in an economy. This ranges from mere regulation to
active participation. The Chapter discusses the competing . conceptual and ideological
theories and tries to situate the Nigerian experience within the broader conceptual
dichotomies of capitalism, socialism and the via media of mixed economy. Chapter 3 is
an eXamination of the meaning and rationales for privatization of state owned enterprises
generally and the Nigerian attempts in particular. Nigeria's privatization program is an

v

ongoing exercise. Yet two distinct attempts are identifiable: one which started in 1988
and the reinvigoration of the exercise, albeit with new constitutive frameworks, in 1999.
Thus, Chapters 4 and 5 review the legal and institutional frameworks for these two
exercises. Chapter t; deals with foreign investments in Nigeria. The discussion
encapsulates the pros Ed cons of foreign investments, especially in Nigeria. Chapter 7
explores the direct and indirect linkages, between the privatization program in Nigeria
and foreign investments in the country. This is particularly apposite because one of the
touted objectives of the privatization exercise is the attraction of foreign investments. A
conclusion foHows. The work finds that although foreign investments appear to have
been indirectly boosted by the privatization exercise, foreign investors initially did not
show interest in direct acquisition of the shares and other interests being relinquished by
the government, but that that attitude has been changing gradually.
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CHAPTER 1
A POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA

I. INTRODUCTION

To set the overall context and background for this thesis, this chapter will review
the political and economic history of Nigeria up to the present time. It is realized
that such history is of itself so broad and indeed might constitute a full- fledged
study. And, in actuality, there is a plethora of works devoted just to such history. 1
Thus, the attempt here will be to set the broad outlines of the historical experiences
of Nigeria emphasizing those aspects that significantly give a sufficient
background to a work such as this.

Nigeria is a complex sovereign nation situated in the western part of sub-Saharan
Africa, and has a total land area of 923,768 square kilometers. With An estimated
population of about 130 million people, Nigeria is the country with most blacks in
the world? It is also the most populated country in Africa and one of the most well
I

See for example FOLORUNSHO AFODUNRINBI, POLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA (New Millenium
1972); K.O. DIKE,
ANDpE AND POLITICS IN THE NIGER DELTA, 1830-1885: AN INTRODUCTION TO THE ECONOMIC
OLITICAL HISTORY OF NIGERIA (Claredon Press, Oxford, 1966)

~unications, 2000); ALAN BURNS, HISTORY OF NIGERIA (Allen and Unwin, London,

2

S~:~~'
u

Ifemesia, Nigeria: The Country of the Niger Area, in BONIFACE I. OBICHERE (ED), STUDIES IN
Hl.cRN NIGERIAN HISTORY, 21 (Frank Cass Publishers, London, 1982)
\

known developing countries, 3 It is bordered by the Atlantic Ocean to the south and
by Niger Republic to the north. Its western neighbor is Benin Republic, part of the
population of which is said to have an affmity with, or indeed to have come from,
the Yorubas, a major group in Nigeria. To the east, Nigeria is flanked by Chad and
the Cameroon. 4 It has two main climactic seasons,s the rainy and dry seasons,
although the intensity of the seasons varies with the particular geographic part of
the country. The rainy season is usually more intense in the south than it is in the
north. The situation is reversed with the dry season, which is usually more
intensive in the north than in the south. It is endowed with many rivers and
waterways; the two most prominent ones are the Rivers Niger6 and Benue. Its
peoples are multifarious and diverse. It is claimed that there are over 250 ethnic
groups and languages in the country. 7 As a result, there is hardly anyone defming
culture applicable to Nigerians. In contemporary times, the two dominant religions
of Christianity and Islam co-exist with different forms of traditional religion, by

3

4

See TOYIN FALOLA, CULTURE AND CUSTOMS OF NIGERIA, 1 (Greenwood Publishing, Westport, CT,
USA, 2002)
Ibid at2

~O~ NJOKU) ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NIGERIA, 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES, 6 (Magnet Business
nterpnses) Enugu) Nigeria, 2001)

~It is ~ought that the country's name was derived from this river. But see Ifemesia supra note 2 at 21-23) for a
W:USSl.O~ of the academic and linguistic controversy on the source of the name Nigeria. Lady Lugard is credited
commg that name but some argue that the name had already been used in materials to which Lady Lugard had
access before she allegedly coined it.
7 Ibid at 4.

2

.;

which is meant a belief or faith system indigenous to the people before the advent
of westerners or other foreigners. This has been a major source of friction and
tension, with occasional, and sometimes violent, clashes occurring between the two
major religions of Islam and Christianity. Some parts of the country practiced
farming, other parts fishing, while others are known more for cattle rearing.
So pronounced are the differences, and lack of homogeneity, that it is an accepted
notion that Nigeria is a creation of the British. Scholars8 and politicians alike are
prone to start a discussion of Nigeria by reference to the momentous action taken
by the British in 1914. It was in that year that the British colonial administration

under the leadership of then Governor General, Lord Lugard, unified the southern
and northern protectorates of Nigeria, to in essence form what is present day
Nigeria. Hitherto that unification, popularly known as the amalgamation of
northern and southern Nigeria, either protectorate had existed as a separate entity
with its own governor general. Indeed, Lord Lugard, the architect of the

amalgamation, in 1914, was on his second tour of duty, having served for six years,
from 1900, as the high commissioner for northern Nigeria, and returning in 1912 to
set in motion the process for the unification of Nigeria. Critics of the amalgamation
accuse Lugard of bias towards the north and of attempting to institute a northern
8

s~~or example, Hassan A.

no .

Saliu and J.O. Durojaiye. Background and Overview of Chapters, in HASSAN A.

~ED!, ISSUES IN CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA, 1 (Sally & Associates,

no. Nlgena, 1999) (asserting that: ''the emergence of Nigeria in its modem sense can be traced to colonialism."

3

hegemony over the south. Lugard apparently was not impressed by the developing

· "j

elites of the south but, instead, admired the laid back attitude of the north. Had
.\

Lugard not been changed as the governor general in 1918, it is speculated that he
would have moved the capital of Nigeria from Lagos, the most cosmopolitan city
in Nigeria then, and located in the south, to Kaduna situated in the north. 9

Ade Ajayi would seem to allude to this preferential disposition on the part of
):

~

, •.' 1

Lugard, when he observes that Lugard gave two reasons for pressing for
amalgamation. "First, Northern Nigeria needed to pool her resources with Southern
Nigeria. For, while the administration in the North was still dependent on Colonial
Office grants to balance its budget, the South with a better-developed overseas
trade was able to exist on its customs and excise duties. Secondly, if the trade of
the North was to expand rapidly, she needed an outlet to the sea which was open all
the year round, in contrast to the River Niger on which traffic was seasonal."}O
Whatever the merits, it seems clear that the merger was prompted by a desire on
"J

:

the part of the British for easy access for trading and economic purposes to the

entirety of the geographical entity now called Nigeria. It is arguable that that

10

J.F. ADE AJAYI, MILESTONES IN NIGERIAN mSTORY, 27 (Longman, New Edition, 1980)

4

prejudice, in favor of the north, has been maintained by postcolonial rulers. I I
Historic as the amalgamation was, it did not wean the peoples of Nigeria of their
profound attachment to their ethnic roots as is demonstrated by constant tensions
and cleavages. Nor did the early leaders have any illusion that it would. The British
ii

government's reason for the unification was economic not pOlitical. 12 In fact, it has
been noted that the British, out of immense concern with exploitation kept the
ethnic nationalities as further apart as possible, and that this was so
notwithstanding the celebrated amalgamation of the Northern and Southern
protectorates. 13 If the colonial powers were not interested in real integration
amongst the people, the early post colonial leaders did not seem persuaded of the
existence any such real unity either. Nor are the people themselves. It has been
claimed that:
"the fact is that Nigerians individually and collectively tend not to
have allegiance to the state imposed by the British in 1914. On an
abstract level, Nigerians identify with the geographical entity mapped
11

See KELEcm AMIHE KALU, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIAN FOREIGN POLICY,

~~ ~ellen Press, New York, 2000) (asserting, " ... the practice of robbing the south to pay the north, once

~titutlonahzed, has remained a vexing issue. The same practice is at the root of the current strategy for economic
~lopment, manifested either in the form of economic diplomacy or as structural adjustment policies, within
C ch the political and economic interests of the northern oligarchy are protected by the military establishment.
ont~mporary economic and political policies in Nigeria will be shown to parallel those of the colonial era,
espectally with respect to development, debt, and funding policies."
12

J..F. ~ AlAVI, supra note 10 at 23 (asserting that: "the British were Dot seeking to unifY Nigeria. They were
~religIOUS or pol!tical reformers seeking an empire where new religious or political principles could be enforced.
de ~ were essentially traders from abroad anxious to establish a situation favourable for the growth and
ve opment of their trade.")

13

Sal'

1U and Durojaiye, supra note 8 at p.l

5

out by the British, but concretely, seem unwilling to associate with the
idea of Nigeria. Perhaps the key reason is that the founding fathers of
Nigeria are foreigners. Hence most Nigerians irrespective of their
nationalistic claims, have a tendency to first identify with their
ancestral roots before identifying themselves as Nigerians." 14
Similarly some of the nationalist leaders have been quoted to openly doubt the
reality of the unity of Nigeria. Perhaps, the most famous statement in this regard is
that credited to the late sage and Yoruba icon, Chief Obafemi Awolowo, who was
the leader of one of the early political parties to have emerged on the Nigerian
scene, the Action Group. He is quoted to have said that "Nigeria is not a nation. It
is a mere geographic expression.,,15 His counterpart in the north, Sir Abubakar
Tafawa Balewa, who led the Northern Peoples Congress, is said to have seen
Nigerian unity as only a matter of intention, stating that "since the amalgamation
of the North and the South provinces in 1914, Nigeria had existed as one country
on paper... It is still far from being united. Nigerian unity is only a British
intention for the country.,,16

14

u~CHI AMIHE KALU, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 39 (Edwin
.ynalen Press, Ltd, New York, 20(0)
15

'

1b d at 41 (quo~ing OBAFEMI AWOLOWO, PATH TO. NIGERIAN FREEDo.M); See also Jefrey Herbst and
AI.
bayo Olukoshl, Nigeria: Economic and Political Reforms at Cross Purposes, in STEPHAN HAGGARD AND

s:i

E ViN B. WEBB (ED), VOTING FOR REFORM (DEMOCRACY, POLITICAL LIBERALIZATION, AND

~g=c ADJUSTMENT), 453, 454 (published for the World Bank, Oxford University Press, 1994) (citing
1987)

A. JOSEPH, DEMOCRACY AND PREBANDALISM IN NIGERIA, 184 (Cambridge University Press,

k··

2S~U, SUpra note 11 at P.41 (citing Ayeni Olugbenga,

Which Way forward, West Africa, Feb 14-20, 1994

P.
6

However some argue that prior to the advent of the colonialists, the people
inhabiting what is now called Nigeria interacted and communicated, even if they
did not have a common government. Such communication was enabled by the
many waterways existing in the territory of Nigeria and by the absence major
mountains. 17 Yet, others aver that though amalgamation was an act of the British, it
was guided, and to a large extent dictated, by existing unities, geographical,
commercial and cultural. 18 Whatever the merits of amalgamation, it is clear that it
did not erase any ethnic or other sectional cleavages. Those divisions, which persist
today, underscore the fact that though formally enunciated as one entity in 1914,
Nigeria's history, per force, involves the distinct histories of the several peoples
that make up the country, an issue to which we now turn.

ll. PRE - COLONIAL IDSTORY OF NIGERIA
It is of course not always easy to determine how far back any historical study of

any people can easily go. That dilemma is the more manifest when the place to be
17

ONWUKA NJOKU, supra note 5 at 6.7
18

th ~E AJAYI, supra notelO at 27. The eminent historian considers amalgamation a positive and asserts, at p. 28;
(o1~ we are ~ere~ore fo~~te in Nigeri~ ~at by and large the. British were drawn to recognize these unities and to
. «QW tb.em

In thel)" l.legottl~tIQIJ.s for ~qqij.IJH.itou lJud IJmlJlglJID.a.Jtou"

7

studied was not always within the radar of early historians. "The early political
history of Nigeria's states, large and small, is very complex, and full of
obscurities.,,19 Evidence abounds of the existence, in what is present day Nigeria,
of indigenous societies during prehistoric times. 2o Such evidence includes the
finding of brass items in Bida, Be-Ife and Benin, bronze in Igbo-Ukwu, terra cotta
animals in Bomo and terra cotta heads in Nok. 21 Similarly, people lived in Nigeria,
during both the stone and metal ages. 22 Pre-colonial Nigeria was made up of many
states. Some were large, some were small. Besides, even before the advent of the
British, the contours of these states continued to change both from internal and
.. )

external factors. Isichei argues that "in some areas, where the celebrated kingdoms
developed, a change seems to have taken place which often follows a similar
pattern, whereby a mUltiplicity of small-scale states, whose 'priest kings' were
sometimes rulers of little territories, and sometimes linked with vocational guilds,

19

ELIZABETH ISICHEI, A mSTORY OF NIGERIA (WITH CONTRIBUTION BY PETER DCHE ISICHEI),
129 (Longman, London, Lagos, New York, 1983)
20

TOYlN FALOLA, mSTORY OF NIGERIA. 37 (Greenwood Publishing group, Inc., Westport ,CT, USA, 1999);
The Library of Congress documents that the earliest known example of a fossil skeleton with Negroid features,
per?aps 10,000 years old, was found in neru in western Nigeria and attest to the antiquity of habiitation in the
(visited 03/07/07)
region. See
21

tb F:Ola, supra note 20 at 37; The skilled artisans and ironworkers of the Nok were said to have flourished between
e ourth century B.C and second century A.D. See

(visited 03/07/07)

2l "810
sub ne age refers to the period associated with hunter-gatherers who roamed the area in search of food and
Sees;qatuently made a transition to agriculture." The metal age began with iron, and later copper, brass, and bronze."
ola, Supra note 20 at 37-38

8

gave way to unified kingdoms. The creation of a kingdom is often linked with an
invasion from outside- but the invader need not come from far away.,,23

A. THE YORUBA KINGDOMS

The Yorubas occupy the western part of Nigeria and speak a language called
Yoruba. They trace their origin to a common progenitor known as Oduduwa. Myth
has it that Oduduwa founded the city oflIe-Ife. To this day the Yorubas regard that
city as the center of their history and tradition. The origin of other cities is traced to
IIe-Ife as it is claimed that Oduduwa dispatched his sons to establish the other
cities such as Oyo, Ibadan and others. Remarkably, about the fifteenth century,
some of these new cities surpassed lIe Ife in both political and economic powers,

with the result that Ile-Ife's relevance assumed only a spiritual dimension. Actually,
this would seem to be case even in contemporary times. Most of the other Yoruba
cities are larger and more developed than IIe-Ife. But in matters of tradition, IIe-Ife
enjoys a pride of place and its traditional ruler, the Ooni, is regarded not just as the
traditional ruler of the city but also as the traditional head of all Yorubas since he
occupies the stool of their progenitor, Oduduwa.
23

ISIClIEI, supra note 19 at 129

9

Of all the cities founded by the children of Oduduwa, Oyo became the most
powerfue4 and was headed by a traditional ruler called Alafin who was assisted by
a council of state called Oyo Mesi. It achieved substantial military victories
resulting in the extension of its empire further north to Nupe and Borgu and even
parts of what is now the Republic of Benin, Nigeria's neighbors to the west. 25
Although, the Binis, to the east of the Yoruba kingdoms, are not strictly considered
Yorubas, they have an affinity to Ile-Ife. Like the Yorubas, their traditional rulers
are called Obas.

26

It is said that because of internal quarrels amongst the Binis,

Oduduwa sent someone to rule them, and the practice endured. Today it is claimed
that the Oba of Benin (the modem name) descended from Ile-Ife.

B. THE NORTHERN KINGDOMS

The history of pre-colonial northern Nigeria is the history of the Hausas, Fulani's
and that of the other peoples who live in that region. The dominant pre-colonial
24

Faiola, supra note 20 at 20

15 Ibid
16

.·1

e!alOla notes that ?riginaIly Benin's rulers were known as Ogiso. Then a dynasty was established by a certain
lII....raka, Who, accordmg to tradition, was influenced by the Yoruba and chose the title of Oba (king). See FaIola,
.'"1' note 20 At 2 I

10

.tD,em4~;:; were the ]{anem Borou, the Hausa and later the Sokoto Caliphate. The
J{aDeIll BorI1u empire in the north east part of Nigeria and existed partlY outside

the territory that constitutes present day Nigeria. The Hausas existed more or less
in the center and were for a long time ruled by the Songhai Empire, which had
stretched from Senegal and the Gambia, in the west, all the way into Hausa land
including Kebbi, Katsina and Gobir. It was not until the sixteenth century when the

songhai empire collapsed following an invasion by an army from Morocco, that
the !Jausa states became independent, that is became free from Songhai's
domination. About the same time Boroo reached its zenith, and also benefited from

the fall of the Songhai empire by being the uncontested power in northern Nigeria.
A severe drought and famine in the middle of the eighteenth century combined

with internal agitations and rivalries to weaken the Borno empire and set the stage
for the Islamic jihad mounted by a cleric, Usman dan Fodio and the creation of the

Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century. 27

11

c. THEIGBOS

A majority who are Igbos populates the eastern part of Nigeria. The unique feature
of the history of the Igbos is the notion that prior to the advent of the colonialists
they were a stateless society. This simply means that in contrast to the Yorubas and
the Hausas and Fulanis, in respect of which certain organizational features had
been documented at, what may fairly be said to be, a macro level, the Igbos ''were
divided into small mainly patrilineal clans, each with its own founding ancestor.
Hundreds of villages existed not as members of one Igbo kingdom, but as
autonomous units, each with its own government.,,28 There was of course mutual
cooperation among the various families and clans. Government existed at the level
of these families and clans. Disputes and serious matters were settled by the elders
or by age grades.29

28

FaIOla, supra note 20 at 44
29

~tiaaUyge grade

is an association of people born within a particular period usually between one to two years.
, members of a particular age grade are usually age mates.

12

ro.

THE ADVENT OF THE BRITISH

As noted earlier, Britain colonized Nigeria and ruled the country for about six
.,!

decades. 30 However, the first Europeans that happened on the Nigerian scene were
the portuguese, who arrived about the fifteenth century and concentrated on
trading and missionary work. They had no territorial desires and restricted
themselves to fortified trading stations. 3l In the sixteenth century, the British,

"

French and the Dutch began to compete with the Portuguese and the focus shifted
to the dehumanizing and immoral trade in slaves. 32 The British continued to place
emphasis on trade but was willing to use force and intimidation to protect its
trading interests. Principally, it used the instrumentality of a trading company
known as the Royal Niger Company to carry out both its trading and quasigovernmental activities. Territorial annexation intensified in the nineteenth century.
Lagos became a colony in 1861. In the late 1880s, the British intervened in what
had been a sixteen-year war among the Yorubas and took over the area. Similarly,
the British conquered Benin in 1897. Meanwhile there had been strong competition
from the other Europeans, the French and the Dutch for more participation in the
30

l~rotn 1900 to 1960; this was the period that of formal colonization. Certainly British coercion started way before
and, some would argue that, it did not end with the independence proclamation of 1960.

31

Faiola, SUpra note 20 at 50
32 Ibid

13

"spoils" of their exploration in Nigeria. The Berlin Conference of 1885 has become
infamous for its brazen and obscene agenda: the so·called partition of Africa. In
their nineteenth century wisdom, the conferees, in consequence of their
distribution, allotted Nigeria to Britain to exploit, under the so-called principle of
dual mandate. Britain was still not interested in formally acknowledging the
annexation of Nigeria as a colony even though to all intents and purposes, it was
maximally exploiting it. But it needed an assurance that the despoliation of the
country would be its, to the exclusion of the other Europeans. While the conference
acknowledged Britain's claims to a sphere of influence in Nigeria, it stipulated that
only effective occupation would secure full international recognition. Britain
therefore took steps to effectively occupy Nigeria. It formed the Oil Rivers
Protectorate, which covered the Niger Delta area up to Calabar. The British
Consulate General relocated to Calabar. 33 This protectorate would later become the
Niger Coast Protectorate34 and be expanded to include the areas from Calabar to
the Lagos colony. This was followed by the occupation of the entire south. The
,

<

r'"

north became a protectorate in 1900.35 The two protectorates were each headed by
a higher commissioner until the amalgamation in 1914, when they came under the
administration of one governor general. An alternative theory is that British
33

Thus CaIabar is sometimes regarded as the first capital of Nigeria.
34

Thi

S was in 1894.

35

Lord Lugard became its high commissioner.
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annexation and occupation of Nigeria was accentuated by the need to stop slave
trade, following its abolition by the British Parliament in 1807.

· .1

IV. COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION

, iii

Following amalgamation, Nigeria was administered as one entity.36 As early as
1922 there had been agitations for greater involvement of Nigerians in its affairs.

Herbert Macauley, often referred to as the father of Nigerian nationalism, founded

his Nigerian National Democratic Party in 1922. That same year the Clifford
Constitution, named after the then governor general, introduced a legislative
council and a limited measure of elections into the council. Another major
development was in 1946 with the introduction of the Richards Constitution of that
year. That constitution introduced the concept of regionalism. A federal principle
was introduced in 1951 and 1954 with the Macpherson Constitution and the
Lyttleton Constitution respectively. All this while, there had been strong agitations,
led by nationalist leaders, for independence. The independence Constitution of

-

36Tbis

was through the principle of indirect rule, by which the colonial administrators administered the colony
ugh ~e local and already existing traditional institutions. That system was fairly successful in the north and
aU: ~hich had established traditional authorities. In the east where there were no preexisting centralized
the .o~ the c?lonial authorities create what they called warrant chiefs, and tried to rule through these chiefs, but
an :'
rule m this part was acclaimed to be a failure. There was also the Nigerian Council, which was touted as
~entyue for the appointed members to express their opinions on the issues affecting governance but was in
merely adVisory.
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1960 granted independence to Nigeria even though the colonial link was not
completely severed. The Queen of England remained head of the country. These
links were completely cut in 1963 when Nigeria became a republic.

v.

COLONIAL ADMINISTRATION AND TIIE ECONOMY

If Nigeria was born in 1914, it follows that its economy, at least that aspect that
relates to the corporate entity, is of recent origin. But as we have seen, people lived

and functioned in the territory now called Nigeria before the coming of the
,..',

Europeans. These folks carried out economic activities although not at modern
large scale or macro economic level. Agriculture was by far the most pervasive of
the economic pursuits of the Nigerian peoples in the nineteenth century. 37 This
was so in almost all parts of the country, even though the kind of agriculture

.. :

practiced varied from part to part, depending on climate. In some parts farming in
the nature of cultivation of crops, was the mainstay. Other parts, such as the Fulani
of the north, engaged in animal rearing, while those with proximity to rivers were
mainly fishers. The large number of waterways available facilitated trading.

»~-------------~N\yUKA NJOKU, ECONOMIC HISTORY OF NIGERIA 19TH AND 20TH CENTURIES, 9 (Magnet Business
.

tpnses, MUgu, Nigeria, 2001)
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Initially, such trading was of the form of trade by barter, whereby an individual
brought goods, which they wanted to sell, and exchanged the goods with another
person having an item, which the first individual wanted. 38 The concept of money
developed .later.

The parts of pre-colonial Nigeria, which had centralized administrations, like the
old Yoruba kingdoms and the empires in the north, had various systems of paying
tributes to the kings or rulers. That would equate modern system of taxation. In the
other parts without centralized systems, communal efforts were usually pooled to
address communal concerns. This could range from occasional levies or other
"J

impositions on adults or households to a requirement of participation in communal
labor to address any needs requiring such labor.

The very nature of colonialism is that of exploitation. As we have seen, the British
interest in Nigeria, nay Africa, was primarily commercial. Therefore, its focus was
in running the colony in such a way as to maximize the realization of its interests.

-

-1Ibis

~"Us ~ cumbersome as it required double coincidence of needs, that is to say that a person desiring to sell did
J:,,!......:e to ~d another person in need of that which the frrst person wanted to sell, but rather another who not

--~ such Item but also had in their possession an item which the first person wanted so that they could

~_etbe items.
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The economy was essentially dependent and a surrogate of the British economy.39
According to Edame, "the output of the country were wholly primary products and
mainly agriculture. These included cotton, rubber, palm oil, and tin, columbite and
coal. The bulk of these were exported to Britain while the country with its vast land
area and teeming population provided a virile market for British goods.',4O Thus,
the thrust of the colonial economic approach was the development of Nigeria both
as a source of raw materials for overseas use and as a market for finished products
from abroad. This parasitic approach was reflected in the economic policies of the
colonial administration, during the colonial era.

It has been argued that the colonial administration adopted a cavalier attitude
towards development policy formulation in genera1. 41

From amalgamation, in

1914, it took the colonial administration until 1945 to prepare a development plan
for the colony. When it finally did so, after the Second World War and while
nationalistic stirrings had begun, it produced a document that has been severely
39

~.E.~AME, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND PLANNING IN NIGERIA, 242 (Harmony Books, Benin

-&?' NIgeria, 2001)

-40

,~,~~~AME, supra note 39 at 242; A.C. EYIUCHE, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT
;~l:lNG IN.DEVELOPING ECONOMIES (NIGERIA PLANNING EXPERIENCE 1945-2000),242 (Maurice
\L Ction SefVIces, Enugu, Nigeria, 2000)
41-
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'btoSe: N.I.lkpeze, C.C. Soludo and N.N. Elekwa, Nigeria: The Political Economy of the Policy Process, Policy
~ 'ce and Implementation, in CHARLES SOLUOO, MICHAEL OGBU AND HA-JOON CHANG (ED), THE
CS
V!:rPress
OF TRADE AND INDUSTRIAL POLICY IN AFRICA FORCED CONSENSUS? Chapter 13 (Africa
, Trenton, NJ, 2004)

18

criticized as not really being a plan.

42

In 1945 the British prepared the Ten-Year

Plan of Development and Welfare for Nigeria, 1946-55.43 The plan was initiated as
a result of a request by the British Colonial Office in London, which had wanted
such plans from the colonies to assist it in disbursing the colonial development and
welfare funds. 44 That plan was to be funded by twenty-three million pounds
sterling from the United Kingdom government and twenty-six million pounds
sterling from Nigeria itself. It was supposed to last ten years but was broken into 5year sub-periods owing to rapid structural changes being then experienced in
Nigeria. Even so, it was terminated in 1954, following the introduction of the
concept of regionalism and that of regional autonomy. Each region launched its
own development plan. 45 Its central objective was the improvement of the socioeconomic well being of Nigerians. 46 "That was to be accomplished through the
provision of physical facilities such as roads, telecommunications, water supply,

42

See KALu, supra note 11 at 57

43

Go00vernment of Nigeria, A Ten Year Development Plan o/Development and Welfare/or Nigeria, 1946-5)(Lagos,
¥ernment Printer, 1946)
44

F.C~C.E. EYlUCHE, THEORY AND METHODOLOGY OF DEVELOPMENT PLANNING IN DEVELOPING
Ni ~OMIES (NIGERIA PLANNING EXPERIENCE 1945-2000), 53 (Maurice Production Services, Enugu,
1et1a, 2000)
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EYIuCHE, supra note 40 at 55
4G

I<ALu supra note 11 at 55
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hospitals and general improvement in the ability of the people to feed themselvesthrough increased agricultural research and yields.,,47

The colonial economic plan, as reflected in the Development and Welfare Plan, has
been criticized on many grounds. First, as in most colonial policies, it was prepared
by foreigners, notably senior colonial government officials, and suffered the defect
that characterized most of such alien policies: It did not reflect the experiences and
aspirations of the people. Similarly, it did not benefit from any data essential to a
plan of that magnitude. Secondly, its treatment of industrialization was poor.
Indeed, it seems that the drafters were loath to the idea of industrialization of the
colony. It seemed to scoff at the notion of an industrial Nigeria, when it stated:
"Due regard will be given to the possibilities of industrialization
where conditions warrant it, and where such production can be carried
out economically and at reasonably competitive prices. It is not
assumed, however, that Nigeria will become an industrial country as
with its large population and area a great deal of its future must rest in
agricultural develofment in its widest sense, and the improvement of
village industries. 4

The tenor of the document was anti industrialization, thus underscoring the fact
that it merely furthered the dual colonial interests of finding a source of raw

-

4 7'KAL

.

U supra note 11 at 55; EYIUCHE, supra note 40 at 54

!QuOted in KALU, supra note 11 at 56
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materials for foreign industries and a market for the fInished products of those
industries. Perhaps, it could be argued that given the state of both educational and
technological development at the time, Nigeria could not rapidly transform into an
industrial colossus. Yet, the whole reason for a development plan should have been
'. r

to document the aspirations of the people and focus their attention towards a goal.
It would not have been overly ambitious at the time for Nigeria to aspire to become
industrialized. The Development Plan instead of promoting this worthy goal
dampened the zeal.

Thirdly, part of the funding for the Plan was to be sourced through loans in the
London market. 49 Again, this benefIted the colonial powers more than it did the
people of Nigeria, and is also criticized as the genesis of the culture, which seems

to have taken hold, for the government to always borrow for development plans. so
Fourthly, and more importantly, the Plan is criticized as being no plan at all but
merely a collection of projects, which had not been coordinated or related to any

-~~-----------
l(ALu, supra note II at 58
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KALU supra note II at 58
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51
overall economlC targets , and the selection of which did not involve the
•

populatIOn.

52

Before the introduction of the next Plan the colonial administration requested the
International Bank for Reconstruction and Development (as the World Bank was
: \.::

then known) to undertake a mission "to assess the resources available for future
development, to study the possibilities for development in the major sectors of the
economy and to make recommendations for practical steps to be taken, including
the timing and co-ordination of developmental activities.,,53 The mission made up
of ten full time members and five part time members spent about three months in
Nigeria and retired to the Bank's headquarters to write their report. 54 Even though

in this case, there was an attempt to understand and reflect the situation of Nigeria,
the mission's report and the resulting five-year Development and Welfare Plan,
55

1955-62 , still suffered from the same problem of inadequate Nigerian input. None

-'1

Anene Nnoli, K.O. Orji and Aforka C. Ibe, Development Planning in Nigeria, in AFORKA C. mE (ED),
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of the fifteen members of the mission was Nigerian. 56 The Plan has thus been
sitnilarly dismissed as not well articulated. 57

VI. POST INDEPENDENCE AND ECONOMY

With independence in 1960, the reins of governance and of the economic destiny

was bestowed on Nigerians, even though they inherited, from Britain, an economy
that has been described as primitive, agrarian and import-consumer dependent. 58

The contest for political leadership in Nigeria has been exceptionally fierce,
turbulent and even violent at times. This has affected the economy a lot. Indeed,
the country fought a civil war from 1966 to 1970, which war obviously impacted
the economy in adverse ways. The recurring decimal of loyalty to ethnicity, which

has, more than anything else, militated both against national cohesion and
economic development, reared its ugly head early in post independence Nigeria. In

~act, the World Bank Mission, which had visited Nigeria in 1953, had warned of

tb~ dangers that undue emphasis on regionalism could pose to development when
4e

The .Chief ?f MiSSlon
. was from the Netherlands. The other members were from AustralIa,
. France, Italy, Turkey,
.'U

wortcfatedank,Kingdom
and the United States. See The Economic Development of Nigeria, vii (A publication of the
1955/01/01)

fi,

supra note 40 at 64-66
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they said that "while agreeing that political decentralization is necessary in a
.. ,

country as heterogeneous as Nigeria, we caution that regionalization carried too
far, as for example by exaggerated emphasis on the particular good of anyone
region, may retard development of Nigeria as a whole."s9 A conspectus of the
Nigerian political economy would reveal that this fear has been borne out. And not
only that, it is arguable that the Nigerian enterprise, as an amalgam of diverse
peoples, is proving unworkable.

At independence the country adopted the Westminster model of democracy. The
Prime Minister60 was from the northern part of the country. The Governor
Genera16 t, who was essentially the British Queen's representative

62

,

was from the

East, While the leader of the opposition63 came from the west. Thus was enunciated
a pattern and an economy ever sensitive to, indeed driven by, ethnic tensions.
/,:

~()netheless, the first republic set about governing. It initiated the First National
!levelopment Plan,

1962-1968. Significantly, this development plan was

iattoduced without the necessary population data obtainable from a census. The
I

Economic Development of Nigeria 22 (A World Bank Publication, 1955/01101)

~bakar .Tafuwa Balewa, who was the leader of the Northern Peoples Congress, which had won the most
o seats m the legislature.
Azikiwe, the leader of the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons .
. situation changed in 1963 when the country became a republic and the Queen ceased to be its head.
Awolowo, leader of Action Group
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attempt to conduct a census in 1963 and the conduct of elections in 1964 are
regarded as the immediate precursors to the crisis of the 1960s. Since electoral
constituencies, and consequently allocation of federal resources, were to be based
on population, politicians were alleged to have manipulated the count in their areas
to maximize, some would say, inflate the official population figures in their areas.
Besides, in a polity characterized by predominant allegiance to tribe, and where
there was no political party with broad national following, every party and every
politician had the practical incentive to inflate the number of people in their
respective areas of influence.

The First National development Plan, 1962-1968, paid attention to industrialization
and enunciated an open door policy which enabled Nigeria to enter into
tnultilateral trade agreements with other countries. 64 It accorded priority to
agriculture, industry and technical training and has been described as the first effort
taorelate planning to national development goalS. 65 Even if the plan would have
Ushered in a viable economy, and whatever gains were made, it was distorted by
civil war, which raged from 1967 to1970. The ethnic tensions came to a head
a coup, the leaders of which were mainly from the Eastern and
supra note 40 at 89-90
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Midwestern parts of the country. Although the coup was aborted and it was
_

,.J',

revealed that the coupists intended to wipe out the leadership of the country, it
happened that the actual victims were mainly from the north. 66 This prompted a
counter coup, led by soldiers from the north, against eastern officers67 , and a
pogrom on the easterners who were in the north. In consequence, the easterners no
longer felt safe in Nigeria and decided to secede from the union. The central
authority declared war on the east in order to prevent the secession. The war lasted

;... ;.

until 1970 when the east surrendered.

The war's end was followed by the program of reconciliation, rehabilitation and
reconstruction, which was, embarked upon by the federal government, now under
the leadership of a military head of state68 from the middle part of the country,
known as the middle belt. The program aimed at reintegrating the east into
mainstream Nigeria and also rebuilding the infrastructure, which had been
destroyed by the war. There was introduced, another development plan, known as
the Second National development Plan, 1970-74. It was unique in the sense that it

-:~~

Prime Minister, Tafawa Balewa, a northerner, and the Premier of Northern Nigeria, Sir Ahmadu Bello, both

~·111 the coup.
M,~

61••.

. .. GeneraI Aguiyi. Ironsi, the Military Head of State, who had taken over the reins of government following the first
and Who haded from the east died in this coup.
Yakubu Gowon
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was prepared by Nigerian economists and planners and ninety per cent of the total
finance was expected to be generated internally.

VII. THE OIL BOOM AND THE CRISIS OF THE 1980S

The era 1970-1980 was the most prosperous for Nigeria. It was at the same time a
period in which Nigeria was at its most profligate. Prior to 1970, agriculture was
the leading sector of the Nigerian economy providing seventy per cent employment
of the population and accounting for eighty per cent of government revenue. 69
Nigeria was also a major exporter of agricultural commodities such as cocoa and
rubber.70 Then, the oil boom came. That boom has been attributed to the Arab
Israeli war in1973, following which Arab countries imposed an oil embargo.71
Demand for Nigerian oil, which had been discovered in 1956, rose dramatically
and the country was awash in oil money. Agricultural exports, as a percentage of

total exports, decreased from 73 per cent in 1962 to 1 per cent in 1981, with oil

'~OBADAN AND FRANK DINOWO, ESSAYS ON NIGERAN ECONOMY, 83 (Mindex Publishing Coy.,
~Nigeria, 2000);
!Iii:,

See also Emmanuel E. UmebaIi, Nigerian Economy: An Overview, in UMEBALI AND
,NIGERIAN ECONOMY: ISSUES AND TRENDS, 1 (Acafor Books, Enugu, Nigeria, 1992)
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AND DINOWO, supra note 69 at 83
supra note 11 at 64
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accounting for more than 93 per cent of exports between 1973 and 1981. 72 Oil also
accounted for 7S per cent of government revenue rising from 26.3 percent in

This development marked the onset of one malaise, and exacerbated an already
existing condition, in the Nigerian economy. These were respectively, what have
been termed the Dutch disease on the one hand and the rentier system or
clientelism on the other. It has been noted that "oil is often not the blessing it
appears to be: it provides great opportunities, but the very nature of the industry
also makes these almost impossible to grasp and induces growing structural strains.
A particular property of oil is that it casts a smokescreen over a country's real
problems. Symptoms such as foreign exchange problems and fiscal inadequacies
are temporarily concealed.,,74 In a clear manifestation of the Dutch disease 75, the

12 Herbst and Olukoshi,

supra note 15 at 458

,73 OBADAN AND DIMOWO,
.1~

supra note 69 at 83

S

~'etree N.I. Ikpeze, C.C. Soludo and N.N. Elekwa, supra note 41. (Quoting Seers, D. 1981. "The Life Cycle of a
oleum Economy and its Implications for Development," Research for Development, Vol. 1, No.1)
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t~h disease is an economic concept that tries to explain the seeming relationship between the exploitation of
~ reso~ces ~d a decline in the manufacturing sector. The theory is that an increase in revenues from natural
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government shifted attention from agriculture to mostly services. 76 Obadan and
I)in1Owo contend that the new found wealth brought with it fundamental changes
in the attitude of the government towards the economy.77 Spending became

ratnpant and was given additional impetus by the reconstruction program being
undertaken after the civil war. The era witnessed a proliferation of public sector
institutions and enterprises while private sector fmns depended largely on imported
... :'!

inputs. 78 The head State was quoted to have said that Nigeria's problem was not
money, but rather how to spend money.79 And the powers that were, devised all
kinds of ways to spend it, fortified in their Dutch courage that the oil wells were
not running dry anytime soon, and that the world's demand for oil would not abate.
The story is told of how government imported bags of cement, which had to stay at

76

See Nigerian Structural Adjustment Program, Policies, Implementation, and Impact, vii (World Bank Report No

130S3-UNI, May 13, 1994)
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changes were: (i) the economy became heavily dependent on crude oil and spawned all kinds of investment

in social, physical and economic infrastructure. There was no incentive to increase domestic revenue mobilization;

. ,:.'

(it) deficit budgets became the order of the day as state governments embarked on spending, with the federal
~overnment readily fmancing these; (iii) state and federal governments embarked on white elephant projects; (iv)
mvestment activities were largely urban based and emphasized social and economic infrastructure without adequate
incentives for private sector participation. This adversely affected the productive sectors such as agriculture; (v)
JI!Olif~tion of firms which largely depended on imported inputs; (vi) emergence of widespread imbalances and
_mons with the dependence on oil exposing the country to external shocks; (vii) competitiveness of agriculture
; : erode~ by over valued exchange rate! inadequate pricing policies, rural-urban migration and neglect arising
In th~ 011 boom syndrome; (viii) the structure of policy incentives and controls encouraged import oriented
~on and consumption pattern with little incentives for non oil exports; (iXO the public sector, assisted by the
l3enan Enterprise Promotion Decrees 1972 and 1977, became the prime mover of the economy through huge
:,estments in social, physical and economic infrastructure. See OBADAN AND DIMOWO, supra note 69 at 83'18

~ Aham Anyanwu, The Nigerian Economy Under the Structural Adjustment Programme, in EMMANUEL
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the port for more than one year before they could be unloaded. Meanwhile, the

. ".

... :0

government continued to pay demurrage. While waiting for the unloading, the

. i.:

cement turned into crystals and had to be thrown away.80 Within the same period,
the government launched the Third National development Plan, 1975-1980, with a
projected capital expenditure of 53.6 billion naira reflecting an increase of more
than 1600 per cent over the Second National Development Plan, which had
provided for a capital expenditure of3.2 billion naira.

Political Scientists teach that people go into politics in order to control the
machinery of government and influence its policies. In every society, such control
to some extent entails influencing the allocation and distribution of state resources.

In most advanced economies, individuals hardly seek political office for the reason
of making money. Indeed, public servants are reputed not to be paid as well as
those in comparable positions in the private sector. This is not so with the Nigerian
scenario. The colonial administrators could have been servants of Her Majesty in

Britain, but certainly were no servants of the people of Nigeria. They were, of
g':i

course, not elected by them and not answerable to them.

Thus, the legacy

(}(,

tIUeathed to Nigerian leaders was not one of service to the people but rather that

~'an image of leaders and government officials as maximum rulers and exploiters
note 20 at 148-149
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answerable to no one. The malady of corruption reared its head almost
irnlllediately independence was obtained. The plotters of the abortive coup in 1966
alluded to this cankerworm. They claimed that their action was aimed at the
eradication of "ten per centers".SI The oil boom aggravated the problem of
corruption and fed the rentier economy. A rentier economy has been described as
one "whose major source of revenue does not arise from taxation on productive

, ."'

activities - agriculture, industry, services - undertaken by its economically active
population. Instead, the rentier state lives by collecting a convenient income from
sources into which it invests little or nothing. Rent comes in without opportunity
costs, and if it comes in as centralized as in the case of oil, it is even more
convenient from the treasury's point of view."s2 The oil boom distorted the
incentive structure and destroyed the traditional link between industry and
government.S3 The state was pre-occupied with distributive politics rather than a
;

1

systematic program of wealth creation and hence, did not take seriously the issue
(

of providing an enabling environment for industrialization"s4 or other more

at Referring to the fraudulent practice whereby government officials demanded that a prospective awardee of a

government contract should pay them ten per cent of the contract price for their own personal use and enrichment.
82
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productive sector. Politics or access to power became the quickest way to get rich
:

and the contest for power has remained fierce and occasionally deadly. Even

:'

industrialists who could have driven the development of the private sector became
caught up in the pursuit of access to the oil rent. Nearly all businessmen were in
85

politics and nearly all politicians were in business. It was also during the decade
from 1971 to 1980 that Nigeria embarked upon the limited nationalization of some
foreign companies86 and the bureaucracy positioned itself to extract maximum
rents from the exercise. 87 The boom did not last long. By the 1980s the country had
been thrown into economic crisis from which it is still trying to rise.

•
•

•

In just under a decade, following the oil boom, the economy took a downturn. It is

•

said that the first shock in the Nigerian economy was witnessed around 1977 and

•

1978, during the first regime of Olusegun Obasanjo, but the government
ameliorated it by introducing austerity measures and these measures coupled with
the recovery of the world oil market ensured that Obasanjo handed a healthy
',l

economy to Shehu Shagari, who became the President of the country in 1979.88
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The civilian administration of Shagari became even more unrestrained, than the

militarY administration before it, in spending. That administration also marked the
adoption of the presidential system of government, which by its very nature is
more expensive. Dispensation of political patronage became the order of day. The
Fourth National Development Plan, 1981-1985, was expected to be funded from
revenue generated from the export of crude oil.89 In 1981, there came a glut in the
world oil market, which significantly reduced the country's earnings from oil. As a
result, the government had to borrow money from private sources to finance the
development plan. 9O Instead of the shortfall occasioning a reduction in spending,
the government paid no heed. Besides, elections were to be conducted in 1983, and
the ruling party was prepared to share the oil rent in whatever manner that would
ensure its return for a second term. Even then, signs of the recession were evident,
as there was a scarcity of essential commodities. The government had difficulty
raising enough money for basic government needs. 91 But the administration
attributed the problem to hoarding, "world wide" recession and the collapse in the
international oil market. 92 Successive administrations have since been struggling to
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the problem. The response of the Shagari administration was to pass the
'~:OIlUIUAJ'

Stabilization (Temporary Provisions) Act 1982. The Act introduced

_..... _._"', measures by aiming to reduce public expenditures and curtailing imports.
Act remained a statement of intention only. Governmental actions did not
Actual

expenditures

continued

to

exceed

projected

expenditures. 93 The international fmancial market became dubious about Nigeria's
credibility. 94 Its negotiation with International Monetary Fund (IMP) was
.,

stalemated because Nigeria refused some of the conditionalities imposed by the
IMF. 95 A combination of the worsening economic condition and the farce that was

•

,,
•

96

the 1983 election

gave the restive military the pretext, if it needed one, to

intervene once more in the political process. A few months after winning, some

•
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would say stealing, its second term, the Shagari government was overthrown by a

"

military junta led by Muhammed Buhari.

Buhari's regime continued the austerity measures imposed by its predecessors, but
made little headway with the international agencies. It also rejected the IMP
t"

Conditionalities. However, it tried to combat the cankerworm of corruption, by

it·Herbst and Olukoshi, supra note 15 at 462
l1lbid at 463

election was characterized by allegations of massive rigging and other voting fraud.
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launching a social program which it dubbed "War Against Indiscipline" or "WAr',
for short. The Buhari administration lasted only twenty months, and so it is
difficult to assess the extent to which its social crusade succeeded, but it is
generally agreed that for the short time, it was the only real attack on clientelism in
"
,

'.'

Nigeria. Notwithstanding that, the economic conditions did not improve much.
This and the excessively autocratic nature of the government generated a lot of

•

dismay amongst the populace. In August 1985, another group of military officers,
led by Ibrahim Babangida, cashed in on the disenchantment and wrested power

-

from the Buhari government.

VIII The Babangida Administration: A Readmission into the International
Economic Fold

Those who contend that the oil boom was a curse mostly point to the phenomenon
of the Dutch disease to which we have already alluded. Another downside of that

~!a is that its collapse led to the exclusion of Nigeria from the international

::UCial fold. Shagari's government sought a facility from the IMF but did not get
because of its rejection of the conditionalities attached. Buhari's government
tried to get a much-needed fmancial shot in the arm from the multilateral
35

agencies to no avail. Nigeria practically became a pariah in international financial
circles.

It would seem that the Babangida administration, from the out set, was determined
;

!

to

reinstate Nigeria into the friendly, or unfriendly, international fmancial

community, led by the IMF and the World Bank. The sticking points in prior
administrations' efforts to get assistance from the IMF and other financial
institutions had been the conditions, which the IMF imposed on such assistance.
Most of these conditions were not palatable to a generality of the people, informed
or uninformed. Ironically, although Babangida's government came to power by
force of arms, it wanted to differentiate itself from its immediate predecessor,
which had been seen as insensitive and overly dictatorial, even for a military
administration. Where it was thought that the Buhari government did not consult
or listen to the people, Babangida wanted to have a semblance of consultation. And
so it happened that the vexed economic issue, of whether or not to take the IMF
loan with its conditionalities, was thrown open, for debate, to the people of Nigeria
to be coordinated by a committee set up by the government. 97 Three options were

said to face the nation: (i) continue with the austerity measures which had not had

--

"a:--------erbst and Olukoshi, supra note 15 at 472
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much impact; (ii) adopt a structural adjustment program and take an IMF loan; or
. " .:

(iii) adopt a Nigerian variant of structural adjustment program, whatever that

means. A field day ensued and opinions were expressed from all nooks and comers
of the country, again some informed and some uninformed, but it was not difficult
to fathom that the preponderance of the opinions was that of rejection of the IMP
loan. The committee accordingly recommended a rejection of the IMF loan. The
government interpreted the rejection of the IMP loan as an acceptance of option iii
(the adoption of a local variant of structural adjustment). It did not seem to matter
that the so called local variant entailed almost all the conditionalities associated
with the IMP loan. Nigerians had spoken and the government pretended to be
listening. It also did not matter that the IMF and the other multilateral agencies
were now impressed and therefore willing to work with the government. In 1986
the government formally announced the adoption of a comprehensive structural
adjustment program (SAP) in cooperation with the World Bank and with IMP
clearance

98

,

thus removing any illusions about the real ownership of the program.

But by then the nation had been sufficiently mollified by the perceived populism of

'its government or was no longer interested in the complexities. Babangida also
_·"a.lL~;;U

a new method of development planning, called the rolling plan. Each plan

and Olukoshi, Ibid at 476
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was for a two-year period but was reviewed at the end of each year and then

11

extended or rolled over for another two years.

The main strategy of SAP included: the adoption of realistic exchange rate policy
coupled with liberalization of the external trade and payment system; the adoption
t

of appropriate pricing policies in all sectors with greater reliance on market forces
. ,,' . ~ . i

,

l.

and reduction in complex administration controls; and further rationalization and

<

restructuring of public expenditure and custom tariffs.99 One of the specific

C

objectives of SAP was to lessen the dominance of productive investments in the
public sector, improve the sector's efficiency and intensify the growth potential of

C

--

....
C

"",

the private sector. toO It was in furtherance of this objective that the government
embarked on privatization and commercialization of public enterprises 101 , which is
"

the theme of this work. Subsequent administrations have continued with the
privatization program originally begun by the Babangida administration. Thus, the
.}~

~)

-.,

H,~ Anyanwu, supra note 78 at 6
tf»

~ ~ers include: (i) restructure and diversify the productive base of the economy in order to reduce dependence on

~il sector and on imports; (ii) achieve fiscal and balance of payment viability over the period; and (iii) lay the

for a sustainable non inflationary or minimum inflationary growth. See Anyanwu, supra note 78 at 6 (quoting

ecntral Bank: of Nigeria Annual report and Statement of Accounts (December 1986 P.lO))

The Buhari administration had rejected the idea of fundamentally changing the pattern of ownership of
parastatals and public enterprises even though it was prepared to reduce grants to them. See Herbst and
supra note 15 at 469
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privatization program is an offshoot of the SAP and in essence is a reversal of part

of the profligacy of the oil boom era.

.;; 1

IX. THE CURRENT SITUATION

The Babangida administration stepped aside in 1993 and was replaced by a shortlived interim administration,102 which itself was replaced by another military
administration headed by Sani Abacha, who later died in office and was replaced

by yet another military general, Abdulsalam Abubakar, who organized elections in

,
(

•

•
•

..•

1999 and handed over to Olusegun Obasanjo who had earlier retired from the

•

military. These administrations essentially continued with the reform efforts boldly

•

initiated by the Babangida administration and indeed intensified the privatization
component of the reform efforts. A notable development during these post
Babangida administrations, is the upsurge in the agitation for resource allocation.

The crude oil, which Nigeria exports, comes mainly from the Niger Delta part of
the country. However, the resource is appropriated by the Federal government,

.Which under a formula that has varied over time allocates part of the proceeds to

,the states. The people of the Niger Delta began to feel deprived and to view the
by ChiefEmest Shonekan who had been appointed by the Babangida government
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allocation to them as insufficient since they consider their part of the country as the
goose that lays the golden egg. The issue was recently addressed by the highest
court in the country, the Supreme Court of Nigeria.

lo3

Yet, the agitation shows no

sign of abating and has at times turned violent and deadly.

CONCLUSION

Nigeria's political and economic history has been one of struggle, internal strife

and crisis. It was welded together by the colonial over lords and has managed to

c
..c

-........
C

remain together happily or unhappily. For the most part, the economy has been
dominated by the state, principally because of the existence of a precious natural
resource: oil. Political authority has guaranteed access to the enonttous rent from
this resource. Such rent has not always been used frugally but instead has often
been pillaged for personal and sometimes sectional interests, which have not
always augured well for the betterment of the country as a whole. Such
mismanagement resulted in a serious economic crisis, which has lasted more than a

<l~er of a century. Various governments have approached the problem in
ways. Finally, international financial assistance was sought and with it the
s"'2ttorney General Federation v Attorney General Abia State & 0 thers, S.C. 28/2001, judgment delivered
, 002
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itnposition of several conditions. In line with the neo-liberal economic tendencies
of the international

financial

institutions, these

conditions require the

disengagement of the state from active participation in the economy except to set
.•

regulations and perform other functions that are inherently governmental in nature.

,j

Nigeria is trying to implement the reforms, one of which is the pursuit of

..

privatization of state owned enterprises.

.

c:
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CHAPTER 2
NATURE OF STATE PARTICIPATION IN THE ECONOMY

INTRODUCTION

Having reviewed the political and economIC history of Nigeria, as a
background and context to the need for privatization of state owned
enterprises, it is pertinent to explore the ideological tensions surrounding
government involvement in the economy. The age-old controversy has been
between advocates of robust state control of the economy, represented by the
socialist school of thought, and the liberal school, which champions
capitalism as the appropriate economic model. In between these is via
medium of mixed economy. The following discussion attempts to analyze
Nigeria's experience and to examine the conventional wisdom that Nigeria
operates a mixed economy.

One manifestation of Third World states'

involvement in the economy is the prevalence of government owned
enterprises. The discussion will then segue into a consideration of the origins
of state or public enterprises in Nigeria and the rationales or objectives for
them.
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I. eAPITALISM

The earliest and still extant most popular economic model is capitalism. I It
may also be known as the liberal economic model. It is a system in which
the means of production are mostly privately owned. By privately owned is
meant that the means of production are not owned by the government or the

,I,

community at large. Thus, this admits of corporate and other forms of
business alignments.

Capitalism is perhaps the most dominant economic model. It is at once the
foremost and the most enduring model. In essence, it relegates the function
of the state to provision of security and other duties that are inherently
governmental. To Adam Smith, the father of capitalism and free market, the
role of the state should be minimal, first because the unrestrained pursuit of
individual interests will yield the greatest good to society, and second,
because the state is an instrument of organized self-serving groupS. 2 In a
sense, capitalism preaches individual liberty believing that the healthy

rivalry among individuals would augur well for the society. The so-called
I

See generally on capitalism, and on this subsection,
10,2007)

(visited April

2

See JOHN F. E. OHIORHENUAN, CAPITAL AND THE STATE IN NIGERIA, xvii (Greenwood Press,
WestponCT, 1989) citing SMITH 17761910 THE WEALTH OF NATIONS, London: J.M. Dent)
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theory of the "invisible hand", propounded by Adam Smith, posits that
society is served by the tension among individuals and that the market is the
most efficient and fairest arbitrator of resources. According to Adam Smith:
Every individual endeavours to employ his capital so that its produce
may be of greatest value. He generally neither intends to promote the
public interest, nor knows how much he is promoting it. He intends
only his own security, only his own gain. And he is in this led by an
invisible 'hand' to promote an end which was no part of his
intention. By pursuing his own interest he frequently promotes that
of the society more effectually than when he really intends to
promote it. 3
Such individuals should have unrestrained liberty to participate in the
economy according to their abilities. Adherents of the free market economy
attribute much of the global economic progress of the 19th century and the
post World War II to the liberal trade system. 4 Proponents argue that one of
the greatest strengths of capitalism is its ability to self coordinate the
complex system of wants and to assign appropriate values to goods without
the intervention of outside forces. Transactions between buyers and sellers
result in a price system and the price of any commodity is a measure of its
value. Furthermore, the profit motive encourages hard work and
entrepreneurship. There is also the attempt to link capitalism to democracy.
3

ADAM SMITH, THE WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776) (Quoted in TONY CLEAVER,
UNDERSTANDING WORLD ECONOMY 13 (Routledge, London, UK, 2002)
4

n.~. N. GAMBO, in M.E. AKOR (ED), READINGS IN CONTEMPORARY ECONOMIC ISSUES, 38

VVlono Expressions, Jos, 1995)
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It is believed that a country cannot really be democratic if it is not practicing
the economic model of capitalism. How can individuals be truly free if they
are not the ultimate arbiters of their best economic interests? Most
democratic states are capitalist, but there have also been capitalist states that
were not fully democratic, and the existence of the latter group would seem
to call into question the claimed capitalism - democracy linkage.

'J,

Capitalism as an economic model is sometimes equated with liberal

(

economic theories. Yet, there are several variants of liberal economics and
various advocates or proponents of such model. The common thread that
runs through all of them is the primacy of the individual in the economy,

with the state playing only a regulatory role, for "all forms of economic
liberalism are inextricably committed to the market and price mechanism as
the most efficient means of organising domestic and international economic
relations. ,,5 As already mentioned, Adam Smith was the founding father of
the capitalism doctrine. He propounded the theory in the course of his
critique of mercantilism, the model then prevailing in Britain and Europe.
The concept entailed a strong state, which sought to maximize its trading

and economic interests especially against other states.

He advocated the

~----------------Gambo, supra note 4 at 39
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centrality of individual liberty in the economy and accepted the laissez faire approach, which allowed the individual unfettered participation in the
economy.

David Ricardo took the principle of capitalism a step further. He argued that
it is profitable for two parties to trade even if one of the parties is more

1,

efficient than the other in every type of economic production. This was the
origin of the concept of comparative advantage. Thus society is better served
where that state devotes its efforts towards the production of the particular
goods in which it is most efficient.6

...-.

.-

III

The gulf between absolute doctrines and reality has always posed an
impediment in the evaluation of political and economic doctrines. In its
purest form, capitalism does not brook state interference. But, in reality an
economy can hardly be left wholly to the invisible hand of the market. There
is only so much that the market can organize. This apparent limitation was
underscored by the great depression of the

1930s. The massive

unemployment of that period called into question the plaudits, which
proponents had heaped on capitalism and threatened to undercut the theory.

6-------See note 1
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John Maynard Keynes thus tried to ameliorate the absoluteness of capitalism
by advocating that it was consistent with capitalism for the state to intervene
in the economy especially to create jobs. 7 To him, state intervention was not
only inevitable but also desirable for capitalism to triumph and operate
efficientll. In other words, it is the duty of the state and it is consistent with
capitalism for the state to "pump prime" or jump-start the economy to avoid
recession. The state can do this by cutting taxes and increasing governmental
borrowing and spending during an economic downturn. His variant of

'C:

,,\\&111
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capitalism is referred to as "welfare capitalism". It would seem that Keynes'
.u.::>:.x~"" ~~~;jitfBi41

version of capitalism is not easily distinguishable from the so-called "mixed
economy" paradigm.

On the heels of the Keynesian theory of capitalism is the neoclassical school
of economic thought or the Chicago school represented by Milton
Friedman. 9 This school is distinguished by its adherence to the purest form
of capitalism. Proponents argued that market economies are inherently stable
if left to themselves and that depressions result only from governmental
intervention. In contradistinction to Keynes, who would have the

------------------ibid
7

8
9

Gambo, supra note 4 p. 41
See note I
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government intervene in order that capitalism might function efficiently,
Friedman and his supporters argued that the great depression resulted, not
from the absence of governmental interference, but in fact because of the
intervention of the Federal Reserve in the United States.

Although dominant, capitalism has not been without criticism. Some argue
that capitalism and free market are not synonymous and that they are in fact
contradictory. The fulcrum of capitalism is that one individual, freely and
voluntarily, trades with another. However, the distortions inherent in a
capitalist economy effectively fall on one party. Anarchists are at the
forefront of this criticism and are irked by the protection, which the very
state that capitalism would rather exclude, afforded to individuals who own
property. Because those who do not own property or goods have no other
recourse, they are forced to enter into transactions with those who own.
Thus, some argue that the decision to do so is not really free but rather
forced. Similarly, critics rebut the perceived benefit, of incentive to work
hard, by noting that the protection of property rights, which forces those who
do not have such rights to buy the use of the property, discourages
productive activities, since the property owners are led to rent seeking. In
other words, they rely on the rents they receive, and this is a disincentive to

48

engage

In

productive activities. And this would not be ideal for any

economy. Furthermore, capitalism is criticized on the basis that it sometimes
leads to market failures. The optimal situation is one in which there is
perfect competition. This capitalist utopia is not easy to attain, and
frequently markets fail or become distorted resulting in monopolies,
oligopolies and other anti competitive structures. The consequence is that

:t,

resources are not efficiently allocated.

The more prevalent critique of capitalism is that it engenders exploitation.
This criticism emanates mostly from the left. Capitalism is founded on
entrepreneurship, which relies mostly on labor to prosper. Thus, capitalists
are accused of exploiting labor and not paying proper wages. However,
proponents argue that employers and employees usually agree on the wages
to be paid and that both parties freely enter into the transaction. But the
others counter that because of the differing bargaining powers, the so-called
"consent of the employees" is a farce. It is also argued that the excessive
individualism inherent in capitalism is not fair because individuals are not
equally endowed. Some may be privileged either by birth, inheritance or
even natural talents. Yet they have to compete with the less advantaged
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ones. In most cases the privileged do better and the disadvantaged are
usually worse off. This leads to social ills such as crimes.

II. SOCIALISM

Socialism is an economic, philosophical as well as political model. lO As an
economic model, it advocates that the means of production and distribution
be controlled by the people as a whole, represented by the state or the

community. Socialism's center of gravity is the community. It views the
individual as antithetic of the community, and the pursuit of individual
interests as necessarily inconsistent with the common good. According to Le
Bon:
Socialism is certainly a reaction of the collectivity against the
individual: a return to the past. Individualism and collectivism are, in
their general essentials two opposing forces, which tend, if not to
annihilate, at least to paralyse one another. In this struggle between
the generally conflicting interests of the individual and those of the
aggregate lies the true philosophic problem of socialism. The
individual who is sufficiently strong to count only on his own
intelligence and initiative, and is therefore highly capable of making
headway, finds himself face to face with the masses, feeble in
initiative and intelligence, but to whom their number gives might,
the only upholder of right. The interests of the two opposing parties
are conflicting. 11

10'----------------See generally on socialism, and on this part,

(Visited April 10,

GUSTAVE LEBON, THE PSYCHOLOGY OF SOCIALISM,13-14 (Kitchener, Ontario, Canada, 2001)
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Hence, whilst capitalists view competition among individuals as healthy,
socialists see competition as unhealthy. Socialism is deeply suspicious of
unbounded individual participation in the economy. It proceeds from the
notion that economic resources are fmite and the unrestrained acquisition by
one individual implies the corresponding diminution of the resources
1,

available to others. Thus, to ensure equity and equality, the state or the
community has to arbitrate the allocation of these scarce resources according
to individual needs. In another sense, socialism acknowledges the inherent
disparity in abilities, intelligence and other natural endowments, and is an
attempt to repair this imbalance. Its distinguishing feature is that it would
assign to the state the fundamental obligation of effecting such repair. The
state is thus to redress the imbalance of destiny by redistributing wealth. 12
And it can confiscate resources before redistributing them. 13

Socialism was initially developed in the context of a critique of capitalism.
Although the term was first applied to the idea in the late 1920s, the origin
of socialism is generally traced to the French Revolution of 1789.
According to Muravchik:
12

LE BON supra note 11 at 28

13

LE BON supra note 11 at 28
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The manger in which socialism was born was the French Revolution,
with its emphasis on equality, its profound anticlericalism and its
promise that all things could be made anew. Amidst the chiliastic
confusion of serial upheavals, one impassioned visionary,
'Gracchus' Babeuf, proposed that the way to give substance to the
slogan 'liberty, equality, fraternity' was to collectivize all
,,14
property .
Following the Revolution, certain thinkers, notably Babeuf, began to
espouse the idea of a common ownership of the means of production. It is
pertinent to note that from the beginning, socialism and its advocates were
viewed with skepticism and were in fact persecuted. Maybe it was not
persecution, as opponents would note that the means which some of the
early advocates adopted were mainly disruptive and in certain cases
~~

downright criminal. For instance Babeuf and his group were accused of what

«
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was termed Conspiracy of the Equals, an enterprise, which was alleged to
have included the plan to use violence to achieve their objective of
communal ownership.

Robert Owen and his disciples are credited with commg the term
"socialism". And they also practically experimented the idea by establishing
communal living in the nature of what were termed Villages of Unity and
Cooperation. These did not prove particularly successful. Then, the famous
14~----------------

lOS HUA MURAVCIDK, HEAVEN ON EARTH: THE RISE AND FALL OF SOCIALISM, 10
nCOuuter Books, San Francisco, 2003)
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duo of Karl Marx and Friedrich Engels stepped in to provide the idea with

an intellectual backing and to canvass it

as a crusade. Indeed, modem

socialism has almost become synonymous with Marxism. They championed
a brand of socialism that they regarded as scientific socialism. To Marx: and
Engels, private property was theft. The class struggle was acute. Capital
accumulation was destroying the middle class and enriching the wealthy;
thus continuing to impoverish the poor. Marx: and Engels predicted that this
dynamic of capitalism would ultimately result in two stark classes: the very
rich and paupers. In the end, this tension or class struggle would lead to a
social revolution in which the proletariat would rise against the wealthy.

II

II

Such revolution would illustrate the contradiction inherent in capitalism, and

III

111

II

would also correct the social distortion.

15

They considered this prognosis

both scientific and historical.

Several commentators note that many years after the passing of the most
popular ideologues of socialism, their prediction of the implosion of
capitalism has yet to materialize, and several more commentators have spent
more time modifying or rather reinterpreting the prediction. On the contrary,

15

Ml1RAvcHIK supra note 14 at 70 and 95
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countries, which have experimented with socialism, have had to abandon the
idea in favor of a more liberal economic model.

Just like capitalism, there are variants of socialism. At its extreme are
anarchists who view both capitalism and the state as inseparable and as
equally to be despised. While Marx and Engels predicted that revolution was

t.

inevitable, Eduard Bernstein seemed to deny such inevitability but rather
noted that moderate socialism evidenced by "the growth of trade unions and
democracy had vitiated the raw powers of capitalists and had ameliorated

t~":~
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capitalism." 16
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Nonetheless, in the 20 Century, several countries operated systems that
were described as socialist. These ranged from China, the Soviet Union to
many countries of Eastern Europe and some Third World countries. It seems
to be a universal verdict though that these countries have not faired well
economically, and towards the end of the 20th Century they began to take
steps to abandon the system of central or state command of the economy in
favor of a market driven one. The most pronounced departure was of course

16

MDRAVCHIK supra not~ 14 at 107
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in the Soviet Union, which had been the poster child of 20th Century
socialism.

The concept of socialism has been subjected to several criticisms. The most
important critique is that collectivism inherent in socialism serves as a
disincentive to hard work. John Stuart Mills asserts that:
It is the common error of Socialists to overlook the natural indolence

of mankind; their tendency to be passive, to be the slaves of habit, to
persist indefinitely in a course once chosen. Let them once attain any
state of existence which they consider tolerable, and the danger to be
apprehended is that they will thenceforth stagnate; will not exert
themselves to improve, and by letting their faculties rust, will lose
even the energy required to preserve them from deterioration.
Competition may not be the best conceivable stimulus, but it is at
present a necessary one, and no one can foresee the time when it will
not be indispensable to progress. I7
Where one is guaranteed the provision of the necessities of life and is not at
liberty to seek other luxuries, his incentive to work is most likely to be
reduced. Socialists, however, argue that the propensity to laxity is checked
by peer pressure. But critics note that even though peer pressure may work
in a setting of a small group where the members know one another, its
effectiveness is doubtful in a group such as country.

17

JOHN STUART MILL, THE PRINCIPLES OF POLITICAL ECONOMY (Book IV, Chapter 7, 1848)

55

Similar to the criticism of disincentive to work is the argument that
competition, which is the catalyst for development, is stifled or non-existent
in a socialist society. This leads to stagnation of the economy. It is also
contended that socialism is usually coupled with fixed prices. This distorts
the standard for measuring the value of goods and services and transmits
misleading information. Capitalists see price as a reflection of the value and
relative scarcity of any commodity. Thus, the price of any item is an indirect
communication to the market as to the relative scarcity of such item and
participants in the market guide themselves accordingly_ But in a socialist

jf~:~
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system, the price might not bear any relation to the relative scarcity or value
1IVi.'iit'lil.
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of a commodity. This may lead to chaos and distortion.
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Socialism is further pilloried on the ground that it breeds dictatorship and
human rights abuses. Essentially, the state runs all aspects of individuals'
lives. The state might forcibly confiscate the resources hitherto belonging to
indiViduals and then micromanage their daily activities. This results in
absolute dictatorship.I8 It is also argued that the historical experience of
socialism does not really recommend the system because the few countries

that have tried the economic model have had to abandon it.

------------------~ee. FRIEDRICH HAYEK, THE ROAD TO SERFDOM, (Routledge, 2001) (arguing that the road to
18

SOciabsm leads society to totalitarianism)
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HI. MIXED ECONOMY

The liberal, or capitalist, and the command, or socialist, divide represents
two opposites, which in reality seldom exist. The tendency has been to
characterize an economy as capitalist or as liberal if it manifests more of the
core principles associated with that economic model, and to characterize it
as socialist if it has more of the attributes of the latter model. Otherwise,
what is more common is that a system would contain features of both
economic models. Mixed economy is the concept that is ascribed to that
system which cannot easily be pigeonholed into capitalist or socialist mold.
Consequently, mixed economy is a form of default classification. No
wonder, it lacks both the philosophical and ideological underpinnings and
finesse of either capitalism or socialism. In the same vein, it is shorn of the
passionate advocacy and advocates that have ensured the intellectual
vibrancy and following associated with both capitalism and socialism. Yet,
for all intents and purposes, mixed economy is not only more realistic than

the other two models but also more sensible. An absolute divorce of the state
from the economy is neither possible nor desirable and a complete control

by the state of the means of production is not only unworkable but also
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inimical to the wholesomeness of the polity. Both the state and the
individual have roles to play.

An economy is generally described as mixed if it admits of both individual
enterprise and government intervention in limited respects. Sometimes, too,
government enterprises coexist and compete with private enterprises.

N. NIGERIA: WHAT ECONOMIC MODEL?
t"":'
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It appears to be an accepted notion that pre-independent Nigeria's economy
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was mercantilist. Perhaps, a better way to put it is that Britain's economic
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attitude towards its colonies, including Nigeria, was mercantilist.
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This is

not surprising. The motive for the colonization was exploitation and
consequently Britain could adopt only the mercantilist model in the colonies,
even though its own Adam Smith had criticized that economic model as far
back as 1776. Nigeria was a colony conquered and dominated to provide

both a source of raw materials and a market for British and European goods.

19---------
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AMIHE KALD, ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT AND NIGERIA'S FOREIGN POLICY, 36
Mellon Press, Ltd., New York, 2000) (noting that mercantilism (or state managed capitalism) rather
free markets characterized British overseas expansionism before the outbreak of the war)
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The controversy is how to characterize the economic framework of postcolonial Nigeria. A cursory examination would reveal that the economy has
manifested attributes of capitalism as well as some features of socialism and
can justifiably be described as a mixed economy. Although the country
became independent and obtained self rule, economic independence is a
different matter. Many believe that colonialism was simply replaced by

t.

neocolonialism especially in the economic field. Tyokase argues that:
The giant strides of capitalism in Nigeria have been possible because
of the class character of the leadership. The national leadership, a
child of colonialism and bourgeois in character did not seek to make
a break with the exploitative nature of the political economy; instead
driven by the zeal to reap from the spoils of the struggle for
independence, they had no interest in abandoning an economic
system which guaranteed their economic priviledges [sic].20
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According to Tyokase, these privileged classes have increased their power
by the use of funds to build private financial empires and by joining foreign
firms and multinational corporations as junior partners? I No doubt, postcolonial Nigeria has exhibited attributes of capitalism. Besides the fact that it
20

C.T. Tyokase, The Political Economy of Feudalism, Capitalism and Socialism, in S.A. ADESINA, S.S.
OGBONNA, R.A ADETORO AND C.T TYOKASE (ED), REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL
:CONOMY OF NIGERIA, 20 (Goad Educational Publishers, Abeokuta, Nigeria, 1999); See also AKIN
ADAHUNSI, TECHNOLOGY AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROCESS: PROBLEMS AND
PR.OSPECTS IN NIGERIA, 9 (Ahmadu Bello University Press, Ltd, 1992) (asserting that "Experience
over the past three decades would thus suggest that for all practical purpose the major capitalist institutions
.. the World bank, the IMF and their powerful parent bodies like the OECD, and EEC have in the main
SI1Clce~ded in keeping the developing countries within the capitalist system - albeit as dependent neoCO oruaI states."
TyOkase, supra note 20 at 20-21
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was a legacy bequeathed by the colonialists, such predisposition has been
strengthened by the paternalistic assistance from the West and the
multilateral agencies over which the West maintains enormous control. To
quote Fadahunsi, "in almost all countries of the Third World that have to
deal with the World Bank and the IMF the deference with which officials
from these institutions are held is such that they very often dictate policy
,.,

options - especially to technocrats in the Ministries of Finance (Treasury)

~.

and the Central BankS.,,22 Cynics note that sometimes the neocolonial
control assumes a life and death dimension. 23 Such control over Third World
economic direction was an integral part of the Cold War, as the pre-colonial
. . . .';'ll<

scramble for partition of Africa was replaced by the post colonial struggle

<:
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between the West and the Soviet Union to steer the newly independent
countries towards capitalism or socialism, respectively. In most cases the

22

FADAHUNSI supra note 20 at 9

23

See for example Uzodinma Nwala, The Poverty of Ideology in Nigerian Development, in OKWUDIBA
NNOLI (ED), PATH TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT, 151, 161 (Codesria, Dakar, Senegal, 1981)
(citing a 1961 statement attributed to the then Minister of Economic Development, Mallam Waziri Ibrahim,
as fOllows : "Certain measures have been taken to introduce a socialist philosophy of economic planning in
Certain neighbouring countries and this has resulted in the imperialists sabotaging the country. Imperialists
have got various means of defending their monopoly. They have got their newspapers and television, and
they go to any extent to tell lies. They can say or write any amount of untruths to discredit us. If we want
really to set about improving our economy in any particular ways, they may say we are communists. They
~ make our countrymen to suspect our moves. If they do not succeed by false propaganda, by calling us
I sorts of names, if they fail to make us unpopular in order to win their case, they can arrange
::SSinat!on. They can do it by poison or by setting our own people against us. They can go to any extent
C out diSCrimination.") The writer also noted that the same Minister went on to assert that the charismatic
ongolese leader Patrice Lumumba was killed because he was a real nationalist who wanted use the
resources of the Congo for the welfare of the Congolese people as a whole.
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West offered to help Third World countries in formulating their
development plans all in an effort to prevent them from going socialist.

Indeed, in 1979 by a constitution of that year, the country chose a mixed
economy model. The drafters of that constitution considered the various
economic models but chose the mixed economy model because of several
.-

factors.

24

Principally, they thought that the mixed economy model was more

consistent with the traditional ways of the Nigerian people. Besides, they felt
it was more universal and more flexible and would better accommodate the
state of the Nigerian nation. It would, however, seem that advocates of a
more leftist or socialist tilt to the Nigerian economy reject the mixed
economy model and see such description of the Nigerian economy as no
more than a mask for what they consider unabashed capitalist mode of
The reasons which the Constitution Drafting Committee gave for preferring a mixed economy were as
follows: (i) traditionally Nigeria's ideology is and has always been a mixed economy; (2) Mixed economy
would give a high degree of operational flexibility; (3) in point of fact the traditional Nigerian economy is
'socialist' in certain areas while permitting individual incentive and private ownership in other areas; (4) a
sharp distinction must be established between the ultimate goals of the state and the stages through which
!he sate must pass in order to effectively attain those goals; (5) the pragmatic and feasible goal of the state
IS ~~ ~ek to enhance individual welfare by providing jobs and better education, housing and health
facilities thus raising the standard ofliving; (6)that goal is more readily attainable under a system of private
inv,estlnent and individual entrepreneurship and this cannot be pursued simultaneously with extreme forms
of ~co.me equalization; (7) Socialism is foreign to Nigeria and relies on paid bureaucrats of the state while
~ltahsm depends on private entrepreneurs; Nigeria did not have the required technically trained
. UI'eau~ts; (8) the record of socialislD in agriculture and housing is not as good as its record in heavy
, ~es and not as good as that of capitalist West; (9) mixed economy is best because public sector plays
~~ading role in setting prices and in mitigating the harsher effects of private competition. See Inyang
g, Myths and Fallacies in Nigerian Development. in OKWUDIDA NNOLI (ED), PATII TO
- .....~l'I DEVELOPMENT, 49, 51-52 (Codesria, Dakar, Senegal, 1981) (citing Report of the
Drafting Committee containing the Draft Vol. 1, Section 3.7-2, p. xiii (Lagos: Federal
ofInformation, 1976)
24
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production.

25

Reacting to the argument that mixed economy accords with

the traditions of the peoples of Nigeria, Eteng argues that in no sense did the
subsistence economies that existed before the advent of the colonialists
exhibit characteristics of the consumptionist capitalist prototype now
prevailing in Nigeria.

26

He further contended that to designate Nigerian pre-

colonial economies as "capitalist" simply because there existed some kind of
exchange in some kind of market based on some kind of medium of
exchange is, therefore, to portray gross and inexcusable ignorance of the
nature of the capitalist system. 27 He further observed that "scientific
socialism and capitalism are mutually exclusive categories; their synthesis
into either a mixed economy or a neo welfarism is, therefore, a historical
impossibility.28 He and his colleagues would rather view the Nigerian
economy through the prism of classic Marxist class analysis.

Thus, to

25

See Uzodinma Nwala, The Poverty ofIdeology in Nigerian Development, in OKWUDIBA NNOLI (ED),
PATH TO NIGERIA DEVELOPMENT, supra note 23, at 151 and 163 (stating that "the objective realities
clearly show that 'mixed economy' is another name for capitalism.") See also T. Uzodinma Nwala,
Ideological Dependency and the Problem of Autonomy in Nigeria, Paper read during the Workshop on
Dependency and Underdevelopment in West Africa, organized by the Institute of African Studies,
University of Nigeria, Nsukka, April 1978 and (cited in Uzodinma Nwala, The Poverty of Ideology in
Nigeria Development, 163) (asserting that "the state or public sector which is regarded by the mixed
economy theoreticians as the socialist sector is in fact established to promote private accumulation of the
capitalist class. It is not run on socialist principles. Thus the so-called 'state enterprises' and institutions
such as the railway, the telecommunication, the airways, mining, civil service, the army, the police, the
public Works, etc., do not serve the interest of labour but rather serve the interest of capital. Furthermore,
they are operated mainly by private contractors and managed by members and clients of the bourgeois
class.")
26

Eteng, supra note 24 at 57
27

Eteng Supra note 24 at 58
28

Eteng supra note 24 at 64
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Onitnode, "in Nigeria's recent history, three dominant classes have waged
dialectical struggles that were often overt and visible, and sometimes latent
and imperceptible. These are the imperialist bourgeoisie centered around the
British in Nigeria, the Nigerian petty bourgeoisie which emerged as a ruling
group after 1960, and the toiling class of workers, peasants, petty artisans,
petty- market women and others.,,29 The colonial period witnessed the
struggle between the imperialist bourgeoisie on the one hand, and the latter
two classes jointly on the other hand. Post-colonial Nigeria has been marked

by a two-cornered struggle, one between the former imperialists and the
Nigerian bourgeoisie, and another struggle between the Nigerian bourgeoisie
and the masses. The Nigerian bourgeoisie would always seek the help of
either the imperialists or the masses as its particular interests and the
particular struggle might require.

Although, the class contradictions and struggles are present in Nigeria, it is
doubtful if a socialist economy is the panacea. First, the history of that

29

P Bade Onimode, Class struggle as a reality of Nigerian Development, in OKWUDIBA NNOLI (ED),
~~ TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT, 166, 188 (Cordesria, Dakar, Senegal, 1981); He classified
genan petty bourgeoisie into four groups, namely (1) the bureaucratic bourgeoisie which is made up of
Ose who control decision making and the bureaucracy in government and the corporations; (2) the
~mprador bourgeoisie which is made made up of local indigenous agents and intennediaries of the
tmP~rialist importers; (3) the professional bourgeoisie made up of professionals like doctors, lawyers,
engme~rs, accountants, management executives etc; and (4) middle or lower salaried sector in the public
and pnvate sector, who according to Onimode, should be closer to the masses but tend more toward the
petty bourgeOiSie because of the hope to to join that class. See Onimode PP. 172-173
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ideology has not been very impressive. As we have seen, countries that
adopted the socialist model have had to abandon it for a market-oriented
economy. Socialism has remained a utopia, and the reality of its application
has been different from its almost transcendental rhetorics. Second, whilst
undiluted capitalism might not be the traditional heritage of the people of
Nigeria, neither is socialism. From time immemorial, traditional African
Ii'

societies admittedly were communal in outlook. This does not mean that all

~..
If:';"

resources were pooled together, to be managed by a common administration.
Each individual or family had its own household but every one came to the
aid of those in need. Granted some factors of production, like land, were
communally owned. 30 The essence of the communal ownership was not that
any proceeds from the cultivation of the land were contributed to a common
purse. Rather, while the ownership was vested in the cotrununity, the
usufruct could lie in any member of the community who could cultivate the
land for their own personal benefit.

;-----------------IanSdee Amodu Tijani v The Secretary, Southern Provinces

(Holding that in traditional Nigerian society,
belonged to the village, community or the family and not to the individual)
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The mixed economy model is not only the reality of the Nigerian economl l ,
but also the desirable model. At the risk of reductionism, mixed economy
simply means the availability at the same time of the features of both the
contending ideologies of socialism and capitalism. The Nigerian scenario
reveals an admixture of the characteristics of both. The Constitution
recognizes the right of every citizen of Nigeria to acquire and own
immovable property.32 Almost as a counterpoint, there is also provision in
the laws of the country, which vest the ownership of all land in a State of the
Federation of Nigeria in the Governor of that State to hold for the benefit of
the people. 33 This is a classic illustration of the tension between the
individualism of capitalism and the communality of socialism. Similarly, the
right to moveable property is also recognized, even though, just like the right
to immovable property, such right may be compulsorily acquired provided
Osaheni Victor Iyayi, Foreign Investors' Perceptions of Nigerian Public Policy on Foreign Investment,
11" (ph,d Dissertation submitted to the Golden Gate University, San Francisco, 1988, on file in the Golden
Gate University Library); See also ALISON A. AYIDA, REFLECTIONS ON NIGERIAN
DEVELOPMENT, 168 (Malthouse Press Ltd., and Heinemann Educational Books (Nig) Ltd, 1987) (noting
that Nigeria operates a mixed economy with well entrenched private sector); and PETER OLAYIWOLA,
PETROLEUM AND STRUCTURAL CHANGE IN A DEVELOPING COUNTRY: THE CASE OF
NIGERIA, (Praeger, NY, 1987); Emeka Ezeife, Nigeria, in ADEBAYO ADEDEn (ED),
INDIGENIZATION OF AFRICAN ECONOMIES, 164, 171 (Hutchinson and Co. Ltd., London, 1981)
(noting that even though the Second National Development Plan, 1970-1974, had called for the state to be
the "commanding heights" of the economy, the situation changed with the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion
Decrees 1972 and 1977. Under the decrees three models were considered: private sector led model, public
sector led model and mixed model. Nigeria chose the mixed model.)
31

32 See Section 43

of the 1999 Constitution of Nigeria.

33 S .
ternectlon 1 of the Land Use Act provides: Subject to the provisions of this Act, all land comprised in the
. be tory. of each State in the Federation are hereby vested in the Governor of that State and such land shall
til held m trust and administered for the use of the and common benefit of all Nigerians in accordance with
e provisions of this Act.
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compensation is paid and other conditions are met. 34 Similarly, other forms
of individual rights are on the books. On the other hand, as will later be
shown, government has been heavily involved in the economy, owning its
own enterprises and in some respects joining as partners with the private
sector in other enterprises. The same Constitution also contains what are
called fundamental objectives and directive principles of state policy, which
essentially urge the State to harness the resources and operate the economy
for the common good. Section 16 provides as follows:

-

.

(1) The State shall, within the context of the ideals and objectives for
which provisions are made in this Constitution:
harness the resources of the nation and promote national
prosperity and an efficient, dynamic and self-reliant economy;
control the national economy in such manner as to secure the
maximum welfare, freedom and happiness of every citizen on the
basis of social justice and equality of status and opportunity;
without prejudice to its right to operate or participate in areas of
the economy, other than the major sectors of the economy, manage
and operate the major sectors of the economy;
without prejudice to the right of any person to participate in areas
of the economy within the major sector of the economy, protect the
right of every citizen to engage in any economic activities outside
the major sectors of the economy.
The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring:
the promotion of a planned and balanced economic development
that the material resources of the nation are harnessed and
distributed as best as possible to serve the common good;
that the economic system is not operated in such a manner as to
permit the concentration of wealth or the means of production and
exchange in the hands of few individuals or of a group; and

~s--·-------------ectron 44 of the Constitution
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that suitable and adequate shelter, suitable and adequate food,
reasonable national minimum living wage, old age care and
pensions, and unemployment, sick benefits and welfare of the
disabled are provided for all citizens.

In Section 17, the State social order is founded on ideals of Freedom,
Equality and Justice. Every citizen shall have equality of rights, obligations
and opportunities before the law. 35 The exploitation of human or natural
resources

10

.t.

any form whatsoever for reasons other than the good of the

community shall be prevented. 36 Similar pro-socialist prescriptions are
contained in other parts of the Constitution. 37 However, these provisions are

3$

Section 17(2)(a)

36

Section 17(2)(d)

" For instance section 17(3) provides:
"The State shall direct its policy towards ensuring thatall citizens, without discrimination on any group whatsoever, have the opportunity for securing
adequate means of livelihood as well as adequate opportunity to secure suitable employment;
conditions of work are just and humane, and that there are adequate facilities for leisure and for social,
religious and cultural life;
the health, safety and welfare of all persons in employment are safeguarded and not endangered or
abused;
there are adequate medical and health facilities for all persons:
there is equal pay for equal work without discrimination on account of sex, or on any other ground
whatsoever;
.' children, young persons and the age are protected against any exploitation whatsoever, and against
lD.oral and material neglect;
provision is made for public assistance in deserving cases or other conditions of need; and
the evolution and promotion of family life is encouraged." Similarly, Section 18 provides:
Government shall direct its policy towards ensuring that there are equal and adequate educational
OPPOrtunities at all levels.
Government shall promote science and technology
Government shall strive to eradicate illiteracy; and to this end Government shall as and when
.
provide
. •. free, compulsory and universal primary education;
free secondary education;
free university education; and
free adult literacy programme.
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not enforceable, and therefore even though they empower the government to
robustly participate in the economy for the common good, no one has ever
rnaintained an action in court to compel the government to do so.

V. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA

Much of the Nigerian state's participation in the context of the mixed
economy paradigm has been through the instrumentality of State Owned
Enterprises (SOE). A certain ambiguity or confusion attends any attempt to
define a public enterprise or SOE. This stems from the imprecision with
which SOEs are viewed. Some see them as business entities albeit owned by
the government, while others view them from the perspective of the social
functions, which they sometimes perform. Ayodele, who offers the latter
definition, sees public enterprises as:
"business enterprises effected with public interests, bear intimate
connection with the process of transportation, other socioeconomic
services and distribution; are under obligation to afford their
facilities to the public generally upon demand at fair and non
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discriminatory rates, enjoy, in large measure, an independence and
freedom from business competition brought about by their
acquisition of monopolistic status or by grant of a franchise or
certificate from the state placing them in this position.,,3&

On the other hand, Tanzi sees public enterprises as "organizations whose

primary function is the production and sale of goods and/or services and in
which government or other government controlled agencies have an
ownership state [sic] that is sufficient to ensure their control over the
enterprises regardless of how actively that control is exercised.,,39
Zeckhauser and Murray Hom see them as business enterprises owned by
government.40 On the other hand, a private enterprise is one, which is
~.

privately owned and controlled by the market. 41 Public enterprises have

c:
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~"Sesan Ayodele, Public Enterprises Reforms in Nigeria, in I.B. BELLO-IMAM, A.A. ADUBI AND A.A.
FAJINGBESI (EDs), PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND
~MlNISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 128 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004)
See AyodeJe, supra note 38 at 128

38

40 See Richard J. Zeckhauser & Murray Horn, The Control of State-Owned Enterprises, in PAUL W.
MACAVOY & ORS, (ED), PRNATIZATION AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES, 7, 9-11, Kluwer,
Boston, (1989) (quoting Aharoni (1986 P.6) to the effect that SOEs have three distinguishing
characteristics: "First... they must be owned by the government. Second ... (they) must be engaged in the
Production of goods and services for sale... Third, sales revenues of SOEs should bear some relationship to
cost.") Although this is not a definition of art, it does underline the requirement that an SOE to be such
must of course belong to the public and must at the barest minimum aim to do business even if profit
~ is not the sole objective. The Nigerian Bureau of Public Enterprises defines a SOE as
&!ove~ent-owned or government controlled economic entities that generate the bulk of their revenues
• 111 ~lling goods or services. It may also include enterprises established to provide commercial activities
~~~h government controls management by virtue of its ownership stake. It encompasses enterprises
-_uy or indirectly through other federal and state government entities." See bpeng.org

41

c,pSonny Nwankwo, Privatization and Organizational Taxonomy: The Case of the National Enterprise, in

. RAo (ED), GLOBALIZATION, PRNATIZATION AND FREE MARKET ECONOMY, 28,31
(Greenwood Publishing Group, Inc., Westport, CT, USA, 1998) (also noting that: "two crucial factors have
~ applied in explaining the private enterprise: (1) ownership and (2) management of benefits
anadham, 1984). The crucial point of the private enterprise is that the organization and its
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three defining characteristics. They are government owned and controlled,
are engaged in commercial activities and also have sociopolitical goals
alongside the primary economic goals.

42

Ramanadham43 has tried to analyze

the public and commercial aspects of a public enterprise. He notes that three
elements are encapsulated in the word "public". First, it means the nonprivate accretion of the net benefits. In other words, the proceeds, profits or
,,'

capital appreciation of the enterprise do not go to the enrichment of a private

~.

group of individuals standing in the position of owners. Second, it involves
public decision-making so that entrepreneurial and other major decisions are

If"':',::'
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made at some public level devoid of personal interest. Finally, it involves
1:Q,':4'1J ~;!'

social accountability, thus the public enterprise has to be accountable to the
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public for its performance. 44 On the notion of enterprise, Ramanadham
identifies two components, (i) financial viability and (ii) cost price
equation. 45 He implies that a synthesis of the two concepts, "public" and
"enterprise", is required for an entity to qualify as "public enterprise." He

Ill8Dagement are solely answerable to the owners via the board of directors. As a consequence, management
activities reflect the supremacy of shareholders' interests.")
42

Sonny Nwankwo, supra note 41 at 31

., See

• En

V.V. RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, 5-19 (Croom Helm, Kent,
gland, 1984)

44

, RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 43 at 15-19
'''RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 43 at 15-19
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argues that an excessive shift towards "public" would make the entity what
he calls a "public non-enterprise", while an excessive shift towards
"enterprise" would result in what he terms a "non-public enterprise.,,46 The
difficulty associated with the private -public dichotomy has also led to a
suggestion that a third variant be included in the categorization.47 But the
prevalent model has been the categorization of enterprises into private and
public ones. A narrow definition of SOEs would require that they be owned

~.
c.:

by the government and be run as business ventures. While many SOEs

rL·.,.,) ,.

engage in business activities, a prescription of profit motive would exclude

r~:}(:

many such entities because there are some which perform socioeconomic

~';/'!L~t.~

functions even though they are ostensibly business oriented. This is the
contradiction that is at the root of the criticisms and reservation toward
SOEs. Yet, much of the literature take a broad view of SOEs, and some
writers include agencies, which perform regulatory aspects ofbusiness.

46

48

RAMANADHAM, THE NATURE OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISE, supra note 43 at 15-19

47

See Sonny Nwankwo, supra note 41 (arguing that the test of ownership might not fully capture the
of an enterprise as there might be enterprises privately owned but publicly controlled, just as there
mIght be enterprises publicly owned but privately controlled; He therefore suggests the concept of a
"national enterprise", which he defines as an "enterprise that is privately owned but still publicly controlled
or PUblicly owned but controlled primarily by the market." See P. 33)
~nce

48

.See for example, Adebayo O. Olukoshi, The Historic Significance of the Policy of Privatisation in
Nigeria, in R. OMATAYO OLANIYAN AND CHIBUZO N. NWOKE (EDs), STRUCTURAL
~JUSTMENT IN NIGERIA, 103, 107-108 (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1989)
(Identifying four broad groups of public enterprises in Nigeria, as follows: (1) those that could be described
as public utilities; (2) those that can be described as financial institutions; (3) those that could be described
as commercial and industrial companies; and (4) those that carry out regulatory duties or act as service
boards)
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The origin or development of SOEs in Nigeria dates back to the colonial
period. It has been noted that pre-colonial Nigeria was essentially precapitalist and the colonial authorities were faced with the task of
49

commencing the process of capital accumulation. One way of dealing with
this situation was the introduction, by the colonial authorities, of certain
agencies for consolidating the colonial economy.50 The Public Works

~.
L .

Department and the Native Authority were some of the agencies responsible
for the provision of roads, installation of electricity generators and provision
of pipe borne water/I while concerns such as coal mines at Enugu, saw mills
at Ijora and stone quarry at Aro were some of the early public enterprises
during the colonial period. 52

49

so

Olukoshi, supra note 48 at 105-106
Olukoshi supra note 48 at 106

Sl

OlukoShi, supra note 48 at 106
S2

L Tom Forrest, State Capital, Capital Development and Class Formation in Nigeria, in PAUL M.
UBECK (ED), THE AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE: CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA,
KE~A AND THE IVORY COAST 307, 309 (Lynne Rennier Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1987); Other
:tities were the West Africa Produce Control Board, which were later reorganized to create marketing
ards, the Nigerian Government Collieries, and the West African Currency Board. See Olukoshi supra
llote 48 at 106
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Following World War II and the increased tempo of the agitation for
independence,

the

colonial

government

increased its welfare and

. the country. 53
developmentaI programs 10

Thus the 1950s saw the establishment of many federal statutory
corporations. 54 After independence more corporations were created. And the
end of the civil war, in 1970, with the consequent need for reconstruction
coupled with the oil boom of the 1970s led to an explosion in public

"-, .

[.

~

enterprises and the public sector. 55 It has been asserted that during the 1960s

and 1970s, SOEs became the rule rather than the exception in sub-Saharan
Africa. 56 This would appear to be the direct consequence of the nationalistic

and independent fervors that were prevalent in that part of the world at that
33

Olukoshi supra note 48 at 106

54 These

included the Electricity Corporation of Nigeria (1951); the Nigerian Coal Corporation (1951); The
Railway Corporation (1955); the Nigerian Ports authority (1955); the Nigerian Broadcasting Corporation
(1958); and the Nigerian Airways (1959). See Forrest supra note 52 at 313
5S Forrest notes that: "in the 1970s, the range of public corporations and companies was extended with the
addition of the Nigerian National Oil Corporation (1971), the Nigerian Steel Development AuthOrity
(1971), the Nigerian Mining Corporation (1972), the Nigerian National Supply Company (1972), the
N~tional Freight Company (1976), the National Cargo Handling Company (1977), and the Nigerian
Airports Authority (1978)."

56 ERNST & YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE OWNED- ENTERPRISES
AROUND THE WORLD, 35 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994); See also Peter M. Lewis, State,
EcPQonomy, and Privatization in Nigeria, in EZRA SULEIMAN & JOHN WATERBURY (ED), THE
LInCAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND PRIVATIZATION, 211 (1990)
W~ew Press, Boulder (noting that throughout the 1950s and 60s Nigerian government's economic role
Wbyas tnt~entionist and tutelary, but limited to the state acting as a "catalyst" for private sector development
creatmg the physical, institutional and fmancial environment for economic progress, but that this
changed with the military intervention in 1966 and as result the 1970s witnessed a strategy of defacto state

capitalism.
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time. 57 Indeed, Nigeria's Second National Development Plan, for 1970 1975, called for the state to assume the "commanding heights" of the
economy. 58 This plan was followed in 1972 by the government's
implementation of a nationalization program under which some foreign
owned companies were indigenized.59 Although the shares in the
nationalized enterprises were available to and acquired by the private sector,
the result of the exercise was the co-existence of state and private enterprises
in the economy. If sub-Saharan African states embraced direct state
interference and participation in the economy, the embrace appeared
warmest in Nigeria, and it is claimed that by 1990, the country possessed the
largest public enterprise sector in sub-Saharan Africa and one of the most
troubled. 60 The growth of the public sector and of SOEs may be a result of

ERNST & YOUNG supra note 56; See also Thomas M. Gallaghy & Ernest James Wilson III, Africa:
Policy, Reality, or Ritual, in RAYMOND VERNON (ed), THE PROMISE OF PRIVATIZATION; A
CHALLENGE FOR US POLICY, 179-230 at 183 (1988) (Council on Foreign Relations) (attributing the
pronounced state involvement in enterprises to a fall out of the anti colonialist efforts which were in
essence anti capitalist and pro SOCialist)
57

SSleWlS,
. supra note 56 at 213
59

See the Nigerian Indigenization Decree 1972.

!iOLeWis, supra note 56 at 210-233; Lewis puts the number of such enterprises at 900 as of 1990. Callaghy
Wilson indicate that Nigeria had 107 SOEs in 1981, 36 of which were wholly owned and represented
3.6.per cent of the 107 SOEs. See Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 57 ... at 184; The number of the SOEs
~~ued to rise in the 1980s and 1990s. By 1993, there were 1500 SOEs. See Nigeria Federal Public
-r:"~iture, World Bank Report No. 14447 UNI March 1996 P. 65 (quoting Technical Committee on
~vatizat~o~ and Commercialization: Final Report of Technical Committee on Privatization and
n!..mtnerclahzation, May 1993); See also W.A. Isola, Privatization, in M. ADEJUGBE (ED),
c~SPECTlVES ON NIGERIA'S FLEDGLING FOURTH REPUBLIC, 80 (Malthouse Press, Ltd., Lagos,
(noting that: ''the country has a large public enterprise sector, which expanded very rapidly as a
197 of the implementation of the Indigenisation Decrees of early 1972 and 1977, and the oil boom of the
. 0 thrQugh 1980. With this development, an increasingly dominant Public Enterprises (PEs) Sector

fd
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the nationalization of a number of companies in a particular industry or the
transformation of a government department into a public enterprise;
acquisition of equity in a profitable enterprise; or setting up of a fresh public
•

enterpnse.

VI.

61

OBJECTIVES

OR

RATIONALE

FOR

STATE

OWNED

ENTERPRISES
I,',
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As we have seen, the provenance of SOEs was founded in the need to fill a
gap, which had existed in the economy. With the nigh absence of a vibrant
:.;,:.; ;.' )1:' ~~!

private sector during the colonial era and the period immediately thereafter,
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the state had to take on the task of laying down the basic conditions,
including the provision of the necessary infrastructure, to support the
development of capital. 62 It has also been noted that public ownership has
most commonly been viewed as a response to market failure and the failure
accounting for about 50% of the Gross Domestic Product (GDP) and 60% of the modem sector/source
employment had emerged in Nigeria by 1980s, (FRN, 1986). Concurrently, the number of PEs at the
federal level was about 600 enterprises and some 900 smaller ones at the state and local government levels
(TCPC 1993)."); According to the World Bank by 1990, Nigeria's public enterprise sector (at both the
fed~ral and state levels) accounted for 30 to 35 percent of GDP (excluding petroleum-related parastatals,
which aCcounted for 15 percent and one fifth of modem sector employment). See Nigeria- Structural
Adjustment Program: Policies, Implementation, and Impact,30 (World Bank Report, May 1994)
61

~s. Mikaila, PrivatisationiCommercialisation and Nigeria Economy, in EMMANUEL E. UMEBALI
B
EPHRAIM N. MADU (EDs), NIGERIA ECONOMY: ISSUES AND TRENDS, 26, 28 (Acafor
ooks, Enugu, Nigeria, 1992)
62

Olukoshi Supra note 48 at 104
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of the private market to secure efficient outcomes.63 It is thus ironic that
SOBs are being turned to the market for the same reason that they were
formed. Broadly, the role of SOEs has been categorized into four groupS.64
First is the provision of necessary environment and support for capital
accumulation. Essentially, they provide aids to trade and commerce by the
construction and management of infrastructure like roads, railways, harbors
and other necessary infrastructure. Secondly, they promote local capital
accumulation by giving loans to the private sector. An unintended aspect of
1'1

the SOEs, especially in the developing world, has been the facilitation of
primitive capital accumulation. By this is meant the corruption in the manner
of kickbacks and other untoward practices through which some SOEs enrich
certain individuals. It is noteworthy that some of the captains of industry in
the private sector were formerly heads of SOEs. It is not far-fetched to
speculate that they accumulated the capital with which they started or
improved their private sector enterprises through the SOEs.

Thirdly, it is noted that SOEs perform the function of regulating the
accumulation process itself, so as to attempt to correct the manifestations of

63

RICHARD HEMMING AND ALI M. MANSOOR, PRIVATIZATION AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
3(IMF, Washington Dc, 1988)
64

Olukoshi supra note 48 at 109
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uneven development at both sectoral and regional levels. 65

This is an

especially important function. Due to scarcity or paucity of private capital,
the private sector might not be able or willing to invest in certain sectors of
the economy or in certain parts of the country. Thus, SOEs fill the void. The
fourth role that SOEs perform is the provision of social services. 66 This is
the most popular role and one with which SOEs are most often identified.
The National Electric Power Authority provides electricity in Nigeria while
NITEL was at one time the only enterprise providing telephone services in

· . 67
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While the above roles properly belong to SOEs, it is also true that some of
them were formed without adequate consideration of their place in the macro
economy, but purely out of political considerations or as a source of

6S Olukoshi supra note 48 at 109~1l1; see also JEROME UDOJI, WHICH WAY NIGERIA?, 157~159
(Spectrum Books, Ibadan, 1999) (noting that upon independence, the wealth of the country was still in the
~ds of foreigners and the politicians needed to do something. They had to take control and one way of
do~ that was by public corporations especially since private firms could not go into some sectors which
reqUITed large capital and infrastructure.)

~Olukoshi,

supra note 48 at 109~1l1; See also GAMALIEL ONOSODE, THREE DECADES OF
1 ONOMIC DEVELOPMENT CRISIS IN NIGERIA - ESSAYS, 146~ 157 (Malthouse Press, Ltd., Lagos,
993); See also MEHDI HARIRIAN, STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES IN A MIXED ECONOMY;
MICRO VERSUS MACRO ECONOMIC OBJECTIVES, 127 (Westview Press, Boulder CO, 1989)
(~~g that"one of the reasons for creating SOEs in mixed economies is to achieve the ends of
SOcIalIsm, yet retain the framework of capitalism")
67

Sometimes the social policy aims and distributional objectives are widened to include creation of
. ~~?yment and prevention of rising unemployment. See RICHARD HEMMING AND ALI M.
UU\1~SOOR, PRIV ATIZAnON AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, 34 (IMF, Washington, DC 1988)
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patronage.
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VII. PERFORMANCE OF SOES IN NIGERIA

Although the SOEs perform important functions, the verdict is that they are
wasteful and hardly make any gains. While these shortcomings or failures
were largely ignored during the oil boom period because the country had
enough resources to continue to subsidize the SOEs, the economic
l'Ii.:.;
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depression of the 1980s and 1990s laid bare the reality that the country has

j~~,.:~:i?,:,io'Jll
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not received much return from its huge investments in the public sector.

69

Many have noted that although the public sector in Nigeria has been
considerably large it has also been largely unproductive in relation to the
sizeable investments undertaken. 70 Several factors account for such

6&

See A Etukudo, Issues in Privatization and Restructuring in Sub-Saharan Africa (Interdepartmental
Action Programme on Privatization, Restructuring and Economic Democracy, Working Paper IPPRED-5)
International Labor Organization, bttp;//www.ilo.orglpubliclEnglish/employmentientipapers/ippredS.htm
Oast visited march 26, 2007); See also ISHRAT HUSAIN, PERSPECTIVES ON THE NIGERIAN
E~ONOMY, 142 (NIIA, Lagos, 1987) (asserting that: "many public enterprises are established at the
~l whim of a minister or of a donor without due consideration of economic and fmandal viability.")
"D~::e Nigeria - Federal Public Expenditure, World Bank Report No 14447, UNI March 1996 (World
--, West Central Africa Dept, Country Operations Division P. 66
70

Ex See ~ikaila supra note 61 at 28 ; see also Isola supra note 60 at 80; Nigeria - Federal Public
;Pendlture, World Bank Report No 14447, UNI March 1996 (World bank, West Central Africa Dept,
Country Operations Division P. 69 (noting that the returns from the considerable investments in the SOEs
~ve been negligible both in tenns of dividends and debt service on loans); Nigeria- Structural Aqjustment
f o~am: PoliCies, Implementation, and Impact, 30 (World Bank Report, May 1994) (noting that "in tenns
o ~ect investment and impact on the overall economy (most notably in its failure to deliver adequate
s~rvices and its displacement of the private sector from profitable activities) sector performance has
Ullifonnly poor. Most of the Government's large-scale capital projects have not proved cost effective:

::c
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perceived dismal performance. First, if the measure of performance is only
the amount of profit made, many SOBs are inherently primed to fail in so far
as their raison d'etre is essentially social and not commercial. Secondly,
even where a SOE would ordinarily do well, it is impeded by the pervasive
corruption of its managers. Thirdly, it has been noted that sometimes the
objectives for which a SOB is established are not clearly defined, while
some projects are non-viable. 71 Besides, sometimes there are bureaucratic
and political interference and political patronage. 72 Similar to these are the
twin problems of lack of managerial and financial autonomy and lack of

financial responsibility and accountability.73

Yet, SOEs are not without defenders. Many suggest that in criticizing SOEs
one should remember their origin. They were initially introduced by the
colonial powers to prop up capital base for the private sector. 74 As Lubeck
has observed, "although the contradictions and costs attributable to
they use inappropriate technologies, are built in the wrong locations, have long completion delays, and are
overcharged by foreign suppliers.")
7\

72

UDon supra note 65 at 160
unoJI supra note 65 at 160

73

DDOJI supra note 65 at 160
74

O~~iba NnoIi, Introduction: The Intellectual Aspects of the Struggle for Nigerian Development, in
1981)

IBA NNOLI (ED), PATH TO NIGERIAN DEVELOPMENT, 1-5 (Codesrla, Dakar, Senegal,

79
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inefficient state intervention are real enough, it is ironic that these same
international agencies and former colonial powers introduced the very state
agencies that are now the object of scom.,,75 Others ask for a balanced
assessment of SOEs, taking into account their peculiar circumstances and
not rush to compare them with the private sector using the profit standard. 76
Indeed, it has been argued that the failures of SOEs are those of the private
sector because most SOEs' activities are performed by the private sector to
which they are contracted. 77 This is of course an aspect of the corruption
malady.
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7S PAUL LUBECK, THE AFRICAN BOURGEOISIE: CAPITALIST DEVELOPMENT IN NIGERIA,
KENYA AND THE IVORY COAST, 247 (Lynne Rennier Publishers, Boulder, CO, 1987); See also
Olukoshi supra note 48 at III (noting that public enterprises played a major role in the emergence of the
Nigerian domestic bourgeoisie and that it is significant that this class which relied heavily and directly on
the state during its formative years should be at the forefront of the calls for privatization)

76

See ONOSODE supra note 66 at (arguing that, "criticism of our public enterprises is of mixed validity.
Some of it is patently unfair having been born of ignorance of the nature of the political and social
constraints within which they function. Some of these criticisms should, in fact, be directed at the
machinery of government and the nature, extent and effectiveness of ministerial control over the operations
8Ildatrairs of these enterprises.") See also HARIRIAN, supra note 66 at 128 (arguing that: "the comparison
of fInancial accounts between private enterprises and SOEs cannot be used as a reliable measure for
performance evaluation because such profitability comparisons are misleading and irrelevant. the use of
SUCh a measure results in demonstrable biases against SOEs. Financial accounts consist of cardinal numbers
that fiIil to consider the characterics and nature of SOE objectives. Comparisons and tradeoffs among
. competing goals are often necessary. The evaluation of SOEs' performance should, therefore, be based
Upon a goal attainment model, rather than solely on financial viability.")

'/'IN Ii
Pub ~o supra note 74 at 5 (asserting that: "most of its activities are now performed by private contractors.
, hc enterprises now hardly execute any of their projects with their own personnel. How then can the

~ ,of their projects be blamed on them rather than the private contractors who execute them? Public
-:'--Znses merely retain the form but not the substance of their previous existence. Their failures are today
~lures of the private sector.")
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CHAPTER 3
MEANING AND RATIONALE FOR PRIVATIZATION

I. MEANING OF PRIVATIZATION
It is always ideal to define concepts involved in any study. This serves a

two -fold function. First, it delimits the scope of the inquiry and secondly, it
;,,;

clarifies the perspective from which such concepts are viewed. But, as with
every attractive option, there are usually difficulties in circumscribing a
study's understanding of concepts. Defmitions are not always easy for they
require exceptional art and dexterity to delineate the contours of a concept
while ensuring that such concept does not become too narrow and technical.
.';J.IL"';

This difficulty is especially pronounced in the case of an issue that dovetails
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into several disciplines. Privatization is a concept essentially suffering from
a crisis of identity. Is it an economic, social, legal or political concept? The
answer is that it straddles all the aforementioned theoretical and practical
landscapes. It touches on the organization of the productive sources of
;

....

SOCiety and as such is economic. It implicates the relationship between the

,

government and the people as well as the relationship among the people, and

as such is social. It addresses the jural correlatives of ownership, control and
,

.,',"

POWer and also impacts the corporate laws of a country. Consequently, it is
also legal. It is political because it is also concerned with the role of the
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government in the society. Accordingly, it is susceptible to defmition from
all these perspectives. And there has not been a shortage of attempts at such
definitions. Hence, the literature reveals that privatization can be defined
broadly or narrowly.l

In a broad sense, privatization has been seen "as a term which covers several

distinct and possibly alternative means of changing the relationship between
the government and the private sector.,,2 It is thus seen as a generic term
covering a range of policies, which seek to alter the ownership structure and
management of the economy away from the government to the private
3

sector. Wiezsacker, Young and Finger view privatization as referring to all
initiatives designed to increase the role of private enterprises in using
society's resources and producing goods and services by reducing or
restricting the roles of governments or public authorities in such matters. 4 To
them, these initiatives include, but are not limited to, transfer of property or
I Tamar Frankel, Symposium: A Recipe for Effecting Institutional Changes to Achieve Privatization:
Forward, 13 B.U. Int'} L. 1. 295 (1995); Ronald A. Cass, Macro-Economic Changes from Centralized to
Market Economies: Big Bang Gradual Change: The Optimal Pace ofPrivatization, 13 B.U. Int'} L. 1. 413
(1995)

2

W.A. Isola, Privatization, in M. ADE ADEJUGBE, PERSPECTIVES ON NIGERIA'S FLEDGLING
(MALTHOUSE Press Ltd, Lagos, 2002) (citing 1. Kay and O. Thompson,
Pnvatization a Policy in Search ofa Rationale, Economic Journal Vol. 96 PP.16"32, 1986)

F~URTH REPUBLIC, 80, 81

3

Isola, supra note 2 at 82
4

(EEmt Ulrich von Weizsacker, Oran R. Young and Matthias Finger, in ERNST U von WEIZSACKER
T D), LIMITs TO PRIVATIZATION: WHEN A SOLUTION BECOMES A PROBLEM, 4 (Earthscan,
Otonto, Canada, 2005)
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property rights, partial or total, from public to private ownership. They
would also include purchase of goods or services by the government from
the private sector and the granting of licenses, permits, franchises, leases or
concession contracts by the government to the private sector even though
5

ownership remains in the public. But they would exclude deregulation from
the purview of privatization, even though the latter often comes with the
former. 6 On the other hand, Professor Rose would attach the label of
~.

.'

privatization generally to "governmentally sponsored efforts to move assets
If,...J

and economic decision-making away from the political arena and into the
hands of individuals or private corporations 7 and would include such
initiatives as recognition, deregulation, divestment and enablement. 8 In one
sense, it is said to be "an array of actions designed to broaden the scope of
private sector activity, or the assimilation, by the public sector, of efficiency
enhancing techniques generally employed by the private sector.,,9 This

s

WEIZ8ACKER, supra note 4 at 4

6 WEIZSACKER

,
8

supra note 4 at 4

Carol Rose, Privatization- The Road to Democracy?, 50 8t Louis L.J. 691(2006)

Rose Supra note 7 at 694

9

hMark.Baker, Privatization in the Developing World: Panaceafor the Economic Ills of the Third World or
A escnption Overused?, 18 N.Y.L. 8ch. J. Int'l & Camp. L. 233,237,238 (1999) (quoting Christopher
dam et at, ADJUSTING PRIVATIZATION: CASE STUDIES FROM DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 6
(}~~); Ersnt & Young see privatization as a process and not an event, and note that it applies to all kinds
~~ public -private ventures. See ERN8T & YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE
D- ENTERPRISES AROUND THE WORLD, 4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994)
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definition is broad enough to include not only government's divestment of

its interest in any or all enterprises, but also every conscious effort
undertaken by the government to reform its public sector and make it more
efficient. tO Understood in this way, privatization should be a constant in the
political economy of every state. This is because no state would admit that it
is not taking measures to make its public sector as efficient as possible. The
dispute has never been on the need for optimization of public enterprises. It
is always on the best way to achieve that result. There are myriad other
definitions of privatization. 11

'~.ll.<~-.

In a narrow context, privatization has been defined as "a transfer of
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10 See also ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 9 (asserting that privatization is a process not an event); Thomas
M. Callaghy and Ernest James Wilson Ill, African Policy, Reality or Ritual, in RAYMOND VERNON,

(ED), TIlE PROMISE OF PRNATIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR US FOREIGN POLICY, 180
(Council on Foreign Relations, 1988) (asserting that: "in its broader sense, privatization is the introduction
of greater market rationality or competitiveness into an arena of economic activity.")
11

Se for example, Coskun Can Aktan, An Introduction to the Theory of Privatization,

privatization.pdf&w=coskun+aktan+rationale+privatization&d=G7YeMvmdOsCb&icp=
l&.intl=us (stating that: "Privatization is frequently used referring to the sale of a
publicly owned enterprise (POE)'s asset or shares to the individuals or a private firms.
However, this definition gives only a narrow meaning of privatization. In broader
ll1eaning, it refers to restrict government's role and to put forward some methods or
~licies in order to strengthen free market economy. The former meaning of
pnvatization, i.e. the sale of a POE's assets or shares to the private sector is mostly called
;denationalizationll); Anthony Bennett, The Measurement of Privatization and Related
~sues, in V.V. RAMANADHAM, HOW DOES PRNATIZATION WORK?: ESSAYS
(RN PRIVATIZATION IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR V.V. RAMANADHAM, 3, 4
Outledge, Florence, KY, USA, 1997)
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ownership and control from the public to the private sector, with particular
reference to asset sales. It is therefore equated with total or partial
denationalization." 12 In this context, it is viewed as "the transfer from the
public to the private sector of ownership and/or control of productive
assets.,,13 It is the sale of a government-operated enterprise to the private
sector. 14 It would seem that the narrower definition is more legal while the
broader definition is more economic. Thus, the former focuses on the legal
',,:

consequence of privatization whereas the latter captures its social and

~; i

economic benefits.
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12 RICHARD

HEMMING AND ALI M. MANSOOR, PRIVATIZA nON AND PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,
1 (lMF, Washington, DC 1988)

13

Id; See also Stephanie R. Nicolas, Privatizing South Africa's Industries: The law and Economics of a

New Socialist Utopia, 30 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 721 (1999) (defining privatization as ''the sale ofa state-

.

owned business to entities other than the state."); Yuliya Mitrofanskaya, Privatization as an International
Phenomenon: Kazakhastan, 14 Am. U. In1'I L. Rev. 1399, 1404 (1999) (quoting Andrei A. Baev, Civil Law
and the Transformation of State Property in Post-Soviet Economies: Alternatives to Privatization, 12
UCLA. Pac. Basin LJ. 131, 150 (1993) to the effect that privatization is "the single act of transferring (by
lIleans of buying and selling) the legal title of State property, which was in the possession of State
enterprises for restricted purposes of producing certain goods under owner-State control, to individual or
associated owners"; Callaghy and Wilson, in VERNON, (ED), supra note 10 at 180 (stating: "narrowly
defined, privatization is any action that serves to dilute or eliminate government equity ownership or
lllanagement control of an enterprise.")
14

to F~el Supra note 1 at 295; See also Cass supra note I (defming it as ''the sale of a state-owned business
Sa~les other than the state"); Maxwell

o. Chibundu, Law and Political Economy ofPrivatization in Sub-

. r:n 1fi'ica, 21 Md. J. Int'l L. & Trade 1.. .. (noting that "in the most commonly idealized image of

:vatization, a state divests itself completely of all interests in a commercial venture, and relegates its
volvement in the affairs of the entity solely to that of an impartial regulator, leaving it to the ingenuities
profit-maximizing entrepreneurs to create national wealth.") see also Emeka Theme, The Legal
ofPrivatization in Nigeria, in EZE ONYEKPERE (ED), READINGS ON PRlV ATIZAnON, 1
EconOmic Rights, Lagos, 2003)
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The narrow meaning of privatization is also not without complexity. If
divestment is the essence of privatization, then how does one categorize the
broader efforts, which diminish or eliminate the role of the state in an
enterprise? Yet, some economies have an adjunct to privatization, which
they regard as commercialization and by which effort is made to ensure that
an enterprise is run purely on business basis and subject to market forces.

Similarly, certain divestments are subject to the government retaining what
,

..

,.'

are called "golden shares" 15 , which enable the government to intervene in
"'\.'

\,

..,"0-'

the enterprise and to exercise what essentially is a veto over legitimate
managerial decisions. 16 But from a legal perspective the narrow definition is
f;JJl ";!. -fl.; 'j~l
~~:»j.,~.r,.

preferable. Privatization presumes the existence of an enterprise owned

wholly or partly by the government. The act of the government in divesting
itself of such ownership is privatization. It is also possible that government
does not transfer all its part or whole ownership. This raises the further
problem of how to categorize the resulting enterprise. Does a sale which
results in an enterprise in which the government and a private entity have
interests still constitute privatization? Does it matter who controls the
enterprise? Does it matter who has a majority of the shares? These are all
nuances and complexities to which a strict defmition of privatization, as a

-------------------bundu supra note 14
ISCbj

16

Cbibundu supra note 14
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sale of government shares in an enterprise, is subject. But these nuances
need not detain us. For the purpose of this work, we will regard privatization
as simply the divestment of shares owned by the government or government
entity. The beneficiary of such divestment would usually be the private
sector. The seemingly successful outcome of the British experience, in
privatizing otherwise State owned enterprises (SOE), in the 1980S1 7 , and the
collapse of communism, have thrust upon the world a certain urgency for a
reduction in direct state involvement in economies. 18

if

17 See Ingo Vogelsang, Micro-Economic Changes from Government Owned and Managed Enterprises to
Private Sector Enterprises: Micro-Economic Effects of Privatizing Telecommunications Enterprises, 13
B.U. Int'l L.J. 313; See also Yair Aharoni, The United Kingdom: Transforming Attitudes, in RAYMOND
VERNON, (ED), THE PROMISE OF PRIVATIZATION: A CHALLENGE FOR US FOREIGN POLICY,
23 - 56, (Council on Foreign Relations, 1988); JOHN VICKERS AND GEORGE YARROW,
PRIVATIZATION: AN ECONOMIC ANALYSIS, 428-429, (MIT Press, Cambridge, MA, 1988) (giving a
favorable review of the British program but expressing reservation about the privatization of monopolies);
John Vickers and George Yarrow, Privatization in Britain, in PAUL MACAVOY & ORS, (ED),
PRIVATIZATION AND STATE OWNED ENTERPRISES, 209-245 (Kluwer, Boston, 1989); Gladstone
Hutchinson, EffiCiency Gains through Privatization of UK Industries, in ATTIAT F. OTT AND KEITH
HARTLEY, (ED), PRIVATIZATION AND ECONOMIC EFFICIENCY: A COMPARATIVE
ANALYSIS OF DEVELOPED AND DEVELOPING COUNTRIES, 87-107, (Edward Elgar, 1991)
(concluding, from a study, that public ownership in the UK led to growth in labor productivity while
Private ownership led to growth in profits); Ronald D. Utt, Privatization in the United States, in OTT AND
HARTLEY, supra at 73 (asserting that the British experience is perhaps the best known and most
SUccessful program of privatization where major divestitures occurred over an extended period)

18

See Otive Igbuzor, Privatisation in Nigeria (Critical Issues of Concern to Civil Society) A
Paper presented at a Power Mapping Roundtable Discussion on the Privatisation Programme in Nigeria,
~ganiSed by Socio economic Rights Initiative (SERJ) Held at Niger Links Hotel Abuja on 3rd September

~03 (asserting that "today, the received wisdom is that the state should recede and that private ownership
o the means of production is the only viable approach to efficient production of goods and services,
economic growth and development. Consequently, there is a move all over the world to privatize erstwhile
public enterprises.")
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Privatization is essentially the withdrawal of the government from active and
direct participation in the affairs of an enterprise, which it hitherto owned. 19
privatization is at once an old and a new concept. On the one hand, the
notion that business efficiency is best attained in private hands has been
around from time immemorial, and could be found in the writings of Adam
Smith as early as 1762.20 On the other hand, the conscious adoption of
privatization as part of state economic policy is recent. It has been noted that
the term first appeared in a dictionary only in 1983.21 Privatization is usually
.:J ,:., ,

done in an effort to affect the economy in a positive manner by removing

'1<",:f
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structural obstacles inherent in the ambiguous (if not self-contradictory)
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See L. GRAY COWAN, PRIVATIZATION IN THE DEVELOPING WORLD, 6 (Greenwood, Press,
NY, 1990) (defming privatization as the transfer of a function, activity, or organization from the public to
the private sector); ERNST AND YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE OWNED·
ENTERPRISES AROUND THE WORLD, 4 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994) (also defining
privatization broadly as "the transfer or sale of any asset, organization, function, or activity from the public
to the private sector."); PAUL COOK AND COLIN KIRKPATRICK, PRIVATISATION IN LESS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES, 3-4 (St. martin's Press, NY, 1988)
19

COWAN, supra note 19 at 6; See also VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 1 (quoting ADAM
SMITII'S WEALTH OF NATIONS (1776): "In every great monarchy in Europe the sale of crown lands
would produce a very large sum of money, which, if applied to the payment of the public debts, would
deliver from mortgage a much greater revenue than any which those lands have ever afforded to the crown
.'. When the crown lands had become private property, they would, in the course of a few years, become
well improved and well cultivated."); ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 9 at 4; See also STEVE H.
1iANI<.E,(ED) PROSPECTS FOR PRIVATIZATION, Vol. 36 No.3 P.2, 1987, NY, Academy of Political
Science (asserting that Adam Smith tilled the ground for privatization.)
20

21

. COWAN, supra note 19 at 6; ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 12 at 4 (noting that although privatization
old, it came to worldwide attention with the British experiment in the 1980s); See also HANKE, supra
note 20 at 2 (noting that although the word, privatization, was not in the dictionary before 1983, its
counterpoint, nationalization, was already in the dictionary by then.); RICHARD HEMMING AND ALI
M. MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 1 (noting that privatization entered popular usage only recently and that
sal7~~ public assets is a recent phenomenon of the 1980s, even though both the word, privatization, and
e actIvities can claim a longer history; further nothing that the word "privatize" appeared for the first time
: the Webster Dictionary 1983 edition where its earliest recorded use is given as 1948; they also note that
Hanke claims responsibility for popularizing the word while serving on the US President's Council of
onomic Advisers in 1981 and 1982)
IS
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roles of the government in seeking to provide services at the cheapest terms,
to the citizenry, whilst at the same time hoping that an enterprise remains a
going concern.

Privatization may also be done gradually or with a "big bang,,22. While a
gradualist or intermediate approach to privatization effects a phased
divestment of government's interest in enterprises, a "big bang" or
immediate privatization exercise seeks to transfer government's interest, in

an enterprise, to the private sector as quickly as possible. It is argued that a
gradualist approach spreads the time within which the pains of the exercise
may he felt and thereby reduces its impact. On the other hand, proponents of
immediate privatization posit that the inherent disruption in services is felt
once and for all. Even if its severity is pronounced, the populace would take
.solace in the fact that it is for a short while. 23 The line between the so-called
bang" and intermediate approaches may not be so sharp. It is
that a government would wake up one morning and simply
its holdings in public enterprises. Usually, preparatory work is done.
lnu.renver, because of the vagaries and uncertainties associated with the

See Nicolas, supra note 13 at 721 - 722; Mitrofanskaya, supra note 13 at 1404

It Kim Reisman, The World Bank and the IMF: At the Forefront of World Transformation, 60 Fordham
. ev. 349, 391(1992)

89

exercise, most states start out gradually on the privatization course.

ll. RATIONALE FOR PRIVATIZATION

Privatization is the pet project of neo liberal advocates, and is validated on
the same grounds as other free market principles. An attempt at justification
of privatization of SOBs is at once a canvassing of the reasons for preferring
free market capitalism to a system where the state sits at the commanding
heights of the economy. Since privatization overlaps different branches of
human existence, the rationale for it cuts across all branches of human
endeavor. The reasons for privatization may therefore vary according to the
perspective. 24

A. Efficiency

: ,

First, and most importantly, it is argued that privatization leads to

24

See Bruno Dallago, The Teaching of Western Experience. in IVAN MAJOR (ED), PRIVATIZATION

AND ECONOMIC PERFORMANCE IN CENTRAL AND EASTERN EUROPE, 1,4 (Edward Elgar,
Che~tenham, UK, 1999) {noting that there four main groups of goals of privatization: (a) social, political

:m
:"il

l~logical goals(these include reduction of political interference, weakening the role of trade unions,
. Cfeasmg number of shareholders and attracting foreign support and capital); (b) financing the state
bud~~t; (c) short run micro(efficiency) and macro economic goals (equity and macro economic
lZlltiOU); (d)long run economic goals, including the economic system and its functioning and targets
. r development}
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efficiency25 in the erstwhile SOEs. The notion here is that the performance
of most SOEs is not measured on the basis of their profitability. Nor are the
managers and other staff of the companies necessarily answerable for losses
sustained by such entities. Instead, the continuity of their employment may
be dependent on other factors.

26

On the other hand, the private sector is

profit driven. Performance is based on output and profit. Directors are
constantly aware of the bottom line and of the need to achieve results. In
i ..'

consequence, it is thought that when the ownership of a SOE is transferred

1-
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to the private sector, it will be infused with the efficiency that is believed to
be standard in the private sector.
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Economists are not totally agreed on the relationship between ownership and
performance. Instead, conventional wisdom is that efficiency is a function of
2S

Mary M. Shirley, The What, Why, and How of Privatization: A world Bank Perspective, 60 Fordham L.
Rev. 23, 25-28 (1992) (asserting that privatization improves the use of public resources and also improves
operating and dynamic efficiencies); Peter Rutland, Economic, Legal, and Political Dilemmas of
Privatization in Russia: Privatization in East Europe: Another Case of Words That Succeed and Policies
That/ail?,5 Transnat'l L.& Contemp. Probs. 1,5 (1995); John R. Dempsey, Thailand's Privatization of
State Owned Enterprises During the Economic Downturn, 31 Law & Pol'y Int'l Bus. 373, 374 (2000)
(asserting that "privatization is the best route to the development of competitive industries, the deepening
of domestic and international capital supplies, and to the continued economic growth in a world ftxated on
reducing commercial barriers and promoting a free market."); Roger Barrett James, Information - The Key
to Fair Privatization: British Successes and Russian Pitfalls, 20 Loy. L.A. Int'l & Compo L.J. 837839, 840
(1998) (stating that "among the most widely espoused reasons are to create an enterprise culture, increase
competition, reduce government involvement in industry decision - making, eliminate waste, minimize
state dependency, and increase and improve the quality of goods and services")
l6

Such as party affiliation and patronage; For example, Nigerian Supreme Court jurisprudence holds that

~ of government owned enterprises cannot be terminated at will. They can only lose their jobs for
I';

DlISConduct, and this can only be after a rigorous procedure. Such employees are said to enjoy a status with
~~ltory flavor; See University of Lagos v Olaniyan; Garba v university of Maiduguri; Laoye v Federal
lVi Service Commission, S.C. 202/87 (l989) NILR 2l
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market and incentive structures.

27

However, advancing what has been

termed the residual claimant theory, it is claimed that for effectiveness and
to produce results, a firm needs a monitor to ensure that each member of the

firm does not shirk their work. However, such a monitor might have no
incentive to do the monitoring, and as a result someone needs to monitor the
monitor. This function devolves on the person who is the residual claimant
to the profit of the firm and who would thus have an incentive to maximize
profits and hence the efforts of the members of the firm. 28 An
;.

~.,

owner- managed firm does not face this problem, but a SOE certainly faces
it because public authorities are not residual claimants. 29 Even so it is
iJlCH"t.~·

conceded that a mere change of a corporation from SOE to a private owned
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company, does not, in and of itself, solve this problem. This is because in a
large corporation, shareholders may not have an incentive to monitor
managers. On the other hand, it is argued that the stock market would
indirectly perform the monitoring function, since it would act as a barometer
for measuring the health of the company. If the share prices fall,
· ".;

shareholders would notice and may in fact sell their shares, This may
'.' :

Ultimately lead to a takeover. Proponents of privatization note that there is
~-----------------

pA~ee AZIZUL ISLAM AND CAROLINA MONSALVE, PRIVATIZATION: A PANACEA OR A
ru..LlATlVE?, 13 (UN, New York, 2001)
28I8LAMAND MONSALVE, supra note 27 at 14
29

18LAM AND MONSALVE supra note 27 at 14
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no mechanism to sanction bad performance and that SOEs are not under the
threat of takeover and are free from the danger of bankruptcy. 30

Similarly, Hemming and Mansoor,31 in discussing the claim to efficiency by
a private enterprise as opposed to a public enterprise, distinguish between
two forms of public enterprises, namely, SOEs that are not monopolies and
which have been exposed to competition, on the one hand, and SOEs that are
monopolies on the other hand. In the case of the former, they note that such
;

~'

firms, perhaps, survived competition only with budgetary support. Thus,

they should not have been SOEs in the first place, and their privatization
:J!~-'.! '!..

,"'Jt:-.",.... i:

should be straightforward. For the latter, they note that large efficiency gains
~:~

<~~

1& 1+,' ~o:~.

can come from privatization of monopolies, but if they have to remain

monopolies, they have to be regulated. 32 This is the worst dilemma presented

by SOEs. If an SOB is a natural monopoly, and is privatized, it is assumed
that the same government which could not manage it effectively to obtain
30

,

J

See ISLAM AND MONSALVE supra note 27 at 14-16 (also identifying other strands for the superior
perfonnance by private sector over the public sector as, the fact that the government is less knowledgeable
than private managers or owners with regard to the everyday functioning of the ftrm and that a change in
OWnership changes the structure of information incentives and controls affecting operating decisions and
~ economic performance; and also the fact that SOEs lack clearly defined goals and objectives); See also
~ Dote 1 (noting that: "if employees' pay and perquisites were the same whether they produced high
quahty goods or low quality goods, they tended to produce low quality goods. If their lives were not
affected by Whether the goods ever got to the market after leaving the factory, they tended not to invest a
great deal in making sure that the goods were actually delivered.")
31

HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 12
32

HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 12
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optitnal and balanced social and economic results, would now have both the
wherewithal and technical capabilities to regulate the enterprise and prevent
it from abusing its market power. It would seem that the factors, which
militate against the government's effective management of the enterprise
would still constrain its ability to effectively regulate. This is especially the
case in the developing countries that do not have effective regulatory
systems.

Nevertheless, it argued that a number of reasons suggest that a regulated

....:,:{
:~ll;
l l\'.

private monopoly, in place of a public monopoly, will increase productive
efficiency. First, it is contended that privatization, even of a monopoly, will
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reduce or eliminate political interference. And this will be so even where the
privatization is partial. In such a situation, Hemming and Mansoor argue that
governmental interference would face two constraints; from the regulatory
agency and from the other shareholders. Again there may be a divergence
between the theory of these constraints and their reality. How would a
governmental agency prevent government's interference in the affairs of a
privatized firm? The regulatory agency itself may be subject and open to
interference by the same government. In all likelihood, the regulators were
appointed by the government and answerable to them. In the developing
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regulatory agencIes are yet to acquIre the independence and
'"

autonomy necessary

;

to

constitute

such

obstacle

to

governmental

interference. Hemming and Mansoor, themselves, seem to recognize the
".1

disparity between the theory and reality of the second constraint. They note
that if the shares of the firm are broadly held, then it would be difficult to
check the government. Their solution is that if the other shares are held by a
financial institution, which of necessity must monitor its investment, then
the financial institution would be alive to this responsibility, and, perhaps, at
least call attention to it. 33

The second reason a regulated private monopoly is preferred to a public
monopoly is that the changing of property rights would act as a check on the
. performance of the enterprise. 34 This is the basic leitmotif of privatization.
What belongs to the public or government belongs to no one, whereas an
individual owner would pay sufficient attention to what belongs to them
individually. Thirdly, it is thought that privatization even of a monopoly
Would result in withdrawal of government financing and therefore subject

33

. They rightly note that such a scenario would run counter to another rationale for privatization which is to
SPread and broaden share ownership. See HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 13

34

See HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 13
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the enterprise to the discipline of the capital market.

35

But, the whole notion

of monopoly might actually militate against efficiency. The monopoly status
insulates the firm from competition, which is the economic incentive for
productivity. And we have seen that the regulation might not be effective
because the very constraints, which inhibit the government from being an
efficient owner of the enterprise, would still prevent it from effectively

· th
'
reguIatmg
e pnvate
monopo Iy. 36

On this account, it is doubtful if a

so- called regulated monopoly is preferable to a public monopoly.

B. Privatization Yields Revenue to the State
.

~,,~.

,:1,'·; .

The sale of SOEs yields revenue to the government. But, again this must be
viewed in the context of the performance of the SOEs. Obviously, if the

SOEs are performing optimally, then, society is better off keeping them.
This is because while the government may realize money from the sale, it
will also lose money in the nature of future profits. But if the SOE is ailing,
3$

See HEMMING AND MANSOOR, supra note 12 at 13
36

See John N. Drobak, A Comment on Privatization and Democratization, 50 St. Louis L.1. 783, 789
(2006) (noting that natural monopoly goods, public goods and goods with social benefits exceeding
:::gate private benefits would not be adequately provided by the market and consequently, it does no
STUDto the market to have the government provide these goods); See also V.V. RAMANADHAM,
IES IN PUBLIC ENTERPRISE FROM EV ALVA nON TO PRIVAnSA nON, 200-202 (Frank
:s, NJ, 1987) ( noting that poof performance is the most powerful factor favoring privatization and that
be bhas two strands - social and financial returns; he argues that the social goals and achievements should
case ~ced with any poor performance and if the poor performance outweighs the social benefits then a
IS made for privatization.)
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then, its sale will bring revenue to the government that it can use for other
purposes or to reduce any deficits that it is facing. Thus, privatization or
divestiture can be used as a means to overcome a short~term financing gap.3?
It is also noted that if the driving force of a privatization program is the

maximization of proceeds from the sale of SOEs this particular objective
:

.,':'

might conflict with the more persuasive aim of efficiency. This is because in
seeking to maximize the proceeds, the government may not promote
measures aimed at increasing competition. 38

C. Distributional Equity
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Another reason for privatization is said to be the promotion of distributional
equity. Ironically, one of the reasons for the existence of SOEs, in
developing states, in the first place, was to ensure that the comprador class
. did not appropriate all the resources of the nation. In other words, most
. ;;

SOEs were created to perform social functions. And it was thought that they
Would work for the public good since they belong to the public. Following
their perceived poor performance or, indeed, their appropriation by the
ruling class, the SOEs, in most cases, became instruments of the ruling class
37

\ ISLAM AND MONSALVE supra note 27 at 18
ISLAM AND MONSALVB supra note 27 at 18
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and served their interests. Privatization, which is a reversal of the public
ownership, is thus considered to be a remedy for the ills associated with
SOBs. But there is a trap in using privatization as a cure for the inequities of
society. The government usually handles the privatization programs and
oftentimes it is feared that the SOEs might be sold to government officials or
•

•

theIr cronIes.

39

As a way out of this, many programs aim for a broad-based ownership
structure for the privatized entities. Two further problems arise. First, not

many people would have the funds to purchase shares. So, in reality, some
of the masses would buy the shares and resell to other individuals, thereby
defeating the purpose of the broad-based ownership. Secondly, the attempt
to have a dispersed shareholding runs counter to the basic objective of
ensuring efficiency by holding the managers' feet to the fire. Where many
individuals hold small fractions of the shares in the entity, the situation is not
so different from a government owned enterprise. The result may be that no
shareholder has enough interest in the company to be motivated to monitor

its activities and ensure that it is being run profitably. In this sense, "the

~

-----------------

~ee Frederic Boehm, Juanita Olaya and Jaime Polanco, Privatization and Corruption, in ERNST U. von
267 IZSACKER, LIMITS TO PRIVA TIZA TION: WHEN A SOLUTION BECOMES A PROBLEM, 263(Earthscan, Toronto, Canada, 2005) (discussing the opportunities for corruption in privatization)
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goals of privatization programmes may come into direct
conflict with the efficiency objectives.,,4o

D. Privatization Facilitates Foreign Investments

In the era of globalization, privatization is also seen as being beneficial to a

state's economy because it attracts foreign capital in terms of foreign
investment. Practically, since the SOEs are for sale, they constitute another
avenue for foreign investment. This is mostly the case in developing
countries where the enterprises may be very gigantic and the purchase price
may not be readily available locally. However, while privatization may
make SOEs available to foreign investors and therefore increase the avenues

..

~

;;',

for capital inflow into the country, privatization alone may not promote

; ";'

foreign investments.41 Outside investors are usually aware of the political,
social and other dimensions to these enterprises. Such circumstances may
40

ISLAM AND MONSALVE supra note 27 at 22; See also Bennett supra note 11 at 12 (noting: "how to
feconcile efficiency with equity remains a leading issue in the transitional economies, Equity calls for the
distribution of public assets to the people at large, not to those who are able to pay the most for them as a
resu~t of their (often illegal) amassing of wealth in an earlier regime .... Efficiency, on the other hand,
requires that effective control of assets is in the hands of those possessing entrepreneurial vision of how
can be most productively used.")
41

Th' ,

Prj I~ IS, one of the stated objectives of the Nigerian exercise; See Article 1(2) of the Guidelines on

vatisation of Government Enterprises (contained in Privatisation Handbook, 3nl edition, published by the
re'
Council on Privatisation) (stating that the government intends to use the privatization program to
.~tegrate Nigeria into the global economy, as a platform to attract foreign direct investment in an open,
and transparent manner,)
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make foreign investors wary of committing their resources into these
ventures. Sometimes, in order to do so, they would seek so many assurances

and other guarantees from the government. But on the whole, privatization
has always been coupled with democracy.42 Another aspect of this rationale
is that privatization promotes technological development in the developing

world. By opening the SOEs to investment by foreigners, the opportunity is
created for the foreigners to bring both their technology and their technical
skills. Besides, the competition resulting from privatization would stimulate
",

.'-:-'."

innovation and development in order to optimize productivity. The firm is
"

·, ..i

~(,~.:'~ ~

/ J;<j

~!

therefore likely to invest in methods that would enhance this.
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Privatization also helps in the development of the capital market. Depending
-.,'.:

on the method of privatization adopted, the capital market may prove central

to its implementation. If the shares of a SOE are to be sold by public offer,
! .~

they would be sold through the capital market. In most developing countries,
the capital and securities market may still be in infancy. With the surge of
activities associated with privatization, handling the sales might
impact the capital market. At the same time, such development

See Rose supra note 7 at 693-694 (arguing that: "the relationship of privatization and democratic
cannot be seen simply as ancestor - to - successor, where one (privatization) precedes the
(democratization). At most (to continue the family analogy) privatization and democratization are
co-existing in a mixed environment of mutual support, dependence, and occasional rivalry.)
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43
would steer the cItIzens towar s mvestments.

Privatization is also said to free the government to do what it is best suited
for, which are regulation and the provision of security and other fundamental
services encapsulated in its police powers.

44

Perhaps, this rationale can best

be understood on two levels. Since, government is inherently not best suited
to run profitable businesses, its direct involvement distracts attention from
its other functions. By pulling out of direct involvement in the running of
corporations, it can concentrate on its core functions. An analogy to the
basic economic concept of specialization is apposite. Privatization results in

ll:!, '~.:' ":
I~:>'~"

the government deploying all its resources to the fundamentals of running
the country and this will lead to optimum performance in that area, while the
private sector engages in directly providing goods and services. This may be
a variation on the theme of efficiency. Even where the government retains
some enterprises, it is thought that privatization of the others gives it more
time and resources to concentrate on the few that it retains.

43

45

On another

Coskun Can Aktan, The Rationale for Privatization, supra note 11

44 !his is one of the reasons which the Nigerian government gave for embarking on the privatization
exercise; See Statement by the Nigerian President, Olusegun Obasanjo, on the occasion of the inauguration
~f th~ national Council on Privatization, at the Presidential Villa, Abuja, July 20, 1999 (hereinafter
PreSidential Statement")
.':

.

4S

IIEMMING AND MANSOOR supra note 12 at 6
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level, the government is the regulator of the economy. In performing its
refereeing role, the government is supposed to be impartial and fair. If at the
same time, that it is regulating the conduct of market players, the
government is also a market participant, there is an inherent conflict of
interest. 46 This may lead to distortions in the economy and again militate
against efficiency. So privatization removes this structural imbalance in the
economy.

Some consider the reduction of government involvement in the economy as
an end in itself and therefore point to privatization as a positive on this
account. Privatization is thus seen as reducing the size of the government. 47
A corollary is that it limits the opportunity for interference in the enterprise
and therefore reduces the avenues available for government corruption. 48
However, a better analysis, or, rather, a logical conclusion to the argument,

.

18

that privatization facilitates efficiency by reducing governmental

46 '1"1.:

HUS is not just a theoretical possibility. There are claims that in some states SOEs may violate
regulations and go free; See Shirley, supra note 25 at 26 (giving the example of one African country in
Which the SOEs were several years behind in paying their taxes and their utility bills but were not
sanctioned)

. 47

ISOla, supra note 2 at 83
.

48

Boehm, Olaya and Palanco supra note 39 at 263
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interference and corruption in the enterprise.

Privatization also reduces the influence of trade unions.

49

Obviously this

would be a controversial advantage, as not every one would agree that a
reduction of the influence of trade unions is a good thing. But to advocates
of free market, trade unions interfere with the efficient operation of market
forces in the labor market, and to the extent that privatization reduces their
influence it actually does have a salutary effect on the economy. Another
labor related claim made by proponents of privatization is that it eliminates
.;,

hidden unemployment. 50 In other words, a SOE retains employees whether it
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needs them or not, and whether they are productive or not. It leads to a
situation of hidden unemployment. But where the SOE is privatized, the new
entity is likely to rationalize the workforce to ensure that employees who are
redundant are so declared.

There are other reasons51 for which a state may choose to privatize its public
49

HEMMING AND MANSOOR supra note 12 at 6

so

Aktan supra note

11

·:~or instance privatization is said to curb inflation. See Aktan supra note 11.; Often times too, privatization
B JUSt a policy prescription imposed on a country by the international fmancial institutions like the World
ank and the International monetary Fund. See Frankel supra note 1; Some cynics believe that in some
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enterprises. These may vary with the particular state, but the over arching
consideration is usually the attempt to attain economic efficiency. 52

m. ARGUMENTS AGAINST PRIVATIZATION
The concept of privatization is not a wholly sweet pill to swallow. It has its
critics, who charge that privatization results in increase in prices and hurts
the common man. This is the direct antithesis of the advantage of efficiency

and market forces. Since the SOEs are not profit driven, they may charge
significantly lower prices for their goods or services. Indeed, the subsidies
-'- ,,"

from the government are indirectly passed to the citizens, in the nature of
,-t ,"

low prices. With privatization, and the need to compete on equal terms with

cases a state may privatize its s just because the level of failure on the part of the enterprises is such that
they imperil the position of the state officials. See Mitrofanskaya, supra note 13 at 1403. In that sense the
privatization is prompted by the self-interest of such officials. See also Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 10 at
183 (attributing the momentum of the privatization exercise in Africa partly to the fact that African
governments ran out of cash)

~13ut sometimes the touted objectives may conflict. And scholars may disagree on the hierarchy of these
rationales. Compare VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 425 (arguing that the primary criterion
for judging privatization is the improvement of industrial efficiency and that other goals such as extending
share ownership, raising revenue and so on, are secondary; they assert that the latter goals can be achieved
by other means) with Leroy P. Jones, Pankaj Tandon and Ingo Vogelsang, Net BetWjils from PrtvatiUJIton
of Public Enterprises, in OTT AND HARTLEY, (ED), supra 17 at 2, 53-70 53 (alluding to ''the most
~dard measure of performance" of privatization, as being social welfare; they assume that governments
pnvatize in order to maximize social welfare, and that to assess the success of privatization is to examine
thharpe
effect of the divestiture on social welfare); Of course the dichotomy between the two reasons is not that
S
. The one inevitably leads to the other. Economic efficiency invariably results in the greatest benefit to
:e greatest number of individuals, that optimal and utopian state which is not antithetic of social welfare.
d owever, as with every controversial subject, perceptions may differ. The rationales may also vary
~pending on the stakeholder concerned. This may range from national and local governments, managers
o the SOE to employees; See ERNST & YOUNG, supra note 9, 13-14
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other participants in the market, the enterprises tend to increase pnces.
However, advocates of privatization would counter that while the cost of the
products may increase, there is a corresponding increase in the quality and
standard of services obtained.

Closely related to this are the redundancies and loss of jobs that seem to
follow privatization. In a bid to achieve efficiency, the privatized enterprises

are wont to streamline operations. This results in loss of jobs. 53 The
I.,'

h"'~~~
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projected positive impact on the over all economy is not immediate and such
aspiration may not seem a sufficient counterpoint to the devastating effect
the loss of jobs may have on individuals. No wonder that in most developing
economies, the stiffest resistance to privatization comes from the labor
unions and other workers' groups. 54 But proponents argue that while the
enterprise remained state owned, the unemployment was hidden55 and that

53

But see Leroy Jones, Winners and Losers in Privatization, in AHMED GALAL AND MARY SHIRLEY
(EDs), DOES PRIVATIZATION DELIVER? (Highlights from a World Bank Conference) 91-94 (The
W~rld Bank, Washington, DC, 1994) (commenting on case studies of privatization in four countries, and
notmg that employees were not worse off; he attributes this to the fact workers generally have some power
to negotiate a favorable deal during privatization and that most public enterprises are reasonably high tech
and thus require employees with technical skills and that this gives employees some leverage)
34

For example the Privatization agency in Nigeria has been having a running battle with the workers of the
state owned electricity enterprise, National Electric Power Authority (NEPA). The workers strongly
OPPOsed privatization ofNEPA.
55

See Aktan supra note 11
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privatization is not the cause of the unemployment but rather the solution. 56
This is because the loss of jobs accompanying the short term restructuring
may be compensated by future employment opportunities that will attend an
efficient enterprise. 57 In some cases, the government has to take account of
the impact privatization would have on jobs and may obtain a guarantee
from the prospective transferees, of its interest, that workers would not be
.... ' ..

laid off. The issue may also be addressed by dialogue with the employees
and by encouraging the employees to participate in ownership. 58

Similarly, it is contended that privatization exposes the economy to
dominance by a few. Only a few rich are in a position to acquire the SOEs.
This problem is compounded by the fact that in most developing countries
SOEs are monopolies. While the government owned them, political
pressures generally would insulate the consumers from the predatory
tendencies of the monopolies. But when they are transferred to private hands
the few rich folks who can afford them would exploit and indeed abuse their

56

CHARLES VUYLSTEKE, TECHNIQUES OF PRIVATIZATION OF STATE - OWNED
ENTERPRISES, Vol. 1 Methods & Implementation, 129- 133 (The World Bank, Washington, DC, 1989)
51

VllYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 129-133
58

VUVLSTEKE supra note 56 at 129-133
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market dominance. 59 This will undercut the social and macroeconomic
objectives for privatization, because "privately efficient profit seeking can
no longer be expected to lead to socially efficient results.,,6o In a region, such

as Africa, reeling from the effects of colonialism, this concern is elevated
and may be at the heart of opposition to privatization. Some might see the
clamor for liberalization as another mechanism to re-colonize the region of
Africa using privatization as the Trojan horse. 61 The panaceas for this
shortcoming are few. First, states may take measures to reduce the market
power of the privatized enterprise by expanding the scope of competition.
This may be achieved by eliminating any barriers to entry into the relevant
market so as to increase the scope of actual or potential competition. 62
Secondly, the enterprise may be restructured so as to eliminate or reduce its
market dominance. 63 Where monopoly power remains, then, as of necessity,
the state has to enact effective competition laws and other regulations. 64 A
caveat is that a cautious balance must be maintained between appropriate
$9

.Thus Vickers and Yarrow argue that "theoretical analysis and empirical evidence support the view that
pnvate ownership is most efficient - and hence privatization is most suitable - in markets where effective
(actual or potential) competition prevails." See VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 426.
60

VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17at 426
61

Callaghy & Wilson, supra note 10 at 183
62

VICKERS AND YARROW, supra note 17 at 427

i'lId
64

Id
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regulation and over regulation since the latter may defeat the purpose for the
privatization.65

Ideally, both reduction of market power and regulation,

should precede the privatization. However, expenence shows that most
developing states at best enact regulatory laws, if they do so at all, only as
part of the privatization exercise.

This imbalance is more pronounced in developing states, and a scholar66 has
argued that writers on the subject tend to ignore this tension. Simply put,
',"

privatization and "marketization" of the economy would benefit the
economically dominant few. It would further entrench their dominance and
cause a tension between democracy, as represented by the majority, and
market, which is dominated by the rich minority. Chua asserts:
"In developing countries with a market - dominant minority, markets
r,

',:

65 Jones, Tandon and Vogelsang, in OTT AND HARTLEY, (ED), supra note 17 at 67 (noting that
government should safeguard against price increase by regulating the enterprise after the privatization, but
that such regulation should be done carefully in order to maintain a balance between the need to protect
against price increase and the need for the enterprise to achieve the objective for its privatization in terms
of cost constraint and productivity improvements.)
66

Amy L. Chua, Markets, Democracy and Ethnicity: Toward a New Paradigm for Law and Development,
108 Yale L.J.I, 79 (1998) (stating: "most developing countries have one or more ethnic minorities who, for
varying reasons, have economically dominated the 'indigenous' majorities around them. Under certain
conditions, the presence of an economically dominant minority will introduce a fundamental tension
between markets and democracy. This will be the case whenever the economically dominant minority is
also market - dominant, meaning that it tends to be economically dominant under market conditions.") Of
COurse it is arguable whether such tension is wholly undesirable. To the extent that the market dominant
~~ is in the political minority, that scenario will offer an inherent protection to the consumers, which
Will mVariably be in the political majority. Furthermore, in the peculiar context of developing or
undeveloped democracies, the dilemma may be theoretical because political power may tend to track
economic power. In other words, those who control economic power, even if they are in the minority, still
:ssess POlitical power. Although this is antithetic of democracy, developing countries especially in Africa
Ve not witnessed true democracy.
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and democracy will tend to favor different ethnic groups. Markets (by
definition) benefit the market - dominant minority, while democracy
will increase the power of the relatively impoverished majority. In
these circumstances, markets and democracy will not be mutually
reinforcing. Rather, the combined pursuit of markets and democracy
will produce a very charged and unstable situation.,,67
Chua's thesis assumes a powerful ethnic minority but the thrust of the
proposition is equally true even where the minority is not a recognized
ethnic group. As long as the economic power resides in the hands of a few,
they will tend to coalesce into an association that may be likened to an
ethnic group. This triggers a tension where they are in a position to virtually
,

buy all SOEs.

Privatization also results in the loss of a sense of symbolic ownership of the
SOEs. Notionally, since the enterprises are owned by the State, they belong
to every one. They are the common heritage of the entire citizenry.
Therefore, upon sale, it is not only the government that is divested but also
the common man. And critics may not be persuaded by the fact that the sale
of the enterprises will be for valuable consideration, which will go to the
common purse. They see the physical structure of the SOE as a sign of their
common ownership. The money realized from the sale may not be so visible

6i

Chua supra note 66 at 79
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to them, and indeed, it may be doubtful if it would be used for their common

good. Besides, in a system that is not particularly transparent, the valuation

and pricing of the enterprises may be tainted or, indeed, be dubious.
Similarly, privatization might be seen as a loss of sovereignty especially if
the SOEs involved relate to the natural resources of a developing country

and is acquired by a multinational corporation or other foreign investor. And
fears are expressed that privatization implies a return by the developing
world to imperialistic conditions, and that it affects a retreat from national
identity and self-determination. 68
"(~

;

~.t ~~.

,;.;'.'

IV. METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION

Various mechanisms are available to a country desirous of privatizing its
SOEs. As with the meaning of privatization, these methods are as varied as
the perceptions of privatization. But, we shall concentrate on those methods,
which result in an ouster of the property rights of the state in the shares in
..'

~.

.
'

the SOEs.

'

. .' .-~

;------------------EcJohn ~. Rhea, Privatization in the International Petroleum Industry: The Interplay Between Politics,
onOmlcs, and Reliance, 33 Denv. 1. Int'l L. & Pol'y 609, 629-632 (2005)
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In a direct sale, the shares of the SOE are sold to a pre-identified single
,

~

.r

purchaser or group of purchasers. 69 This may be through a pre-qualification
of bidders who then bid for the shares or through direct negotiation. For
investors, direct sale represents the most straightforward method of
acquiring control over a SOE. For the government, this method has the
advantage of enabling it to select strong purchasers with relevant industrial,
fifo';·";;:';

commercial, financial or other experience. 70 This method also has the

~
~f....t.·:·~••·..;
~n(J ~~,

advantage of ensuring a quick completion to the transaction. However, it has
been noted that the most effective way of finding the best suited investor and
to maximize government revenues from the sale is through competitive
. tender, and that direct negotiations with a single buyer rarely generate the
possible deal for the government. 71 It has also been noted that
......lL,Q.u...'u

......

V'IJ~'"

by sale to the highest bidder is the preferred method in

economies because it leads to efficient matching of buyers and

. \TUnsTEKE supra note 56 at 16-20
VUVtSTEKE supra note 56 at 16-20; KALLY MEGYERY AND FRANK SADER, FACILITATING
PARTICIPA nON IN PRIVATIZA TION, 14 (World Bank, Washington DC, 1996)
. MEOYERY AND SADER supra note 70 at 14
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assets .72 On the downside, where the direct sale is done privately, it opens
the process to accusations of lack of transparency. 73

B. public Offering

Under a public offering, the state sells to the general public all or large
blocks of stock that it holds in a SOE.74 This is usually through the stock
exchange. This is usually the preferred mode where the aim is to broaden the
share ownership. Usually the SOE is prepared for the privatization to make it
attractive to the public and to ensure there is an adequate distribution
,'.

:

network for the sale. 75 Sale through public offering has the advantage of
~' ... ~
l:

transparency. Anyone can buy the shares on the stock exchange. However,

it might result in the transfer of the SOE to so large and dispersed a group as
;to negate the economic or efficiency motive for the privatization. This is
"because no one investor or group of investors would have a significant
"

~

.'12

.' See John Bennett, Saul Estrin and Giovanni Urga, Methods of Privatization and Economic Growth in

Transition

Economies ,
P. 8 (last visited May 17,2007)

'13

VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 16·20
1.

VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 11·16; See also Philip M. Nichols, Creating a Market Along the Silk
A Comparison of Privatization Techniques in Central Asia, 29 N.Y.U. J. Int') L. & Pol'y 299, 308

MEGYERY AND SADER supra note 70 at 14
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:lnterest to warrant the extra effort that might be required to monitor the
enterprise. Some countries address this shortcoming by combining the public
stock offering with a direct sale. A particular portion of the SOE' s shares
might be sold to pre-identified investors who have both requisite resources

and acumen to tum the entity around, while the remainder of the shares
would be sold to the public at large through the public offering.

c. Sale of Government Assets

-,"" :,,;;

In this method of privatization, the assets of the SOE are sold usually

through private sale. 76 The distinctive feature of this method is that the

.'0,\

purchasers do not receive any shares. Instead they buy the assets of the SOE.
But if all the assets are sold, then the SOE is wound up. Sometimes the

assets may be transferred to a new company to be formed by the government
';

and private shareholders, and the assets would thus be considered the
government's, or part of the government's, contribution to the new
Company. The advantage this has, for the investor, is that they can acquire

;----------------VllYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 20- 23
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the company without the attached liabilities, since they buy only the assets. 77

D. Reorganization into Component Parts

This involves the breaking up of a SOE into several entities or into a holding
company and several subsidiaries. 78 This might be a prelude to outright sale
of some or all of the entities. This is usually preferred where the SOE
incorporates many activities that, in the aggregate, are not attractive to
:;

,".

potential investors, whereas individual units would be. It may also be used
,,';'1"'<

where the SOE is a monopoly and the fragmentation would facilitate
competition. This method can be considered as a method of privatization in
the broadest sense. To the extent that the breakup of the SOE into several

units, entails the elimination of the SOE as it was initially known, it could be
said that the act of reorganization extinguished the SOE. But until the
several entities are transferred to the private sector, the privatization remains

;-----------------MEGYERy AND SADER supra note 70 at 15; In truth the investors do not technically acquire the
COinpany. They only buy its assets. Perhaps a better analysis is that the investors acquire the use of what
once the company but not its liabilities.
TEKE supra note 56 at 23-26

114

,'.,

private Investment in a SOE

Private investment in a SOE entails the injection of new capital into a

80E. 79 The result is that of a dilution of the government's interest and the
creation of a partially privatized enterprise (that is if there was no private
equity involvement in the enterprise in the first place). This method is used
where the SOE has capital problems and there is the desire to infuse private
...

capital into it. This is considered a method of privatization not so much
..

"

'.

because the government parts with its shares in the enterprise but because
the private sector now participates in what was previously a wholly
government enterprise.

F. ManagementlEmployee Buy-Out

Under this method of privatization, its management and employees acquire
the SOE.80 Usually, the employees and managers would have to source for
the funds to acquire the SOE, and would sometimes use the SOE as
collateral for the funds. This method is usually adopted where the SOE is
plagued with labor issues and where the alternative is liquidation. The

;-----------------VDYLsTEKE supra note 56 at 26-29
80

MEGYERY AND SADER supra note 70 at 16; VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 29-34
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interest becomes an incentive for the management and employees
they now have a direct personal and pecuniary interest in the success
81

of the enterprise. Politically, too, this method is attractive as it avoids the
criticism of selling out to foreign or other interests. But the downside is that
the enterprise might become undercapitalized because the management and
employees might not have enough funds and in some cases the enterprise
could even be sold to them on a discount. 82

r::':,:.::,~:

G. Voucher Privatization

~:.(~. ~~t;';

:::"""".J.n!

oucher privatization is used where the purpose is to spread the ownership
of the SOE. Typically vouchers are given to citizens for free. They can then
.

,

these vouchers to "purchase" the shares of SOEs. This is not effective in
~G1~mJl: capital for the enterprise, even if it is popUlar. Besides, it may defeat

purpose of the privatization because of the spread of the shareholding. 83

are other devices which some regard as methods of privatization.
range from lease and management contracts to introduction of
supra note 56 at 29~34
AND SADER supra note 70 at 16
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competitive features to the enterprise. 84
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ti'~'

,
',.-

,,~'

~,~~. ,.;

~----------------------

84

See generally VUYLSTEKE supra note 56 at 8-9 and 34-40; others included are economic policy

lef~nns such as demonopolization, increased private sector fmancing of new activities such as contractor
~~ financing, revenue participation certificates or revenue bonds issued by the state or state bodies and
pnvatization by "attrition" (SOE failing to invest in its monopoly and thereby allowing the private sector to

Illvest in plants and related facilities and take over all or part of the SOE's operations)
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pRIVATIZA nON: THE NIGERIAN EXPERIENCE

As earlier stated, Nigeria has, for some time now, experimented with the
privatization of its SOEs. Two broad episodes are identifiable: the first
major attempt was in 1988 under the supervision of the then existing

military government while the second, and subsisting effort, was initiated in
1999 and is being managed by the civilian administration. This chapter will

.,

"\

';,T •. "

be devoted to the first episode. The current exercise will be discussed in
Chapter 5.
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I. BACKGROUND TO THE PRIVA nZAnON PROGRAM

While there might currently be ambivalence about SOEs in Nigeria, the
provenance and reason for the state's intervention, in the nature of
Participation in ownership of SOEs, are undoubtedly clear and free from
controversy. At independence, the establishment of SOEs seemed a natural
policy for the government to take. The development of the newly
·

'

independent country of Nigeria was one of the topmost items on the agenda

118

the government. Understandably, development of private capital was very
low. The First National Development Plan, 1962-1968, thus aimed at the
development of an economy in which private capital would be dominant. l
But certain SOBs were inherited from the colonial administrators and were
retained, principally to stimulate the private sector. These enterprises were
not profit driven, but instead charged prices, which were statutorily
determined? It was thought that since the outputs of the SOBs constituted
inputs in the production of other goods and were also required by
~.:'"

households, setting their prices low would attract inflow of foreign capital
and reduce disparity in the living standard of the people. But these
expectations did not materialize. The inflow of foreign capital was limited
and went into commercial rather than the industrial sector. The private sector

was not developing fast enough and there was a general lack of expertise, on
the part of Nigerians, to occupy the positions left by foreigners after the
indigenization program in the 1970s.3 To address this lapse, the Second and
Third National Development Plans, 1970-1974 and 1975-1980, respectively,
I

MIKE OBADAN AND 'SESAN AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION
POLICY IN NIGERIA, 6-7 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 1998) (hereinafter "OBADAN AND AYODELE,
COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY")
2

OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note

lat 6-7
3

h Omawale A. Kuye, Problems and Prospects of Nigeria's Privatisation and Commercialisation
ogramme, The Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. XXV No. I October 1990, P. 49 at 54-57
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the enlargement of the existing SOBs and the establishment of

ones. 4 Similarly, the establishment of the SOBs extended, beyond the
~ial

services and utilities sector, into unorthodox areas such as

manufacturing, agriculture, commerce and banking. Thus from the private
sector focus (as the engine of development) of the First National
Development Plan, there was a shift in the Third National Development

Plan, which relied on the public sector to be the prime mover of the
,

socio-economic development of Nigeria and the SOBs thus became the main
engine of growth.

5

The conventional wisdom was that the SOBs did not perform well although

it is an open question what standard was used for measuring their
performance. Bven as early as 1968, the question of how best to use the
SOEs had become topical. Different commissions were set up by different
aaIinmlstra1ti()nJ.~ to look into the best way to optimally use SOBs. The Ani
6

, Some of the enlarged ones included Nigerian Railway Corporation, Nigerian AirWays Limited, the Post
" Telecommunications Department and Nigerian Telecommunications, NlTEL. The new ones included
Electric Power authority (created from the merger of Electricity Corporation of Nigeria and the
dams Authority), the River basin Development Authorities, the Nigerian national Petroleum
i ....urDO"'.tj~n NNPC, (which metamorphosed from the Nigerian National Oil Company). See OBADAN
AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRlVA nZA nON POLICY supra note 1 at 7-8
AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALlZAnON AND PRlVATIZATION POLICY, supra note 1
7; See also National Centre for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA), Pubic
Reform,29 (Training Programme Report 2000/200 I)
Adebayo Olukoshi, The Historic Significance ofthe Policy ofPrivatisation in Nigeria, in R. OMOTAYO
AN AND CHIBUZO N. NWOKE (BDs), STRUCTURAL ADJUSTMENT IN NIGERIA, 103,
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was instituted to look into government parastatals in 1968. In

, 1973, the Udoji Commission was also concerned with an examination of the

public sector. This was followed by the Onosode Commission, in 1981, and

the AI·Hakim Commission, in 1984. Results from the reports of the
commissions showed problems with the SOEs. These problems included
misuse of the enterprises' monopoly powers; defective capital structures
resulting in heavy dependence on the Treasury for funding; escalating
.'

:: .~-

budgetary burden; bureaucratic bottlenecks in relations with supervising
Ministries; mismanagement, corruption and nepotism; ill advised investment
resulting in costly and inefficient utilization of public resources; and

.

,!

constant political interference in decision making. 7

The latter two

Commissions 8 were specifically charged with the responsibility of
determining the basis for a new funding arrangement that would make the

SOBs less dependent, on the treasury, for funding, detennine appropriate
.capital structures and appropriate incentives to enhance productivity and

;': ~ .

.115 (Nigerian Institute of International Affairs, Lagos, 1989); Technical Committee on Privatisation and
~lIunelrciailisa1tion Final Report Vol. 1 (Main Report) 1993 (Hereinafter "TCPC Report") P. 8; A.F.
A Framework for Evaluating the Performance of Nigerian Public Enterprises: Implications for
frll1tlliZ'atiGIn. The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XXI Nos. 3 & 4 April/July 1987P. 190 at 191;
Centre for Economic Management and Administration (NCEMA), Pubic Enterprises Reform,29
Programme Report 2000/2001); Ekong Emah, The Change of Baton: From State Control to
[rJV,atis(;rtion and Commercialisation, in Setting the Economy Free (a publication ofKee Communications

LagOS, 1993) p.9

VIlO~lOde Commission set up by the Shagari administration and AI-Hakim Commissions set up by the

adtninistration
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9

efficiency of the staff. Both recommended a selective privatization of the
public sector.

lO

Significantly, both the Onosode Commission and the AI-

Hakim Commissions were set up at a time of perceptible economic crisis
and international pressure for the country to rationalize its public sector. And

it is arguable that their recommendations reflected the global trend towards a
shrinking of the public sector in favor of private enterprises as championed
by the "Washington Consensus". Yet there are those who contend that

privatization was not new to Nigeria even in the 1980s.

11

Certainly, here and there before the 1980s, the government might have
handed over a project or another to the private sector, but it was only in the
\

: )"

1980s that privatization came to be considered as a thrust of government's
economic policy. The first documented attempt at privatization was in 1983

,,')

9

Ekong Emah, The Change of Baton: From State Control to Privatisation and Commercialisation, in
Setting the Economy Free (a publication ofKee Communications Ltd, Lagos, 1993) P.9

,-,'

10 Od "d
eJl e supra note 6 at 190-191; The AI Hakim Commission recommended as follows: (a) the
government should embark on a program of selective privatization as a way of prompting the parastatals to
~ more efficient; (b) in embarking on the program, the government should ensure that the 'national
mterest' and 'national security' were paramount; (c) four out of eight public utility companies should be
fully or partially privatized by making them go public and seek quotation on the stock exchange; (d) the
government's privatization exercise should ensure that private interests were allowed to hold between 50
~d 70 per cent of the shares of public enterprises put up for sale, the aim being to reduce government
l1l~nce in their management to the barest minimum; and (e) in undertaking the change from public to
Pl'iv~te ownership, workers of the affected parastatals should be allowed 10 per cent participation in the
eqUlty so as to induce in them a sense of commitment to the organization. See Olukoshi, supra note 6 at I 17

II

JEROME

uoon, WInCH WAY NIGERIA? 166 (Spectrum Books Ltd, Ibadan, Nigeria, 1999) (stating

tba~ priVatization was ftrst practiced in Eastern Nigeria
" 'I

in the early sixties when the government of that

regIon sold its shares in the Nkalagu Cement Company to the public.)

122

when the Shagari administration, as part of its effort to contain the growing
/ fiscal and payments problems of the country, announced that it had decided

in principle to relinquish its ownership, of certain corporations and
parastatals, to private interests.

12

Since that administration was terminated

that year, it did not have time to fully implement that decision.

That responsibility fell to the succeeding military administration of
Muhammadu Buhari, which also had to continue the negotiations with the
International Monetary Fund (lMF), an institution that had been demanding
governmental economic reforms including privatization of SOEs.

That

administration instead opted for commercialization, maintaining that it
would be unfair to sell the parastatals, with the huge public investments that
had gone into them, to a few people.13 Nonetheless, the government decided
to sell a set of public companies engaged in agro-allied activities to the

private sector.

14

However, neither the commercialization to which the

government was amenable, nor the privatization of the few enterprises could
be completed before the Buhari government was itself sacked by the Ibrahim
Babangida military administration.

12

See Olukoshi, supra note 6 at 116

13

Olukoshi, supra note 6 at 117
14

Olukoshi, supra note 6 at 118
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As shown in Chapter 1, the Babangida administration, 1985-1993, was the
first to seriously adopt a privatization program in Nigeria. Although such
policY prescription was one of the fundamentals of the conditions usually
imposed by the IMF and World Bank, two institutions that the government
was desirous of working with, the Nigerian version of privatization was also
said to have been prompted by so many other factors most of which dovetail
with the general rationale usually proffered for privatization any where.

Olukoshi 15 has summarized the prevalent arguments for privatization

ill

Nigeria as follows: The primary concern is the notion of efficiency and
.'

:.

f

performance. The SOEs were considered to be underperforming and to be

'",

unprofitable. For instance, it was argued that the electricity enterprise NEPA

~.

continued to operate at a loss from 1978-1987. 16 Moreover, the unprofitable
SOEs constitute an intolerable drain on the scarce resource of the
....

0,,;.;

government because apart from failing to generate revenue for the

15

Olukoshi supra note 6 at 120-121
16

OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note
at
See also A.O. Sanda, Justification and Strategies for the Selective Privatization of State Owned
J;jerpnses, The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XXI Nos 3 & 4 ApriIJJuly 1987 P. 173;
(MaHNSON A. AKINBADE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIVATISATION IN NIGERIA, 74·75
cal< Books Ud, Lagos, 2004)

1 61'~6;
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government, they also depended on the state for sUbventions. I7 The SOEs

<

were also accused of failing to fulfill the objectives for which they were
established, namely large scale physical output of goods and services, and
they were also alleged to be characterized by poor billing systems, poor
costing and credit control. It was thought that the only way to correct these
anomalies was to privatize them. Furthermore, it was argued that privatizing
Nigeria's SOEs would generate greater wealth and provide more
employment. It was also thought that the corruption endemic in public
enterprises would be solved by their privatization, while at the same time the
opportunity for political interference and administrative red-tape would be
eliminated. Privatization would also yield enormous amounts of money for

the government through the proceeds from the sale of the enterprises. This
would be in addition to the taxes that would be chargeable on the profits of
privatized enterprises and such monies would go a long way in helping to
solve the fiscal crisis of Nigeria. Moreover, "even if the SOEs were viable,
profitable and efficient, they would perform better if they were privatized
because private managers are better than government managers.,,18 And
finally, privatization would unfetter the market forces to liberate the

;----------------Olukoshi supra note 6 at 121
<

18

Olukoshi supra note 6 at 121
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from

the

burden

of unnecessary

and

obstructive

state

20

Obadan and Ayodele would seem to broadly classify these arguments into
three groups. First is the efficiency-based justification. Secondly, there is the
public finance justification, which relies on the need to relieve the enormous
burden, which the SOBs impose on the government. Third is the socioeconomic rationale, which itself has three dimensions: to rein in government
deficits, to improve efficiency by introducing private sector reward/penalty
·

!

~

incentive structure, and to reduce the size of government involvement in
economic activities, if only in response to international agencies.

19 Other writers

have also alluded to similar arguments. See A.O. Sanda, Justification and Strategies for the
Selective Privatization ofState Owned Enterprises, The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XXI Nos
3 & 4 ApriVJuly 1987 P. 177~ 17 (noting that the justifications for privatization were@i)the manifestations
of underdevelopment; (U) the limited capacity of the SOEs to perform efficiently; (iii) some SOEs were
involved in providing uneconomic services; (iv) phenomenal growth in the number and size of the SOEs;
and (v) extreme levels of misallocation of resources in the SOEs); AKINBADE supra note 16 at 74-75
(noting the objectives of the privatization program to be: (i) improvement of economic performance; (ii)
resolVing management problems; (iii) revenue generation; (iv) discipline of the Trade Unions;
(v)promotion of popular capitalism; and (vi) promotion of consumer sovereignty); The government, on its
part, jUstified undertaking the privatization program on grounds that it would: (i) restructure and rationalize
the public sector so as to lessen dominance of unproductive investments; (ii) reorient the enterprises for
privatization and commercialization towards new horizon of perfonnance improvement, viability and over
all efficiency; (iii) ensure positive returns on public sector investments in commercialized enterprises; (iv )
check the absolute dependence of commercially oriented parastatals on the Treasury for funding and
encourage them to approach the Nigerian capital market fOT funding; (v) initiate the process of gradual
• Cession to the private sector of such public enterprises that by the nature of their operations are best
~anaged by the private sector; (vi) create a favorable investment climate fOT both local and foreign
Investors; (vii) reduce the level of internal and external debts; (viii) provide institutional arrangement and
Operational guidelines that would ensure that the gains of privatization and commercialization were
~tained in the future. See TCPC Report PP. 2·3 (quoting the statement of then Nigerian Chief of General
taff, Augustus Aikhomu, at the inauguration of the TCPC)
.. 20

OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRNATIZATION POLICY, supra note
I at61-n
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above reasons boil down to the proposition that Nigerian SOEs are

being privatized because private sector is more efficient and productive than

the public sector and also because the government would have a positive
fiscal impact by such privatizations. We shall return to this proposition but it
is important to note that certain criticisms were leveled at the introduction of

the privatization exercise in Nigeria.

Akinbade summarizes these criticisms. 21 While privatization reduces the role
of the government, it does not reduce its responsibilities. Privatization
widens the gap between the rich and the poor. Perhaps, this is because while
the rich might afford to buy the SOEs, the poor might not. The lack of
transparency that sometimes attends the privatization programs raise doubts
about the real motives. Privatization might breed unemployment. This is
remarkable because advocates of privatization also argue that privatization
improves employment. While privatization yields revenue, the funds, which
are realized, are not ploughed back into the economy. In other words, there
.:

are no guarantees that the privatization funds would be used for the greater
gOOd. This is a very important objection considering Nigeria's experience

21

AKlNBADE supra note 16 at 74 -75
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with corruption. The sale of the SOBs entails the loss, on the part of the
government, of future revenue, at least in respect of those SOBs that are
profitable, and also compromises the developmental objectives of the SOBs.
Furthermore, privatization opens the economy to domination by foreign
investors and their local proxies. Most of the SOBs are national symbols and
heritage and their sale is essentially the sale of national patrimony.

Privatization might well be the fad of the moment and might also appeal to
the international community. It is also possible that in terms of profits, the
private enterprises make more money than do the SOBs. Yet, to return to the
proposition that SOBs should be privatized because they are less efficient

and less productive than the private sector, such a conclusion is simplistic.
Private enterprises exist for different reasons and answer to different
constituencies. SOBs perform a social function. To assess SOBs on the same
standard as private companies, which is on the basis of profitability, is to
reject the fundamental distinction between the bases for their existence.
Indeed, it has been noted that private enterprises have operated mainly in a
sellers' market and always enjoy numerous direct and indirect incentives and
Subsidies from the state?2 They enjoy these without the concomitant social

;----------------Olukoshi supra note 1 at 122
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responsibilities that apply to SOEs. Consumer protection laws are dead
letters, if they exist at all, in Nigeria. Besides, it has been noted that, "a
comparative analysis of the specific role of the private sector in production
vis-A-vis that of the public sector, reveals the relatively poor performance of
the private sector in Nigeria's economic development.,,23 And this is so even
though most of the private sector enterprises have been doing well reporting
growing turnovers and annual profits.
,

.,

24

"

:-:1\1,;,

The failure of the SOEs is merely symptomatic of the failure of governance

"

in Nigeria. Most countries of the west, which are admittedly market oriented
,

,'\

and profess economic liberalism, do retain social safety nets, be it in health
care, unemployment benefits or other similar cushions, against market
\.

failures and the other vagaries of capitalism. In Nigeria, and most
developing countries, especially in Africa, such safety nets are lacking.
Perhaps, if the argument is framed in terms of an option between doling out
benefits and having servIce oriented public enterprises,
while providing needed social services, also provide employment

,OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note

at4S

OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION POLICY, supra note

at 49
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opportunities to the people, the choice would not easily be privatization. The
perceived failures of the SOEs are those of the government. And such
failures are not limited to the SOEs. They pervade the broad gamut of
government functions. The seeming readiness, willingness and ability of the
government to embark on the privatization program is in essence a shirking
of the responsibility to instill in the SOEs whatever good or business
management that are considered fit. But because the so-called leaders and
those in government, in most cases, are usurpers who seize the reins of
government through illegal means, they become captives to the unsavory
machinery by which they come to office. The SOEs thus become sources for
appeasing and patronizing that same machinery. This is the crux of the
problem of SOEs. Government is always able, if it is willing, to demand
accountability from the SOEs. But it is unwilling because it is compromised.
The standard argument of efficiency is a smokescreen to mask what is in
·.!
•

j

essence the failure of government. Privatization might result in increased
profits for the enterprise, but as Olukoshi asserts: ''what does it matter if the
'. owners of a privatized NEPA or water corporation record fantastic annual
profits but a majority of Nigerians continue to suffer darkness as a result of

. an inability to pay for electricity and do not have access to portable water for

130

the same reason."Z5 Whatever the merits or demerits of privatization in
Nigeria, the military government introduced the policy in 1988, and it has
continued since then.

ll.

THE

LEGAL
PROGRAM IN 1988

FRAMEWORK

FOR

THE

PRIVATIZATION

A feature of the military administrations that dominated the political

landscapes in Africa in general, and in Nigeria in particular, from the 1960s
to the late 1990s, was the ease with which they enacted laws. Being
dictatorships, laws in most cases required only the assent of the head of state
or military president, whatever the chosen appellation. Some adopted a
semblance of legislative bodies, populated by military subordinates and
other cronies, some of whom were civilians. In reality, these bodies were, at
best, advisory to the military ruler. The result was that most laws did not
enjoy detailed examination and scrutiny as would be the case in a normal
democracy. Most laws, too, were terse, in most cases containing few, but
SOmetimes broad, provisions. Usually the government could amend any of
:c

<the laws as easily as it could make them. The Babangida administration
t

~

"

"legislated through the instrumentality of decrees. The decree introducing the
;

..

,"

~

Privatization program was thus issued with the ease with which the
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government regularly passed its laws. It is noteworthy though that to the
extent that the privatization program is a part of the structural adjustment
program, the government could claim that the country sanctioned it when, in
a national debate, it rejected the IMP loan and instead "chose the local

variant." We had adverted, in Chapter 1,

to the quaint interpretation, which

the government applied to the popular rejection of the IMF package.

That decree was the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree. 26 The
scheme enunciated by the 1988 decree was the categorization of enterprises
into four groups. These were those to be partially privatized, fully privatized,
partially commercialized and fully commercialized. 27 Partial privatization,
....

J _

under the decree, implied the divestment of part only of governmental
holding in the affected enterprise. Government still exercised some influence
over the partially privatized SOEs but only to the extent of its representation
the board of directors. 28 Full privatization entailed the divestiture of all
proprietary interest held by the government in the affected firm.29 Such

CnVilltIsaltion and Commercialisation Act, Vol. XXI Cap 369, Laws of the Federation
(formerly Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25, 1988)

. See Sections

1 and 12 of Decree No 25, 1988. (The former deah with partial and full privatization while
, latter dealt with partial and full commercialization.)
Ituye Problems and Prospects supra note 3
the provision of Section 14 of the Decree the word "enterprises" was given an expansive connotation
-Illean: "any corporation, board, company or parastatal established by or under any enactment in which
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enterprises would cease to be operated by he government but instead would
nOW be owned and run by the private

sector.

Similarly,

full

conunercialization meant the reorganization of the enterprises with the result
that they operate as profit making ventures and without subvention, of any
kind, from the government. 30 For partially commercialized entities, the
government was to still fund capital projects but not recurrent ones. As with
most decrees promulgated by the military administrations, the 1988 decree

was brief and contained scant substantive provisions. 31 It established a
Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation (TCPC), with
responsibilities for advising on the capital restructuring needs of enterprises
coming under the purview of the decree and generally implementing the
provisions of the decree. 32

Federal Military Government, or any of its Departments, Ministries, or agencies has ownerShip or
interest and shall include a partnership, joint venture or any other form of business arrangement or
IIP1lllsati{1n ."

See Section 14 of Decree No 25, 1988.
Contained 14 sections divided into three parts.
See Sections 3 and 4 of Decree No 25, 1988.
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The TCPC was given the function of conducting the privatization program. 33
Although the TCPC was charged with implementing the privatization
exercise, it did so under the general supervision and guidance of the Federal

Military government. 34

The 1988 decree introduced the novel concept of commercialization as an
adjunct to the policy of divesting government's interests in the SOEs. It
defines privatization as "the relinquishment of part or all of the equity and
other interests held by the Federal Military Government or its agency in
enterprises whether wholly or partly owned by the Federal Military
Government", and similarly construes the word "privatise".35 On the other
hand, it defines commercialization as "the reorganization of enterprises
33 The specific functions were to: (a) advise on the capital restructuring needs of enterprises to be privatized
or commercialized in order to ensure a good reception in the Stock Exchange market; (b) carry out all
activities required for the successful issues of shares of the enterprises to be privatized including
appointment of issuing houses, stockbrokers, solicitors, trustees, accountants and other experts to the
issues; (c) approach through the appointed issuing houses the Securities and Exchange Commission for a
tlir price for each issue; (d) advise the Federal Military Government after consultations with the Securities
and Exchange Commission and the Nigerian Stock Exchange, on the allotment pattern for the sale of the
~~s of the enterprises concerned; (e) oversee the actual sale of shares of the enterprises concerned by the
ISSUing houses in accordance with the guidelines approved by the Federal Military G()vernment; (f) submit
to the Federal Military Government from time to time, for the purpose of approval, proposals on sale of
Government shares in such designated enterprises with a view to ensuring a fair price and even spread in
the ownership of the shares; (g) ensure the success of the privatization exercise taking into account the need
for balance and meaningful participation by Nigerians and foreign interests in accordance with the relevant
Jaws of Nigeria; (h) ensure the updating of the accounts of all commercialized enterprises with a view to
assuring financial discipline. See Section 4 (1) of Decree No. 2S 1988.

34

Decree No. 25 contains several provisions in which the TCPC could act only with the approval of the
• Federal Military Government to which it submitted periodical reports. For example Sections 4 (4), 9, and
10.
3~

S .
ectlon 14 ofPrlvatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25 1988
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or partly owned by the Federal Military Government in which such
shall operate as profit making commercial ventures and without
subventions from the Federal Military Government." It also requires that the
word "commercialise" be accordingly construed.

36

The TCPC regarded

privatization as the transfer of government owned shareholdings in
designated enterprises to private shareholders and broadly as an umbrella
term to describe the variety of policies, which encourage competition and
emphasize the role of market forces in place of statutory restrictions and
monopoly power. 37It noted that such broad definition applies in countries
such as Nigeria, where privatization is an integral part of the structural
adjustment program, while the narrow definition applies to developed
,

:;.

countries where the privatization program is not necessarily coupled with
structural

adjustment.

The

agency

saw

commercialization as the

reorganization of an enterprise wholly or partially owned by the government,
such that they would operate as profit making ventures, without subvention
from the government. Its main thrust were: (a) to provide enhanced
operational autonomy at enterprise level; (b) to provide competitive
remuneration; (c) to evolve a more result-oriented and accountable
36

Section 14 of Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25 1988

37

19See Technical Committee on Privatisation and Commercialisation, Final Report Vol. I (Main Report)
93 (TCPc Final Report) P.I3
.
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management based on performance contracts; (d) to strengthen financial and
accounting controls at the enterprise level; (e) to upgrade information
management system of affected enterprises; (t) to ensure financial solvency
of the public enterprises through effective cost recovery, cost control and
prudent financial management; (g) to remove bureaucratic bottlenecks and
political interference through clear role definitions between the supervising
ministry, the board of directors and the management of the enterprises. 38

In most countries, the common reform policy is that of privatization. 39 The
tacking of the policy of commercialization to the privatization exerCIse
indicated the ambivalence towards total surrender to the market forces. It
would seem that the government was concerned that even though the SOEs
deserved a total revamping in terms of their ownership outlook, there were
those, which could not just be abandoned to the private sector. In another
sense, it was perhaps a reflection of the gradualist approach to Nigeria's
privatization program. Such approach did not want to sell the SOEs in one

. fell swoop, but rather preferred to privatize some first and others later. In a
SUbsequent chapter, we would notice that some of the SOEs, which are
38

TCPC Final Report p, 13

39

,See TCPC Final Report p, 13 (noting that Nigeria was the only country carrying out a hybrid program of
pnvatization and commercialization simultaneously)
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subject to privatization under the current exercise, are those that were
commercialized under the regime of the 1988 decree.

Similarly, in curtailment of any notion of unbounded free market, the 1988
decree sought to ensure that a few individuals did not hijack the SOBs. It
provided that in the event of over subscription for the shares of the
enterprises, no individual should be allowed to hold more than 1 per cent
equity in anyone enterprise. 40

And, in an attempt to placate the most fervent critics of privatization, namely
workers of the affected SOBs, Section 7 of the Decree provided that not
more than 10 per cent of the shares in any SOB to be privatized should be
reserved for the staff of the SOB. It is obvious that the section intended to
,\'(

:'J

give the implementing agency the discretion to determine the percentage of
shares to be given employees of the enterprise even though the decree put a

,. ',1'1

.;,

cap on such percentage. The provisions of Section 7(5), as couched, enabled
the implementing body to set aside a percentage for the staff, provided such
.,erc:entage did not exceed ten. But did the discretion enable such agency to
allot any percentage at all to the employees? In other words, could the

. Section 7(6) of Decree No 25 of 1988
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,
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agency set aside zero percentage for the said staff? This would seem an
academic question, but it could certainly have arisen under the section.
Obviously, zero is not more than ten per cent and since the section
prescribed no minimum percentage, it could be argued that a failure to set
aside any number, at all for the workers, would be in compliance with the
decree. This was more so when the subsection is juxtaposed with Section
7(2), which prescribed that a maximum of twenty percent and a minimum of

ten per cent was to be set aside for associations and interest groupS.41 On the
other hand, it is also arguable that not setting aside any percentage at all
would have negated the intention of the decree, which was clearly to
guarantee some stake for the employees in the enterprise. Happily the
implementing body, the Technical Committee on Privatisation and
Commercialisation (TCPC), exercised the discretion by following the spirit
of the section, which was apparently to give priority to the workers in the
sale of the SOES.42
41

Se .

ctlon 7(2) provided: ''Not less than 10 per cent and not more than 20 per cent of the total shares shall

be allotted to associations and interest groups such as, but not limited, to State investment agencies,
Workers, trade unions, market women organizations, universities, friendly societies, local and community
associations: provided that in the case of an over-subscription not more than 1 per cent of the shares on
offer shall be allotted to each State through its investment agency.

'i

42

. MSee
.

I.N. Chigbue, Legal Framework for Privatisation and Commercialisation, in GODSON O.
ONEKE (ED), PRIVATISATION AND COMMERCIALISATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES: THE
OF PROFESSIONALS, 187 (Nigerian Institute of Quantity Surveyors, Lagos, 2000) (also noting
the the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree 1993, which replaced the Privatisation and
Conunercialisation Decree 1988, clarified the position by stating that ten per cent of the shares were to be
reserved for the staff.

:LE
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In similar vein, and in a comparable bid to ensure widespread sale of shares,
Section 7 went further to require a mandatory allocation of shares to
associations and interest groups.43 All these provisions were aimed at
ensuring that the privatization exercise benefited a wide spectrum of the
society and the resulting acquisitions were not limited to the top echelons of
society but instead cut across all strata of the public from the affluent, the
middle class to the poor.

Section 2 seemed to be directed at the main source of the problems of the
SOEs. It prescribed that "notwithstanding the provisions of any enactment

I, '

~

.

,;:'

and without prejudice to the generality of 1 Section 1 (dealing with the
categorization into partial and full privatization and the power of the
president to modify those classifications)44 the control, management and
composition of the Boards of Directors of privatised enterprises shall as
.' from the date of privatization reflect the ownership structure of the
enterprises." Many commentators considered this provision to be
J .. :/)

SUch as State investment agencies, workers, trade unions, market women organizations, universities
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,
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monumental and even controversial.

45

However, the section was not that

monumental. It was a declaration or affirmation of what ordinarily should be

the case. The prevailing company laws even at the time of the passing of the
decree had several rules governing the appointment and control of corporate
bodies. And usually, ownership and management generally belonged to
equity shareholders. Technically, control might differ from ownership as
where majority ownership is dispersed resulting in the effective control by
minority shares concentrated in one individual or a group of individuals who
~'.

are able to coordinate. However, the question of control is usually a question
of fact, which is perceptible from the circumstances of a company. It is
hardly amenable to legislative prescription. It is a de facto situation, which
may not necessarily tally with a de jure stipulation. Certainly, a law, or a
. company's constitutive documents, could specify the composition of the
Board of Directors or of management. And notionally, the Board controls

the day-to-day running of the company whilst the overall control and default
.,
"

•POwers lie in the general meeting, which retains the power to appoint and

.,

See, for example, Eyimofe Atake, The Legal Aspects of the Implementation of the Privatisation and
Programmes, in H.R. ZAVYAD (ED), ECONOMIC DEMOCRATISATION, 57
lagos, 1992); Ki~r D. Barnes' Comments on Atake's Paper; Udoji supra note 11 at 169 (observing
one hank had interpreted the provision to mean that owners of the enterprise would have their own
at the general management level of the privatized companies in proportion to their equity
but noting that Section 2 should have applied only to the Board of Directors and not to
,UllIIIllgenlent. See also Boiaji Owasanoye and T.A.T. Yagba, Legal Frameworkfor Privatisation of Banks
in I.A. AYUA AND BOLAJI OWASANOYE, PRIVATISATION OF GOVERNMENT
BANKS AND THE ISSUE OF OWNERSHIP AND CONTROL, 5 (Nigerian Institute of
,f'IlYanCp.rI Legal Studies, Lagos, 1996)
~~tmel·cja.rjsalrjon

,

;'.
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rel110ve directors. It did not seem that Section 2 was meant to be strictly
interpreted. Were it so intended, the further question would have arisen as to
the basis for the allocation of the control of management or the Board
especially where the shares were vested in a dispersed group as was
contemplated by the widespread share ownership envisaged under the
decree. Instead, Section 2 was an admonition, to the government officials in
the affected Ministries, to desist from intermeddling and trying to control the
enterprises. They were to respect the corporate structure enunciated by the
privatization of the SOEs. The proper and normal functioning of corporate
management was to be allowed vis-a- vis the privatized entities. The point
being made is that pre- privatization, the same officials were not supposed to
meddle in the affairs of the SOBs, some of which were set up as companies,
and therefore were subject to the normal rules of corporate management. But
they did so anyway, because they, in fact, could get away with it. Thus, the
legal

prescription that the control of the enterprises would be vested in the

ownership of the enterprises, did little to prevent the same officials from
intermeddling because the source of their ability to interfere was not
necessarily the prevailing law but a de facto situation in which, in reality,
they could do so.
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The 1988 decree also stipulated the methods of privatization to be adopted.

It required the shares of the SOBs to be offered for sale in the Nigerian
capital market and that the offers should be by public issues. 46 However, the
Federal Military Government could decide that the shares should be sold by
private placements. This would be on the advice of the implementing

f;"'

..:

;

~

47

agency.

, .

III. INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK
:..:
;.'.

:

: ' . : . i ::

~

Most government policies are benign. They become good or bad, depending
on the implementation. Thus, the fate of the privatization program depended
so much on the character, ability and effectiveness of the implementing

..,
I'

The literature reveals three universal alternatives available to a
intent on privatizing its SOBs. 48 First, there is the ministerial or
..... u:,.'"'u

approach. Under this approach, the Ministries, which had been

the SOBs, are charged with implementing the privatization
-"""'_.04.

Bach Ministry conducts the sale or transfer of the government

in the SOBs under its supervision. This approach has the advantage

6 of the Decree
supra note 42 at 187-188
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that since the Ministry has been supervising the SOE, it is familiar with all
its ramifications, and, all things being equal, is in a good position to assess it
both in terms of the appropriate purchaser of the shares and in terms of the
price to be charged for them. This was certainly not an appealing option for
Nigeria. First, the civil servants in the Ministries always viewed the SOEs as
areas over which they could exert influence. They probably would have
scuttled or slowed down the privatization program. Secondly, given the
reality

of Nigeria's

political

life,

especially

under the

military

administrations, with the leadership vesting in one institution, indeed one
. individual (the head of state), and the colossal nature of most of the SOEs,
the president, and indeed any Nigerian president, would like to keep a tight
reign over the exercise. Besides, it is arguable that, even the privatization
program would be an avenue for patronage and the ruling class would be

very reluctant to let civil servants oversee such exercise.

.,

.'

~

?

second approach is what is called the treasury approach. Here the
or Ministry of Finance privatizes all the SOEs. The advantage is
the treasury department is intimately involved in fiscal and sometimes
·l~

- - " ' .......

policies and since privatization is somehow connected to the over

policy of the country, the treasury department would be in a good
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, position to implement it. The downside is the same as under the ministerial
or decentralized approach, which is that civil servants might not be keen to
effect the privatization.

The third and most popular approach is the independent focal point
approach. Under this method an entirely new agency is constituted, with the
purpose of implementing the privatization program. The agency would
normally be independent and have direct channel to the highest quarters of
government. The upside to this approach is that since the main purpose of
/ the agency is to undertake the privatization of the SOEs, it would embark

upon that purpose with zeal. It would also serve as one stop shop for all
SOEs, so that anyone desirous of acquiring interests in the SOEs would
have to deal, for the most part, with only the agency. The downside is that if
properly managed, the agency could become additional government
with its members being tempted to transform it into a
---&............... u.

bureaucracy.

adopted the independent focal point approach in both the first
and in the ongoing program. The 1988 decree established a
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committee known as the Technical Committee on Privatisation and
Commercialisation (TCPC).49

The TCPC's membership was drawn from both the private and public
sectors of the economy and was made up of persons with detailed
knowledge and experience. 5o The members were appointed on such terms
and conditions as the president might deem fit in the circumstances. 51
Besides the specific functions contained in Section 4(1 )52 of the decree, the

j\'

TCPC was also charged with performing such other functions as the
;

·-\

president might, from time to time, assign to it. 53 It was also subject to such
directions as the president might deem necessary. 54 Similarly, the TCPC was

..

/

to report to the federal government through the office of the president.

55

The

rcpc was funded by grants from the federal and state governments and was
required to maintain a fund, which consisted of such moneys as was, from
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. time to time, provided by the federal and state governments. 56 Its expenses
were defrayed from such fund. 57 It was also required to keep proper accounts

and records of its receipts, payments, assets and liabilities and to prepare, in
respect of each financial year, a statement of accounts in such form as the
federal government might direct. 58 Its accounts were to be audited within 3
months after the end of the financial year to which the accounts related. 59 It
is reported that "from 1988 to 1993, activities of TCPC were funded from
three main sources, viz Federal government grants (74.2%), United Nations
Development Programme (1 %) and "other receipts" typified by interest
incomes (24%)",60 for a total ofN43.8 million.

was to submit a report of its overall activities every 6 months,61 and a
·

.. ,

, '!

",..."... ,. report within 3 months after the expiration of the year. 62 Consistent
efficiency and, perhaps, because of the complexity involved, the TCPC

N.M. OGUBUNKA, ELEMENTS OF PRIVATISATION IN NIGERIA, 103 (Rhema Enterprises,
2000) (noting further that the federal government provided grants to TCPC for only two years
and 1989/90) and that the grants from UNDP came in for two years too, 1989/90 Iud 1990/91)
9

10
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authorized to have standing and ad hoc sub-committees and to co-opt
non-members into the sub-committees provided such sub-committees were
presided over by members.

63

IV. CLASSIFICATION OF ENTERPRISES FOR THE PURPOSE OF THE
pRIVATIZATION PROGRAM
The scheme of the first privatization program was the classification of
"":,'

enterprises into those to be partially privatized, fully privatized, partially
commercialized I:llld fully commercialized. 64 Experts suggest that for such
classification to be meaningful there need be bases for placing a SOE into
one or the other of the groupS.65 Some suggest that indeed the decision to
privatize a particular SOE should be based on whether the perceived market
failure, in the sector in which the SOE operates, has been solved. If it has,
then, the SOE should be privatized, whereas if it has not, the government
should retain ownership.66 Others, such as Sanda,67 opine that privatization

See Section I of the 1988 Decree.
See for example the comments of Professor V.V. Rhamanadan on H.R. Zayyad, Implementation of the
Privatisation and Commercialisation Programme, in H.R. ZAYYAD (ED), ECONOMIC
U"II..((r-.r.~ TISATION, 44 (TCPC, Lagos, 1992) (stating that: "the question which is necessary to be
and answered by the Government is: in which sectors have market failure been completely solved?
a t case, let us divest or privatise. Secondly, we will ask the question; in which sector is market failure
In existence? In conditions of market failure, the enterprise may have to remain in the public sector for
but at the same time we have to make the enterprise operate under market discipline.")

ttt.

See Prof Rhamanadan's comments supra note 65
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should be selective based on the following criteria: (i) extent of strategic
significance of each SOE; (ii) level of government equity participation; (iii)
the empirical records of performance of the SOE for an interval of time
(example five years or more); (iv) level or extent of government
administrative capacity; (v) the availability of investors, entrepreneurs and
local associations to take over the divested shares. 68 It is not clear what
criteria informed the placement of the SOEs into the different
classifications.69 It is not exactly the case that the SOEs were established as a
result of perceived market failure in certain sectors of the economy, and
therefore Professor Rhamanadan's formulation/o on the choice of

I

enterprises to be privatized, might not have been appropriate to Nigeria. As

has been shown above, the SOEs were formed following independence and
mainly because the private sector was not yet developed, and not because of
any market failure in the private sector. Perhaps, a variant on Rhamanadan's

" See A.O. Sanda, Justification and Strategies for the Selective Privatization of State Owned Enterprises,
The Quarterly Journal of Administration Vol. XI Nos 3 and 4, April/July 1987 (published by the Faculty of
. Administration. Obafemi Awolowo University, IIe-Ife, Nigeria) P. 173
68

.'.

Sanda supra note 16 at 179-180

69

!'t.~. Odejide, supra note 6 at 191 (noting that the decision of the government on the enterprises to be
.. pnvatized or commercialized was not arrived at as a result of any critical or dispassionate evaluation."; See
..•·.h1so Udoji supra note 11 at 171-172 (noting that it is difficult to discover the criteria government used for
. the classification of enterprises into those to be privatized fully, those to be partially privatized and those to
.... commercialized fully or partially, but guessing that the government wanted to retain ownership and
COntrol of viable enterprises and strategic industries like steel. He further observes that whilst retention of
~tegic industries might be justified, retention based on the fuct that particular SOEs are viable might not
.. JUStified.)
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theme would be to ask the question, in what fields the private sector had
become developed. This overlaps with the criteria articulated by Sanda
above. Certainly, the privatization program could have benefitted from an

apriori examination of all enterprises before their placement into one or
other category of the four-pronged reform, and the TCPC could have been
empanelled even before the allocation of the enterprises into those
categories.

Nonetheless, while the government did not specify the exact bases for the
classification into the full privatization, partial privatization, partial
commercialization and full commercialization categories, a plausible
,

,;

rationale could be detected from the types of enterprises placed in each
group, and it did not seem that the government was trying to retain viable
enterprises whilst selling unprofitable ones. The first category contained
those SOEs, which were partially privatized. These included development,
commercial and merchant banks; oil marketing companies; steel rolling
mills; air and sea traveling firms; fertilizer companies; motor vehicle
assembly plants; paper mills; sugar companies; and cement companies. 71 It
could be speculated that these were areas of the economy in which although

------------------'Tc~e
1 Section 1(1) Part I of Schedule 1 to Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25 of 1988;
rC Report P. 11
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private sector was fairly developed, because of their impact on the
the government did not want to fully divest. It still desired to be
.... involved in some ways,72 especially as the private sector could not be said to
bave attained the level of development suitable for an economy such as

. .,

Nlgena s.

F or instance, whereas there were private oil marketing

companies, the downstream sector could not just be left for the private sector

in 1988, as there were not enough of such concerns to effectively serve the
country. Similarly, steel rolling mills, motor assembly plants and fertilizer
companies involved substantial amounts of capital outlays that could still be
considered fairly substantial for private concerns. In these, and similar
industries, it could be surmised that the government chose to "partner" the
private sector, under the auspices of partial privatization, in the continued
: ~ .. :.~

effort to develop those segments of the economy. Of course, it also reflected
the ambivalence or, if you are more charitable, the cautious approach, of the
government towards privatization.

A similar analysis attends those SOBs placed under the category of fully
PriVatized enterprises. For the most part, these were enterprises involved in:
hotels and tourism; textiles; transportation; food and beverages; agriculture
.,
:

..!

,.
~

------------------72

.• l(uye assert that "Enterprises to be partially privatized are those which the government considers
strategic' because of the greater 'public' nature of their goods." See Kuye supra note 3 at 65
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end livestock production; salt; wood and furniture; insurance; film
. production and distribution; flour milling; cattle ranching; construction and
engineering; dairy; and others. 73 It could be conjectured that the government

felt that its total withdrawal from these sectors would not have a negative
impact on the overall economy. Compared to the kinds of enterprises in the
partially privatized group, it is arguable that the kinds of companies in the
fully privatized group were more widespread and commonplace, and also
more easily operated by the private sector. They also involved less capital
1

outlays.

r

The clearest manifestation of the government's hesitation, or carefulness, is

in the coupling of commercialization to the privatization program. The
j.

choice of the enterprises for commercialization seemed to be informed by
.the need to guard against imperiling the public utilities and those other
enterprises that are not only strategic but, indeed, central to the economy.
included: the Nigerian Railway Corporation; Nigerian Airports
, Nigerian Power PLC; Nigeria Security Printing and Minting
\"OIlnDalnv,~ National Provident Fund; Ajaokuta Steel Company Limited;
l'1U!'PM~ln Machine Tools Limited; Federal Housing Authority; Federal Radio
. See Section 1(2) and Part II of8chedule 1 to Privatisation and CommerciaIisatioJl Decree No 25 of 1988;
ReportP.ll
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of Nigeria; Nigerian Television Authority; News Agency of

Kainji Lake National Park; and the River Basin Development
These were partially commercialized, which meant that
government stopped giving them money for recurrent expenses even though

it could fund their capital projects.74 On its face, the list boasted enterprises,
.

'.f

: J

which were significantly important to the economy nay the nation. And
while the government was not entirely satisfied with their performance it
was not ready to turn them entirely and immediately to the private sector.
tnstleaCl. it tried to gradually set them on the path to market forces.

last category, under the 1988 Decree, consisted of those SOEs, which
fully commercialized. Again, the government considered these to be
to the economy, but perhaps what distinguished them from the SOEs
were only partially commercialized was that unlike the latter, they were
commercial from the beginning, even though they also contained
social or public utility aspect. In other words they seemed to have less
utility content than the partially privatized group. The partially
group
.............. Vlll.

included:

the

Nigerian National

Petroleum

the Nigerian Telecommunications PLC; the Associated Ore

See Section 12(1) and Part I of Schedule 2 to the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No. 25 of
TCPC Report PP. 59-61
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Company Limited; the Nigerian Mining Corporation; the Nigerian

coal Corporation; the National Insurance Corporation; the Nigerian
h

Reinsurance Corporation; National Properties Limited; and Nigerian Ports

PLC. 75 The commercialized enterprises were empowered to fix the rates,
prices and charges for goods and services, which they provided and to
capitalize their assets. 76 They were also empowered to borrow money and
issue debenture stocks, as well as to sue and be sued. 77

v. PRIVATIZATION METHODS USED BY TCPC
The TCPC utilized several methods in privatizing the SOES. 78 Thirty-five of
'. <".

the SOEs were privatized through public offer of shares in the Nigerian
· Stock Exchange. Those enterprises were required to satisfy the requirements
by the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC). Such
conditions included the requirement that the SOE must show strong
· evidence of historic and futuristic profit and must, at the time of sale, show
7$

See Section 12(2) and Part II of Schedule 2 to the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25 of
· 1988; TCPC Report PP. 62-63

'18

TCPC Final Report PP. 22·23; MIKE I. OBADAN AND A'SESAN AYODELE,
· COMMERCIALISATION AND PRlVATIZA TION POLICY IN NIGERIA, 89 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 1998)
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v:.

evidence of five years maintainable profit and a strong net asset base. 79
. TCPC refrained from selling weak shares to the pUblic. Thus, it required that

such SOBs should be in a position to pay attractive dividend to shareholders,
and that it should also be possible to recover the cost of floatation of any

SOE privatized by public offer. 80 Seven SOBs were privatized through
private placement. This method was adopted where TCPC felt that a SOB

had a lot of profit potentials but would entail a high cost of floatation if it
was sold by public offer.81 Obviously, sale by private placement presents the
worst possible opportunity for corruption, in that the privatizing agency if it
was not careful could transfer the SOBs to a few individuals. But the TCPC
adopted a policy of first offering such SOBs, to be sold by private
placement, to state investment institutions, because it considered them to
reflect the generality of the Nigerian society. Secondly, such practice
iiC(:Orc:led with the declared policy of spreading share ownership.82 However,
SEC was still involved in determining the price of the shares. Eight
were disposed of by the method of selling their assets, the so called

Omowale A. Kuye, Problems and Prospects of Nigeria's Privatisation, Quarterly Journal of
Vol. XXV No 1 October 1990 P. 49 at 58
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stripping. This approach was adopted for the SOEs that were
·.T "

characterized by serious losses that it was thought that they could not be
turned around. Essentially, the assets of the SOEs were sold off. The River
Basin Development Authorities were disposed of in this way. 83 One SOE

I

Ii'

was sold in a management buyout. Four were handled through a system
called deferred public offer. This meant that the government sold the shares,

in the applicable SOE, to a group of private investors on condition that a
certain percentage (40o/G) would, in turn, be sold to the public within five
years. 84 The reasoning was that the concerned SOE was not very viable at
the moment but could be turned around. The group of investors essentially

was to turn it around within the prescribed period, and then sell a portion of
the stake in the enterprise to the Nigerian public.

commercialization, the TCPC's approach was to detail a committee of
to undertake a diagnostic exercise, covering many aspects of the

. Nigeria - Structural Adjustment Program: Policies. Implementation, and Impact, (World Bank Report,
1994) P. 32; Shamsuddeeen Usman, Monitoring and Regulatory Aspects oj Privatization in Nigeria,
V.V. RAMANADHAM (ED), PRIVATIZATION AND AFTER: MONOTORING AND
TION, 92, 95 (Routledge, London, 1994) (noting the deferred public offer method was adopted
enterprises which, though viable, were such that their privatization by public offer would not raise
commensurate with the real value of their underlying assets)
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enterprise.

85

These included its organizational and management structure of

the enterprise, development of scientific measurement criteria for assessing
the performance of the enterprise, the design of appropriate capital structure
and expenditure policies. Other areas covered by the detailed analysis were
the revenue generation and collection system, evolving staff remuneration
programs commensurate with the revenue generated by the enterprise; and a
review of the management information system of the enterprise in terms of

its relevance. 86 Then the enterprise would be commercialized either partially
or fully. An important feature, indeed, the most revolutionary aspect of the
commercialization program, was the performance contract, which SOEs
signed with the government and which also included the TCPC. We shall
.IJ
. ;
~

to this reform device later in this chapter.

~

I,

!.

"

ASSESSMENT OF THE FIRST PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM

assessment of the first privatization program would reveal some positive
I-" ................u

or that it had salutary impact on the economy. It is noted that

lCuye supra note 3 at 69

156

exercise reduced the number of the 80Es87 , and, presumably, by that
reduced the problems associated with SOEs with which the
'."j,

",j

govenunent had to contend. While such a reduction might be a primary
. outcome of the privatization effort, it is not, in and of itself, significant. This
is because it is merely a corollary of the exercise and does not per se show
benefit to the economy. The sale of the shares in the SOEs also yielded
enormous revenue to the government. It is claimed that the government
realized 3.3 billion Nigerian naira from the sale of the enterprises which
enterprises had an original investment of 652 million Nigerian naira. This
translated to a 2.6 billion Nigerian naira capital gain accruing to the

~.

"

'.,

government. 88 Moreover, the government realized additional funds from
.corporate taxes, accruing as a result of the increased efficiency on the part of
the enterprises. 89 Again, prima facie, these proceeds would seem to have
JUSllne:(1

the privatization, but this might not present a full picture. First,
account must be taken of the hyper-inflationary trend that
the Nigerian economy during the period. Perhaps, reckoning

MIKE

OBADAN AND A' SESAN AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND PRIVATIZATION
IN NIGERIA, 169-173 (NCEMA, lbadan, 1998) (noting that the public enterprise sector was
by the number of the 88 SOEs which were privatized under the first program); See also MIKE
PRIVA TIZA TION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA (ISSUES AND CONDITIONS
SUCCESS IN THE SECOND ROUND), 55 (NCEMA , Ibadan, 2000)

TCpc Final Report PP 14-15; OBADAN, PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN
(ISSUES AND CONDITIONS FOR SUCCESS IN THE SECOND ROUND) supra note 87
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inflation might reveal that the so-called capital gain, was actually a loss
or, at least, not as much as it seemed. Besides, if adequate account is taken
of the potentials of the SOBs, and the government's loss of potential future
profits, the short term cash realized from the sale of the SOEs would not
appear as significant as the 2.6 billion naira capital gains might first suggest.
Yet, having said that, it must be noted that since the conscious decision had
been taken to privatize the SOEs, essentially because they were not
performing well, it was encouraging that so much was realized from the sale.

A noteworthy beneficial effect of the privatization program is the investment
....,

consciousness, which it seemed to engender in the populace. It is claimed
that prior to the commencement of the privatization program the awareness
of the capital market was at a low level, and that no serious efforts were
made to arouse the financial consciousness of Nigerians and to redirect their
consumptive habits to investment habits. 90 But as soon as the exercise began,
the implementing agency, TCPC, began to undertake national tours to
enlighten the people on the need to invest their money in business activities
that are more rewarding to them in the long run, instead of committing them

;-----------

A.tI~?Wale A. Kuye, Problems and Prospects of Nigeria '$ Privatisation, Quarterly Journal of
. -.umtstration, October 1990 P. 66
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activities, which are consumptive in nature. 91 The result was an increase
personal share ownership in Nigeria. Over 800,000 shareholders were
m"'<l'...... -

as a result of the privatization program, almost twice as many as

. .there were in 1988 when the program was commenced. 92 The increase was
such that the TCPC could proclaim that: "the cold hands of Treasury control
'. have been replaced by the warm hands of the Capital Market which are as
, stimulating as they are invisible.,,93

upshot of the increase in acquisition of shares is the perceived
,......\,IJ, . . . . . .

v ....... v ....

of national wealth implicit in the newfound interest of the low-

mc()me group in becoming shareholders. Using data from the subscriptions
three enterprises, Kuye noted that 74.3% of the shares on offer in
Mills Nigeria Limited were allotted to people of the low income
In the case of African Petroleum 68.02% was allotted to the low
group, while 92% of the shares on offer in National Oil and
..• .......JIU""'i:lll:::;

Marketing Company Limited were allotted to that group.94

Final Report 14-15
Final Report P 15

luye supra note 3 at 67 (asserting that ''within a short time TCPC has contributed more to the
of national wealth than economic policy measures had achieved in the past.")
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It is also claimed that the privatization program led to improvement in the
efficiency of the enterprises. 95 A number of enterprises gained solvency and
began to make profits following the privatization and commercialization
policy.96 In a World Bank study on the privatization of banks and
performance, spanning the period 1990 to 2001, the researchers found that,
"while privatized banks performed significantly worse than privately owned
commercial banks before privatization, this gap was effectively closed by
privatization. ,,97 It also found evidence of the poor performance of banks that
continued with minority government ownership during the sample period. 98
In another study, that measured the impact of privatization on the private
9S TCPC

Final Report P. 14-15

Shamsuddeen Usman supra note 84 at 101 (noting that the most notable of these enterprises was the
Nigerian telcommunications PLC (NITEL) ); See also Commercialisation of Public Enterprises: A Case
8tuc/yo[NEPA, in SETTING THE ECONOMY FREE, supra note 6, P. 72 at 81 (noting that between 1990
and 1992, following the commercialization of NEPA, there was an improvement in the financial
Performance of NEPA and in the supply of electricity nationwide as well as in revenue/debt collection and
~ quality of staffs performance); and Commercialisation of Public Enterprises: A Case Study of NITEL,
III SETTING THE ECONOMY FREE, supra note 6, 83 at 88 (stating that following commercialization;
Final report PP. 14-15 (noting improvement in the internal efficiency of the enterprises as well as
unprovement in the allocative efficiency of the economy and that a number of public utilities regained
SOlvency)
96

!cPc
97

E !h0rsten Beck, Robert Cull and Afeikhena Jerome, Bank Privatization and Performance Empirical
:V/(Jencefrom Nigeria, World Bank Policy Working Paper 3511, February 2005, P. 4
98

~orsten Beck et al supra note 97 at 4; But the study also noted that the Nigeria case was difficult to
Classify as a success or failure, and that the performance improvement related only to profitability and
POnfolio qUality. It further asserted that: "since other tests indicate that privatization did not bring about
~st reductions, at least not in the first years thereafter, profitability improvement is only attributable to

:~eased revenue generation." (See P. 25) Thus the study seemed to suggest that while the banks increased

8 ~Ir

re~enue generation, it could not be conclusively stated that their improved fortunes translated into

~
stan.bal welfare improvement. This was because "the mix of profit generating activities for Nigerian
was tilted away from private lending."(See P. 25)
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sector, it was found that privatization led to some improvement in the
economic and financial position of the enterprises.

99

It also found that the

operational efficiency measures and earnings per share showed significant
itnprovement. The study was of seven fully privatized firms and covered a
period of five years prior to privatization and five years after privatization. 100

It also found that the wage income of workers increased, and that contrary to
expectation, privatization did not lead to unemployment in some enterprises.

On the public revenue rationale, it was also found that the government
subsidies did not continue after the privatization, while, on the other hand,
the firms recorded a significant increase in the payment of taxes to the
government. 101

The privatization program also had a positive impact on the Nigerian capital
market. By all accounts the program led to a growth of the Nigerian capital
market from a capitalization of N8 billion in 1988 to over N30 billion in

99

See A. Soyibo, Kolawole Olayiwola and Babatunde Alayande, A Review of Nigeria's Privatisation
Programme, in E. REM! AlYEDE, BABATUNDE ALAYANDE AND AZZEZ MABAWONK (EDs),
READINGS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NIGERIA, 211, 224-232
100

The firms were: (i) Okomu Oil Palm PIc; (ii) United Nigerian Insurance Co. Plc. (UNIC); (iii) Royal

~Ch~ge assurance; (iv) Aba Textiles Mills Plc.; (v) Flour Mills of Nigeria; (vi) National salt Company of
1gena Plc. (NASCON); (vii) Nigerian Yeast and Alcohol manufacturing Plc. (NIY AMCO). See A Soyibo
SUpra note '" at 224
101

A Soyibo, supra note 97 at 23 1-232
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1992.

102

Given that the economy was still young relative to the developed

countries, the privatization program helped to stimulate development and
exposed the capital market to complexities. It has been stated that: ''the
money and capital markets, until privatisation programme was put in place,
were characterized by dullness." 103 The privatization program created
awareness in the capital market. The Securities and Exchange Commission

and the Nigerian Stock Exchange earned increased incomes from the fees
arising from the floatation of shares by the implementing agency, the TCPC,

and by those in the private sector who followed the example of the TCPC. I04
Similarly, the withdrawal of subventions in commercialized enterprises
meant considerable savings to the government. 105

VII. PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING
;

~

.

If the concept of commercialization is a compromise between advocates of
privatization and those who are dubious about government's divestment of
TCPC Final Report, PP.14 - 15; OBADAN AND AYODELE, COMMERCIALIZATION AND
PRIVATIZATION POLICY IN NIGERIA, supra note 1 at 169 - 173 (. that the floatation of shares
through, and borrowing from the capital market raised the market capitalization of the Nigerian Stock
Exchange from N 12 billion in 1989 to N285 billion in 1996); Usman supra note 84 at 95

. 102

103

104
10$

I(uye supra note 3 at 68
I(uye supra note 3 at 69
TCPC Final Report PP. 14-15
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shares in SOEs, such compromise poignantly finds expression in the
i~nIjl"""I'" of performance contract. This is a mechanism, which is intended to

efficient management into public enterprises, by using the
instrumentality of a contract. A linchpin of the commercialization program is
the use of this mechanism to instill performance-based standard into the

SOEs. Performance contracts are "negotiated, written agreements between
governments and the managers of state enterprises that specify targets that
management pledges to achieve in a given time frame and define how
performance will be measured at the end of a specified period."t06 They are
sometimes called other names such as, contract plans, memorandums of
signaling

system,

program

contracts,

performance

agreements, statements of intent, or public utility licenses. to7

The origin of performance contracting is traced to Europe, especially France

in the 1960s and 1970s in the context of high inflation and unemployment,
Which prevailed in those times. t08 Corporatist governments, such as France

106 Mary

Shirley, Why Performance Contracts for State-Owned Enterprises Haven't Worked, Public Policy

for the Private Sector, Note No 150, August 1998
107

Mary Shirley, supra note 106; PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES,

(PIapers presented at an Expert Group Meeting Held in New York, 24-27 April 1994, United Nations, NY,
995) P. 11
.

loa

PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 8
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and the United Kingdom, used public enterprises to counter those
problems.

I09

The first performance contract signed in a developing country

was in Senegal with the National Railway in 1980. 110 Since then, other
African countries have followed. 1II

They are aimed at the common purposes of clarifying the objectives of
service organizations and their relationship with government, and to
facilitate performance evaluation based on results instead of conformity with
;'

t··,

bureaucratic rules and regulations. 112 Most SOBs are criticized because of
the entanglement with supervising Ministries, which exert a lot of
interference in what should be business decisions. Besides, it is contended

.

~

.. ,

that the governments' control of SOBs places emphasis on the input into the
SOEs and their procedures. Performance contracts try to shift this paradigm
to results-oriented controls. 1I3 It serves to clarify the relationship between
the government and the enterprise, by delimiting their respective roles,

it

101)

PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 8
llO

PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 9
III

.

for lOStance, Cote d'Ivoire used it in 1985; Benin from 1987; Ghana from 1989; Guinea from 1990; the
G8Illbia from 1987; Malawi from 1990 and Nigeria in 1992; see PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR
ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at 9. We shall discuss the Nigeria experience with performance
\iIlntractinQ shortly.
112

PUblic Sector Management Reforms in Africa: Lessons Learned, 20, Development Policy Management
Addis Ababa, Ethiopia, (Published by the Economic Commission of Africa, Dec 2003)
Public Sector Management Reform supra note 112 at 20

164

L __

.f.nY\~ and problems. 114 In order to achieve its objective a performance

addresses three of the key problems commonly facing public
115

These are "ill-defined and unreconciled goals, political and

bureaucratic interventions in operational decision-making, and management

rewards which are fixed irrespective of efforts or results.,,1l6

A basic and conceptual problem with performance contracts is the

nomenclature, or rather its exact legal nature. Although known as
performance contract, the agreement does not lend itself to enforceability in

the normal way contracts are enforced. It is said to be only a metaphor for
the relationship between cooperators rather than a legally enforceable
document. 11 ? Of course, it will not be realistic to expect that a government
an enterprise, and therefore can exercise all the incidents of
including the ability to hire and frre the management of the
,~nt:erolris.e.

would instead be suing the enterprise or its management for a

Violation of a performance contract. A more pragmatic remedy, where the
- · · " " ....""LI. ..

is not satisfied with the enterprise or its management, would be

PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR BUSINESS ENTERPRISES supra note 107 at P.12
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 at P.14
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note 107 atP.14
PERFORMANCE CONTRACTING FOR PUBLIC ENTERPRISES, supra note to7 at P. 13
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to exercise those powers to hire and fire or to discipline. Similarly, it will
require an unnatural audacity on the part of management to sue the owners,

in this case the government, for a violation of a performance contract. A fear
of retribution, in terms of exercise by the government of the rights attaching
to ownership, might discourage management from seeking judicial
enforcement of the performance contract. Some performance contracts
provide for arbitration as an enforcement mechanism. But, even arbitration,
to the extent that it contemplates a mandatory submission thereto, may not
offer a meaningful solution. This is because a government might still not be
• .!

easily amenable to such process.

Thus, the efficacy of performance

contracts depends, in large measure, on the commitment of the parties,
especially the government, to the enterprise objectives and other terms
,. ' ,

contained in them. And it would, perhaps, be more appropriate to refer to

,.;:

these so-called contracts for what they are: mere understandings between
governments and enterprises. In a sense, it would seem to corrupt the term
"contract", which has a standard and widely known legal connotation and
denotation, and to reduce the respect often attached to it, to apply it to
understandings that, from the get-go, are known to lack judicial
enforceability, which is an essential characteristic of the term, especially in
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the conceptual difficulty associated with performance
many countries utilize them as yet another reform tool in dealing

with public enterprises.

Under the first privatization and commercialization program, the TCPC
adopted the use of performance contracts in commercializing those
enterprises, which were still to be owned by the government. According to

TepC, the performance contracts were introduced in order to ensure that the
increased autonomy granted public enterprises was not misused or abused

.and that the public enterprises act consistently with the goals of the owner
(government) and also to instill a culture of accountability within the public
enterprise sector. I IS The performance contract was intended to formalize the
business relationship between the government and the enterprise specifying

the obligations and responsibilities of the government and of the enterprise;
It was also meant to identify and specify the overall mission of the
enterprise, and specify the business strategies and actions the enterprise
Would take to attain its mission; Similarly, it was expected to provide
.. i

appropriate incentives for performance, while providing a basis for fair
iiI

TcPC Final Report P. 54
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of the enterprise; Finally it was meant to provide an independent

,n,.. process through the TCPC, which was authorized under the

IlIU..":.::,_
..

;.;. ......"f'r$l'r.T

to monitor the compliance of the parties to the contract. 119 In simple

termS, the board and management of the enterprise guaranteed the attainment
pfcertain stated levels of performance in return for operational autonomy.120
Each such contract was intended to have an initial tenure of three years
during which no material modification was to be made to it. The TCPC was
· ,r'.:

to monitor its effectiveness during such period. 121 An essential part of the
performance contract was the corporate plan, which identified the
'Aftt"'1"1"l1"1'

's mission, provided an assessment of its current performance, as

as determined what its long-term objectives were. Furthermore, the
plan identified the strategies that the enterprise would use to
its objectives and the resources that that would require. Having
,,",VIJ'I.,",U

the language of contract it was important for the performance
to prescribe duties or obligations of the parties. The performance
were in essence tripartite contracts involving the government, the
and

the

privatization

and

commercialization

program

"'p1e

mell1tlflg agency, the TCPC. The Federal Government's obligations
Final Report P. 54
Final report P. 55
Final Report P.55
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.' were, in the main, to allow the enterprise to operate with autonomy and not
'!

to hinder the enterprise in its implementation of its corporate plan. 122 For
their part, the Board and Management of the enterprise undertook to manage
the enterprise efficiently.123 The TCPC's obligations were to monitor due
performance by the parties of their obligations under the contract and to
compile and publish operational data on the activities of the enterprise. It

was also to generally facilitate the process of negotiations between the
Federal Government and the enterprise. 124 It could demand that any party in
default of its obligations under the contract remedy the default and, failing
" !

that, could refer the matter to the Public Enterprises Arbitration Panel.

122 Other obligations of the government were: not to subject the commercialized enterprises to civil service
circulars relating to conditions of service; to allow the enterprises the freedom to, (i) pursue their corporate
mission and take normal business decisions without let or hindrance, (ii) hire and fIre their personnel at all
levels and to reward on a competitive basis, with the exception of the Chief Executive and executive
Directors, (iii) determine their tariff structure so as to recover their production cost plus adequate margin to
earn. reasonable return on investments subject to consultation with the supervising ministries, (iv)operate
their own budget and to allocate their resources and raise funds within the capacity of their balance sheets
to finance their operations, without government guarantees, (v) acquire and dispose of their capital assets as
the needs arise, and (vi) take such business decisions as will promote the enterprise's survival and growth .
See TCPC Report P. 56
123

The specifIc obligations were as follows to: (a) manage the enterprise efficiently to achieve the
objectives in the corporate plan and faithfully implement the approved TCPC reform measures; (b) ensure
financial prudence by the adoption of efficient management techniques for cost reduction and maximization
of revenue; (c) at all times during the continuance of the performance agreement maintain and keep in
proper working order and condition of the plant, machinery and equipment, buildings belonging to the
enterprise; (d) insure and keep insured all its insurable property and equipment against aU risks in
IlCcordance with sound commercial practices; ( e) keep proper books of accounts in line with sound
Commercial principles which shall give a true and fair view of the enterprise's fInances and operations; (f)
PUblish its annual report and accounts within three months of the end of the fInancial year to which they
refer; (g) make contributions to the staff pension fund; (h) do all that is reasonable and consistent with the
other provisions of the agreement to achieve the level of performance specifIed in the corporate plan,
annual budget and detailed performance targets. See TCPC Report P. 56 - 57
124

See TCPC Final report P. 57

169

It could be asserted that the performance contract system adopted by the
,

.

~,

not work to achieve the touted objective of insulating the
enterprises from governmental interference and also enabling them to
perform efficiently. And such failure is not unique to the Nigerian
commercialization program. As Shirley notes, "the logic of performance
contracts is persuasive, but the reality has been disappointing.,,}25 Citing two
empirical studies probing the link between performance contracts, on the one

hand, and profitability and productivity, on the other hand, she noted that
both found no evidence that performance contracts had improved
efficiency. 126 She attributed the failure to three problems, which she suggests
a performance contract must address for it to improve performance. First, it

must reduce the information advantage that managers enjoy over owners.
Secondly, it must motivate managers through rewards or penalties to achieve
the contract's targets; and thirdly, it must convince managers that
government's promises are credible. 127 One of the critical problems of the
divorce of ownership from management is the fact that the owner might not
as much technical and other information as the manager. As a result,
owner might not be in the best position to superintend the manager. In

170

context of the performance contract, Shirley notes that managers are able
use their information advantage to negotiate targets that are either hard for
"', .,:,r.,;

outsiders to evaluate or easy for the firm to achieve. 128 In such
circumstances, the performance contract will hardly conduce to efficiency.
Similarly, if the performance contract does not properly provide incentives
for the managers or other workers, then it might not achieve its objective of
promoting efficiency. The mistrust toward government and the absence of
enforcement mechanism also militate against the utility of performance
contracts.

Apart from these inherent problems associated with performance contracts,

. the Nigerian performance contracts, which TCPC and its successor, the
. . Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE), orchestrated with commercialized
enterprises also encountered the problem of lack of adequate monitoring.
Under those contracts, the performance of the enterprises was to be
,!' ")"

(

.'.

evaluated every year. But, more than a decade after the "contracts" were
made, most of the enterprises were yet to be evaluated. 129 And the

------------------supra note 107

. 128 Shirley

·129

MIKE
AND SESAN AYODELE,
PoLIcy INOBADAN
NIGERIA, supra note 1 at 156
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have been no less subject to interference from governmental
prlnistries and department, than they were prior to privatization. 130

Performance contracting is one more illustration of a penchant for pseudo
legalism - a declaration of readiness to abide by law while in actuality
remaining above it. The Boards or Managements of the enterprises could not
, i

sue the government on these contracts. Indeed, TCPC had the power to
unilaterally review or vary the performance contracts. For all of its
formalities, performance contracts create no legally or judicially enforceable
relationship. They are so broad and ambitious resembling more such policy
documents as budgets and statement of objectives. It is in some respects a

. r

misnomer to regard them as contracts, and in a fledgling democracy with
fragile institutions, it might be better to use other terms so as to avoid

'J

confusion and also in order not to detract from the aspiration towards respect
for contract and agreements. Prior to commercialization, the intermeddling
of the Ministries in the affairs of the enterprises was not legal. Such
was not normally in the nature of formal official actions. Most

See Usman, supra note 84 at 101 (arguing that the failure can be attributed to a number of factors: (i) the
human problem of resistance to change; (ii) inadequate staff and training at the TCPC (or BPE) to
"'U""T""'~ fully the monitoring exercise; (iii) inadequate or tardy records of the activities of the enterprises
hinder the monitoring activities; (iv) the enterprises have been very slow in implementing certain
of the reform program; (v) the government's failure in ensuring the stability in the boards and
of the enterprises as required under the performance agreement; (f) government's failure to
the enterprises the freedom to review their tariffs as provided for in the performance agreements.)
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titnes, it was informal and subtle. Essentially, it took the nature of political
pressure, intimidation and other pressures, which could not be classified as
wholesome or even legal. So the solution did not lie in a formal contract
such as the so-called performance contract. It lay in punishing or otherwise
legally redressing the actions of the erring officials of the Ministries and of
the enterprises. One dares say that it lay in criminal sanctions in some cases.
No wonder the officials continued to interfere in the affairs of the enterprises
notwithstanding the existence of the performance contracts.

131

Besides, there is a measure of contradiction in the TCPC or BPE monitoring
the performance of the enterprises. Granted, TCPC and BPE were and are,
respectively, manned by professionals, but they are essentially government
agencies not dissimilar to the Ministries. And they constitute another layer
of bureaucracy .

TCPC Final Report P. 58
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CHAPTER 5

THE NIGERIAN PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION
PROGRAM 1999-DATE

I. INTRODUCTION

Although the privatization program introduced by the 1988 decree was
mainly successful in the sense discussed in Chapter 4, it was also beset by
numerous problems. The erudite Professor Mike Obadan has summarized
the problems encountered in the execution of the first privatization
program. 1 According to him those who were ideologically opposed to
privatization mounted significant opposition to it. 2 Similarly, some public
officials and enterprise managers and staff resisted the policy. Public
officials saw the program as diminishing their areas of influence because it
( sought to sell the SOEs over which they exercised a lot of influence, and, in
the case of commercialization, it sought to grant the SOEs autonomy from
those officials. The opposition from the public officials, even though subtle,

-------------------

( ~~ OBADAN, PRIVATIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA, 58-62 (NCEMA,
. &vauan,2oo0)
2

~ee also A Soyibo, Kolawole Olayiwola and Babatunde Alayande, A Review ofNigeria's Privatisation
~mme, in E. REMI AIYEDE, BABATUNDE ALAYANDE AND AZEEZ MABA WONK (Eds),
INGS IN DEVELOPMENT POLICY AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NIGERIA, 211, 221
evelopment Policy Centre, Ibadan, 2003)

. (J)
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more effective because the privatization agency required their
Organized labor, especially in the SOEs that were to be
a~u.•- - .

vehemently opposed the program, which they feared would lead

to retrenchment and other forms of unemployment.

The program was also hamstrung by the absence of market competition and
effective regulatory framework. "And so, commercialized PEs that were
., planned to operate in a competitive environment in order to allow for the
emergence of economic efficiency in all its ramifications, continuously
retained their monopoly statuses in an evolving market-oriented economy.
Consequently, the tariffs of social services and utilities skyrocketed while

the associated services remained poor and undesirable.,,3 Of course this

.

,',

problem was always at the core of misgivings about privatization. The fear

,

was that public monopolies could be turned to private monopolies. The

Utilities Charges Commission, which was supposed to regulate the tariffs of
commercialized enterprises proved weak in doing so, with the result that
commercialized enterprises hiked their tariffs. Another consequence of an
3

OBADAN, PRIVATIZA TION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA, supra note I at 59; See also

Sesan Ayodele, Public Enterprises Reforms in Nigeria, in I.B. BELLO·IMAM, AA ADUBI AND AA
FAJINGBESI,
PERSPECTIVES
ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND
ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, ]28, 134 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004) (noting that: "it may be recalled
that up till ] 994, except for air transportation and the postal services, a truly competitive market
environment as envisaged in the Decree which legalized the reform, remained elusive.")
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Incftelil\.CU monopoly, or a poorly regulated one, was that the efficiency,
was the aim of privatization and commercialization, was

Furthermore, there was the problem of inaccessibility to credit. Many
prospective shareholders did not have enough money to acquire the shares,

and the banks did not heed the government's directive to extend credit
facitlities to those desirous of acquiring shares. Besides, some of the shares
were oversubscribed, because of the activities of institutional investors.
Small individual investors were thus obstructed from acquiring shares. Other
problems were that there were "imbalances in equity shareholder distribution
among income groups and geo-politically,,4, and there were unanticipated
delays in the commencement of the privatization program and in the
processing of the equity share application forms. 5

OBADAN, PRIVA TIZATION OF PUBLIC ENTERPRISES IN NIGERIA, supra note 1 at 61
Other problems associated with the program were: political interference in the operations of the PEs and
also traces of bureaucracy causing delays; arbitrary fixture of products and services tariffs; supply cum
imbalances in utilities market. See Sesan Ayodele, Public Enterprises Reforms in Nigeria, in I.B.
---.....V-l1YlA.M A.A ADUBI AND AA FAJINGBESI, PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL ECONOMIC
AND ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 128, 134 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004) and A
Kolawole Olayiwola and Babatunde Alayande, A Review ofNigeria's Privatisation Programme, in
AIYEDE, BABATUNDE ALAYANDE AND AZEEZ MABAWONK (Eds), READINGS IN
POLICY AND CAPACITY BUILDING IN NIGERIA, 211, 221 (Development Policy
Ibadan,2003)
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As a result of these problems, the first privatization program was heavily
criticized. And some suggest that these criticisms led to its suspension in
1994.6 Before the abandonment, the government had already made
modifications. It passed the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree No 78 of
1993 (to replace the Privatisation and Commercialisation Decree No 25 of
1988) and replaced the Technical Committee on Privatisation and
~

Commercialisation with the Bureau of Public Enterprises as the agency

'. ,

responsible for the privatization and commercialization of SOEs. 7 While the
issue of the problems might have been one consideration in suspending the
program, it was not necessarily the only reason. Nigeria's political
....'.

;

experience has been marked by frequent and oftentimes unplanned changes

in government. And any incoming administration would always try to
discredit the policies of its successor. It would be recalled that the Babangida
administration, which started the privatization program, ended in August

The Abacha administration, which succeeded it, was not as enthusiastic
.
SoYIbo
& others, supra note 2 at 221; Ayodele supra note 3 at 134

G

,

See J.J. Bala, The Impact of Commercialization in Nigeria, in V.V. RAMANADHAM" HOW DOES
nZAnON WORK? ESSAYS ON PRIVATIZATION IN HONOUR OF PROFESSOR V.V.
63,75 (Routledge, Florence, KY, 1997)
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about privatization as its predecessor. Instead, it introduced the concept of
contract leasing in 1995.8 This involved leasing SOEs to both local and
foreign entrepreneurs on as-it-were basis. 9 The lessees were to be fmns with
proven track records and must possess the managerial and technical skills
peculiar to the enterprise as well as financial resources needed to manage the
enterprise. The leases were to be for a period of ten years with an option for
renewal on a mutually agreed upon basis.

The trial with contract leasing did not really gam ground before the
government reverted to what it called "guided privatization." The aim of
guided privatization was to privatize one enterprise at a time, so that the
lessons learned in that one privatization would be applied to subsequent
pmrattzations. It also sought to limit the share acquisitions to core strategic
with relevant expertise to participate in the ownership of the
..f t " d _ _ ~·

10

underscore the point that the fate of the privatization program was tied to
OBADAN supra note I at 63; Bala supra note 7 at 75; Ayodele supra note 3 at 134; Soyibo & others
note 2 at221

& others supra note 2 at 22]
See generally OBADAN supra note 1 at 63-68; Ayodele supra note 3 at
2 at 222-223

134~135; Soyibo & others supra
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disposition of the administration for the time being, the interest in the
vau.£.al-,lV.L ..

program was fully revived in 1999 during the tenure of a new

of state. The military administration of Abdulsalami Abubakar passed

'the law that has formed the legal basis for the current wave of privatization
and commercialization of SOEs. II It must be noted that although that
administration passed the law and, in essence, jump started the program

again, the country was returned to democratic rule in May 1999, and since
then there have been two civilian administrations, both of which have
continued with the efforts to reform the economy and particularly to
privatize or commercialize the SOEs.

A further illustration of the penchant on the part of the government to
pretend to make a clear break with the past, especially in the areas of
refonns, is that although the law enacted to effect what may be called the
second wave of privatization and commercialization is for the most part
similar to the 1988 decree, the government also sought to articulate its own
reasons for the privatization program. 12 Those reasons are not dissimilar to

II Upon coming to office Abubakar reaffirmed his government's commitment to privatization and
announced that the government would privatize its investment in telecommunications, electricity,
petroleum refineries, petrochemical and bitumen production and tourism in addition to spillovers from the
first round of privatization, ie the one that began in 1988. See OBADAN supra note 1 at 69.
12

The objectives are stated to be the following: (i) to redefine the role of government in order to allow it
concentrate on the essential task of governance which includes the creation of sound legal and
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the original motivations that informed the earlier efforts. The over arching
fiscal constraints that plagued the economy in 1988 were still present.

Indeed, they were aggravated by the instability that characterized the politics
1;

of the 1990s in Nigeria.

II. CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE CURRENT PRIVATIZATION
PROGRAM

An issue, which assumed a measure of prominence in the discourse of the
pros and cons of privatization, under the second program, was the
constitutionality of the policy of privatization and commercialization. Again
this was peculiar to the second phase because it was to be implemented by a

',I

macroeconomic frameworks among others; (ii) to restructure and rationalize the public sector in order to
lessen the dominance of unproductive investments in the economy; (iii) to re-orientate the enterprises slated
for privatization and commercialization towards a new horizon of performance improvement, viability and
overall efficiency; (iv) to promote efficiency by fostering well structured markets and competition; (v) to
create more jobs, acquire new knowledge and technology and expose the country to international
competition; (vi) to raise funds for financing socio-economic development in such areas as health,
education and infrastructure; (vii) to ensure positive returns on public sector investments in commercialized
enterprises through more efficient management; (viii) to check the absolute dependence on the treasury
funding by otherwise commercially oriented parastatals and so, encourage their approach to the Nigerian
capital market to meet their funding requirements; (ix) to initiate process of gradual cession to the private
sector, such public enterprises that are better operated by the private sector; (x) to reduce the fiscal burden
ofloss- making in public enterprises which undermine fiscal control and macro-economic stability; (xi) to
mobilize domestic resources for developing and deepening financial development; (xii) to spread and
democratize share ownership with the benefits of positive change in labor attitudes and enhanced
productivity; and (xiii) to lead to fairer pricing. See PRIV ATISATION HANDBOOK (Published by the
~ureau of Public enterprises, National Council on Privatisation, 3rd Edition 2001) (Hereinafter simply
PRIVATISATION HANDBOOK" PP. 40 - 41; See also Eze Onyekpere, Challenges/or the Privatisation
P~ogramme, in EZE ONYEKPERE (ED), READINGS ON PRIVATIZA TION, 24, 26 (Socio Economic
. ~ghts Initiative (SERI), Lagos, 2003) (hereinafter simply "READINGS ON PRIVA TIZA TION"); But see
OIINSON A. AKINBADE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIVA TISATION IN NIGERIA, 95 (Macak:
B~ks Ltd, Lagos, 2004) (suggesting that the major concern of the government under the Obasanjo
• P?vatization program was fiscal, ie to raise revenue and that a secondary objective was to remove price
dIStortions in the economy)
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elected government operating under a constitution that was
as the supreme law of the land. 13 It is an elementary proposition
that any law or policy inconsistent with the constitution is void to the extent
of the consistency.14 Theoretically, the constitutional jurisprudence that
prevailed during the first privatization program, discussed in Chapter 4,
recognized the primacy of the constitution, or what was left of it. However,
the manner of amending the Constitution was simple. Whereas the current
constitution is fairly rigid, the one operated by the military in 1988, and
thereabouts, was flexible. The government could easily modify it. Indeed, no
affirmative act of amendment was required. It was deemed amended by any
subsequent law, usually called decree, passed by the military administration.

As a result, the 1988 decree, on privatization and commercialization, did not
.necessarily have to pass constitutional muster because its prOVIsIons
prevailed over what was left of the then prevailing constitution. 15

To return to the current exercise, which is subject to the constitution, many
people faulted its constitutional validity. This protestation of constitutional

:

,"

13
'.

','

.

.,:;! ',j

;:

..

See Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria, 1999, Section 1(3).

14

Section 1(3) of the Constitution of the Federal republic of Nigeria
IS

AtC~nstitution ofthe Federal Republic of Nigeria 1979 as modified by the Constitution Suspension and
odification Decree No 1 1983.
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was especially loud in the activist civil society and was rooted
liberal conception of the role of government than in strict
~on,::;UI,U"'J.'VU'''''' analysis. For instance, much of the argument l6 is centered on

...

of Section 16 of the 1999 Constitution, which provides,
among other things, that the state shall "manage and operate the major
,sectors of the economy.,,17 Major sectors of the economy are defined as
.'

..

"such economic activities as may, from time to time, be declared by a
resolution of each House of the National Assembly to be managed and
operated exclusively by the government of the Federation.,,18 But "until a
resolution to the contrary is made by the National Assembly, economIC

'.:

.

activities being operated exclusively by the Government of the Federation
on the date immediately preceding the day when,,19 Section 16 came into
force, "whether directly or through the agency of a statutory or other
:corporation or company, shall be deemed to be major sectors of the

16

; See for example Kalu Onuoha, The Legal Regulation of Privatisation - A Critique, in READINGS ON
'PRIVATIZATION,9, 10-13 (arguing that: "the practice of having core/strategic investors particularly in
those SOEs providing essential services/utilities is unconstitutional"); Chom Bagu, Efficient Allocation of
Resources or Looting the Patrimony: A Critical Review of Privatization in Nigeria, in READNGS ON
'. 'PRIvATIZATION, 43, 47-48 (arguing that Sections 16 and 17 make the current privatization program
unconstitutional); Otive Igbuzor, Privatisation in Nigeria: Critical Issues of Concern to Civil Society, in
READINGS ON PRIVATIZATION, 36,40 (suggesting that the privatization program appears to "abuse"
Section 16 of the Constitution)
, 17

The full provisions of Section 16 are:
18

, Section 16(4) of the Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999
, 19 Ibid

section 16(4)
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economy.,,20 The argument then is that to the extent that the public utilities

and other enterprises hitherto owned and operated by the Federal
Government are sold to the private sector that would be an abnegation of
Section 16 of the Constitution and therefore be void.

However, neither the text nor the spirit of Section 16 compels such a
conclusion. The section enables the State to manage the major sectors of the
economy, but it does not state that such management should be to the
:, ,

exclusion of any participation by the private sector. On the contrary, it
recognizes in Section 16( 1)(d) "the right of any person to participate in areas
of the economy within the major sectors of the economy." It is also arguable
that management of the major sectors could be achieved by the State simply

by maintaining robust regulations over those sectors whilst allowing private
individuals to participate in them as envisaged by Section 16. 21 Besides,
Section 16 is a statement of aspirations, and, just like other parts of Chapter
II of the constitution of which it is a subset, it is not meant to be a precise
constitutional command admitting of no variation. In legal or judicial
lOlb'Id section 16(4)
11

See also Emeka Iheme, The Legal Regulation of Privatisation, in READINGS ON PRIVATISA TION, 1
~ 3 (arguing that "privatization, no doubt, is one way in which the government may enable individuals to

~~cipate' in a sector of the economy", and further that "on the whole, however, the Constitution does not
hge the government either to maintain public enterprises or to privatize them. The question is one of
POlicy to be addressed by each government in its own wisdom."
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it is said to be non-justiciable. 22 This means that the normal
judicial remedies available in the event a constitutional breach are not
,,)

available in any alleged violation of Chapter II. The Courts do not have

.j

jurisdiction over disputes founded on violations of that part of the
Constitution and, as a result, will not entertain actions to redress any such
violations.

However, one must agree with Theme that there are aspects of the Public
.!

Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act 1999 that might not

•

comport with the 1999 Constitution. 23 The Act confers enormous powers on
the National Council on Privatisation (NCP) to add to, delete from, alter or
amend the list of enterprises to be privatized. 24 Iheme25 rightly argues that to
the extent that NCP's powers enable it to add a statutory corporation (not
otherwise included in the list for privatization) to such list, such powers may
be unconstitutional if the addition implies an amendment or repeal of the
statute that established the enterprise. Since the designation of such statutory
corporation involves an amendment or repeal of the statute, only the
22

.
.

23

14
2s

See Section 6(6)(c) of the Constitution
lheme supra note 21 at 4
•

Section 1(3) of the Act
lheme supra note 21 at 4
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Assembly, in the exercise of its constitutional legislative functions,

is competent to designate it for privatization.

Ill. LEGAL FRAMEWORK OF THE CURRENT PRIVATIZATION
PROGRAM
,, ,

The currently operative legislation, which provides the legal framework for
privatization, is the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation)

Act 199926 (hereinafter "Privatisation and Commercialisation Act" or "the
, i

Act"). The Act enacts a gradualist approach27 to privatization. In doing so, it
follows the 1988 model of placing SOEs into four categories: (i) partially
privatized28 , (ii) fully privatized29, (iii) partially commercialized30 and (iv)
fully commercialized. 31

26

There was also the Bureau of Public Enterprises Decree 1993 but this was repealed by the Privatisation
and Commercialisation Act

2'1 It is

gradualist or intermediate if you take the entire exercise as a whole, otherwise it is arguable that for

the enterprises to be fully privatized the approach is immediate or the so-called big bang.
, 28 Section

1(1) of the Act and Part I of the First Schedule thereto.

29

Section 1(2) of the Act and Part II of the First Schedule to the Act.
30

Section 6( 1) of the Act and Part I of the Second Schedule to the Act.
31

Section 6(2) of the Act and Part II of the Second Schedule thereto.
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pARTIAL PRIVATIZATION

OLU'......

~~

•• ,..,

to the Act, partial privatization means that the government does

not fully divest its interest in the concerned SOE. Instead, in the exercise of
the powers vested in it, the NCP introduces a scheme whereby fifty one per
cent of the shares in such enterprise are sold to what they call "core" or
"strategic" investor. The government retains twenty nine percene2 of the
!\

equity, while twenty percent is available for subscription by Nigerian
individuals. Out of the twenty percent available to individuals, ten percene 3
(i.e. half) will be allotted to the staff of the affected enterprise. 34

Significantly, the notion of "core investor" has been central to the ongoing
privatization program. The Act does not specifically provide for it, although

it would seem to tacitly recognize it in the provisions of Section 4 thereof
which states that "a privatized enterprise which requires participation by
strategic investors may be managed by the strategic investors as from the
effective date of the privatization on such terms and conditions as may be

32

The distribution was formerly forty percent to core investor and forty percent to the government. The
National Council on Privatisation (NCP) Amended Schedule.

33

Section 5(3) of the Act; Originally this was one percent, but pursuant to powers which the Act has
vested in it the NCP increased it to ten percent.

341'L,
tlUS

appears to be an attempt to woo employees and to reduce their opposition to the exercise.
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upon." As a policy matter, it has been driven by the NCP and the
in the exercise of the enormous powers and wide latitude given to NCP

'in respect of administering the privatization program.
.;;

The concept of "core investor" appears to be an indirect appeal to foreign
investors. This is because such an investor "must not only possess the
technical know - how in relation to the activities of the enterprises they wish
to invest in but also possess the financial capacity to pay competitive price

for the enterprise and increase their capital base.,,35 Given the paucity of
both resources locally, it appears the dual requirements would work in favor

35 Presidential Statement supra not 14; See also Section 34 of the Act (which defines "strategic investor" as
"a reputable core investor or group of investors having the requisite technical expertise, the managerial
experience and the financial capacity to effectively contribute to the management of the enterprises to be
privatized"). The Guidelines on Privatisation issued by the NCP has the following proviSions on core
investors: "Core Investors or Strategic Investors can be described as formidable and experienced groups
with the capabilities for adding value to an enterprise and making it operate profitably in the face of
international competition. They should possess the capabilities of turning around the fortune of such an
enterprise, if by the time of their investment, the enterprise is unhealthy. The major characteristics that
distinguish strategic/core group investors are:~
(a)
They must posses the technical know~how in relation to the activities of the enterprises they wish
to invest in. For example, a Core Investor into a Cement Company must have access to cement production
expertise with regards to optimal use of the machinery, maintenance of such machinery and other technical
aspects of Cement Production such as procurement of raw materials, etc.
(b)
The Core Investors must also posses the fmancial muscle, not only to pay competitive price for the
enterprise they wish to buy into but also to turn around its fortune, using their own resources without
relying on the Government for funds. Each CorelStrategic Investor is expected to prepare a
ShortlMediumILong term plan for the development of the enterprise and indicate how it will be fmanced.
(c)
The Core Investor must have the management know~how to run a business profitably in a
Competitive environment where market forces dictate the business environment.
13.2
Given the magnitude of investment level in the utilities earmarked for Privatisation, the limited
absorptive capacity of the Nigerian Capital Market, our low technological level among other reasons, it is
qUite obvious that there is need to utilise the services of core investors in the new dispensation.
13.3
In consonance with 8(4) of the Privatisation Act, privatised enterprise which requires participation
by Strategic Investors may be managed by the Strategic Investors as from the effective date of Privatisation
?D such terms and conditions as may be agreed upon. On the other hand, strategic investors will work hand
III hand with the existing Management for a certain transition period."
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·foreign investors. This is consistent with the general intendment of the
"'41'{~lSt:::

to attract foreign investments. It is also pertinent to mention that the

of the shares available to Nigerians shall be done on the basis of

equality of Federal Constituencies.

36

And where there is an over-

subscription, no individual subscriber shall be entitled to hold more than 0.1
per cent of the equity shares in the enterprise. 37 Significantly, the critical

"

enterprises are in the list of entities to be partially privatized. 38 This reflects

the ambivalence with which many still view privatization. The government
' .. i.'

is yet to wholeheartedly embrace it. 39 Whether this approach is beneficial is
an open question. On the one hand, considering the strategic nature of these

36 Section 5(2) of the Act; again this result is consequent on the amendment effected by the NCP.
Originally, the emphasis was on equality of States.
37 Section

5(4) of the Act; It is arguable whether this is an adequate safeguard against monopoly.

38 Examples are: the telecommunications sector (Nigerian Telecommunication PLC (NlTEL»; the
electricity sector (National Electric Power Authority (NEPA»; the petroleum sector (the Refmeries); gas
sector (Nigerian Gas Company Ltd); others are machine tools (Nigerian Machine tools Company Ltd); steel
and aluminum sector (Jos Steel Rolling Mill Ltd; Katsina Steel Rolling Mill Co. Ltd; Oshogbo Steel
Rolling Mill Co. Ltd ; Ajaokuta Steel Co. Ltd; delta Steel Co. Ltd; Aluminum Smelter Co. Ltd); insurance
COmpanies (NICON Insurance PLC, Nigerian Reinsurance PLC); transport and aviation companies
(Federal Airports Authority of Nigeria, Nigerdock PLC, Nigeria Airways Ltd); paper companies (Nigerian
National Paper Manufacturing co. Iwopin, Nigerian Newsprint Manufacturing Co. Ltd Oku Iboku, Nigerian
paper Mills Ltd Jebba); sugar companies (Sunti Sugar Co. Ltd, Lafiagi sugar Co., Nigeria Sugar Co.
Bacita) and other miscellaneous companies. See generally Part I of the First Schedule to the Public
Enterprises (Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act No 28, 1999.

19

Herbst attributes the ambivalence to the political roles SOEs play in Africa. As a result, he argues,
governments would not wholeheartedly commit to privatization. He thus suggests a more realistic and
lasting solution that would involve incremental reforms to improve public sector operations along with
selected divestment. See Jeffrey Herbst, The Politics of Privatization in Africa, in EZRA SULElMAN &
JOHN WATERBURY (ED), THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF PUBLIC SECTOR REFORM AND
~RIVATIZATION, 234-254, 251 (Westview Press, Boulder, 1990); Indeed the control of these huge SOEs
IS seen as one of the attractions of governance and many politicians factor them in their political
calCulations.
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enterprises, there may be a need for the government to retain some form of
interest in them. However, experience has shown that once the government
is involved, it may in fact call the shots irrespective of the amount of its
shareholding.40 As a result, such an arrangement may not augur well for
attracting the much needed foreign capital. Foreign investors are usually
particular about stability and some form of certainty. And they are aware of
the legal, political and other constraints in redressing governmental
intermeddling in enterprises. One suspects that it is this incongruence that
41

caused the National Council on Privatisation

(NCP) to amend the ratio of

percentage ownership in partially privatized SOBs, from 40: 40 to 51: 29, in
favor of core investors. It is doubtful if such enhanced and clear majority
provides a sufficient assurance that the government will allow the core
investors the required free hand to turn the ailing partially privatized
enterprises around.
,;,
\:"'/

)

-;

,~',

~or instance in the past government has been known to appoint and remove directors of companies in
whIch it had an interest without reference to constitutive documents of such companies; See also ERNST &
YOUNG, PRIVATIZATION: INVESTING IN STATE OWNED- ENTERPRISES AROUND THE
WORLD, 35 (John Wiley & Sons, Inc., NY, 1994) (alluding to the unwillingness or inability of
government to relinquish control completely, but noting that private investors and governments usually
Illake uncomfortable bed partners.)
40

..
,..l

.

,

4\

A body created under the Privatisation and Commercialisation Act
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FULL PRIVATIZATION
':1

Full privatization entails the divestment of the entirety of government's
shat'e holding in the enterprise. In most of the companies involved, the
government is only part holder of the stocks. Thus, privatization, in this
sense, is the transfer to the private sector, of the government's already
litnited interest in the companies. The firms in this category are not as
.J

strategic as those for partial privatization.42 As in the partially privatized
companies, the shares available for sale are to be allocated on an equitable
geographical spread using the equality of Federal Constituencies as a basis;
and ten percent of such shares are to be made available to employees of the

'i ' >'

enterprises. 43

.2

'·r·

The prominent fIrms here may be some of the operators in the downstream sector of the oil industry
(such as Unipetrol PLC, National Oil and Chemical Company PLC and African Petroleum PLC); others are
cement companies (such as Ashaka Cement Company PLC, Benue Cement Comapany PLC, Northern
Nigeria cement Company PLC; Nigerian Cement Company Limited Nkalagu" Calabar Cement Company
Ltd, West African Portland Cement); Commercial and Merchant Banks (Afribank Nigeria PLC, Assurance
B~ PLC, FSB International bank PLC; NAL Merchant Bank PLC); Agro-Allied Companies(Ayip-Eku
Oil Palm Company PLC, Opobo Boat Yard, Nigeria Romania wood Industries Ltd, Ihechiowa Oil Palm
Co. PLC); Motor Vehicles and Truck Assembly Companies (such as ANAMCO Ltd, Leyland Nigeria Ltd
Peugeot Automobile of Nigeria Ltd, Volkswagen of Nigeria); Hotels (Nigeria Hotels Ltd, Festac 77 PLC,
AbUja International Hotel Ltd) etc. See generally Part II of the First Schedule to the Public Enterprises
(Privatisation and Commercialisation) Act No 28, 1999.
43

Section 5(2) and (3) of the Act, respectively
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COMMERCIALIZATION

we saw earlier, privatization, in the broad sense, encapsulates

:}

.... ;

commercialization. This is because, in its wide connotation, privatization

:

encompasses every attempt by the state to make the SOEs operate with the
same level of efficiency found in the private sector. This is at the heart of the
Nigerian approach to commercialization, which at the same time
distinguishes commercialization from privatization. For firms to be partially
,,~.

commercialized, the implication is that "such enterprises so designated will

be expected to generate enough revenue to cover their operating
expenditures. The government may consider giving them grants to finance
"

their capital projects.,,44 On the other hand, full commercialization ~'means

./

that enterprises so designated will be expected to operate profitably on a
. commercial basis and be able to raise funds from the capital market without
government guarantee. Such enterprises are expected to use private sector
procedures to run their businesses.,,45

44

See Article 6(d) Guidelines on Privatisation
•. 4$

See Article 6(c)
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,

strict or narrow interpretation of privatization may exclude both forms
of commercialization because the legal ownership of the enterprises or
therein,

remams

vested

in

the

government.

However,

conunercialization effects the removal of the subsidies they hitherto enjoyed

from the government. These enterprises are, therefore, not available for
foreign direct investment. But the bulk of the enterprises in both categories
provide social and other important services46 to the economy. And to the
extent that they operate at their optimum, they definitely would contribute to
an environment that is very attractive to foreign investors.

N.INSTITUTIONAL FRAMEWORK

The Privatisation and Commercialisation Act creates two bodies directly
charged with implementing the privatization program. The first is the NCp47 ,
which is composed of persons holding certain important portfolios in the
....

government and others appointed by the President. Its functions 48 are

)

,

46

.

,Examples of companies to be partially commercialized are: the River basin development authorities, the
. N~gerian Television Authority, the parks etc while examples of those subject to full commercialization are:
NIgerian National Petroleum Corporation, Federal Mortgage Bank of Nigeria, the development banks etc.
See generally Parts I and II of the Second Schedule to the Public Enterprises (Privatisation and
COmmercialisation) Act, No 28, 1999.
•7

•

Section 9 of the Act
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policy related and supervisory. It determines the broad guidelines
effectuating the privatization program. 49 It can indeed change the
classification of an enterprise from one to the other of the four categories of

full privatization, partial privatization, full commercialization or partial

: i J

commercialization. 50 The second body is the BPE or Bureau,51 which is
headed by a person designated Director Genera1. 52 The Bureau's functions
are essentially to execute the policies set by the NCP and to provide
secretarial support to the NCP. Both bodies are to work in tandem to ensure

~,

48 Section II of the Act enumerates the functions as follows: (a) to determine the political, economic and
social objectives of privatization and commercialization of public enterprises; (b) to approve policies on
privatization and commercialization; (c) to approve guidelines and criteria for valuation of public
enterprises for privatization and choice of strategic investors; (d) to approve public enterprises to be
privatised or commercialized; (e) to approve the legal and regulatory framework for the enterprises to be
privatized; (t) to detennine whether the shares of a listed public enterprises should be by public or private
issue or otherwise and advise the Government of the Federation accordingly; (g) to determine the time and
a public enterprise is to be privatized; (h) to approve the prices for shares or assets of the public
enterprise to be offered for sale; (i) to review, from time to time, the socio-economic effect of the
pro~~une of privatization and commercialization and decide on appropriate remedies; (j) to approve the
lpp()mt:lllelllt of privatization advisers and consultants and their remuneration; (k) to appoint as and when
necell!1lll'V committees comprising persons from private and public sectors with requisite technical
COInipete:nce to advise on the privatization and commercialization of specific public enterprises; (I) to
the budget of the Council; (m) to approve the budget of the Bureau; (n) to supervise the activities
the Bureau and issue directions on the implementation of the privatization and commercialization
programme:, (0) to receive and consider, for approval, the audited accounts of the Bureau; (p) to submit to
President of the Federal Republic of Nigeria in each year a report on the activities ofthe Council and
bureau; (q) to receive regular and periodic reports from the Bureau on programme implementation and
appropriate directions; and (r) to perform such other functions as may from time to time be necessary
its objectives.

Section 31

provides that it "may make regulations generally for the purpose of giving effect to the
of the Privatization and Commercialization Act.

See Sections 1(3) and 6(3) of the Act

Section 17 of the Act; the Director General is a member of the NCP.
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all aspects of the privatization program are carried out effectively and
53

For all intents and purposes, the BPE is like an agent of the NCP, albeit a
statutorily appointed one. This is because the BPE is to carry out the
decisions of the NCP, although the former may make recommendations to
the latter. Yet, in a curious departure from established drafting tradition in
the country, the Bureau is statutorily made a body corporate and invested

'!

53 Sections 13 and 14 of the Act respectively deal with the functions of the BPE in respect of privatization
and commercialization. Section 13 provides as follows: "The Functions of the Bureau with respect to
privatization are to: (a) implement the Council's policy on privatization; (b) prepare public enterprises
approved by the Council for privatization; (c) advice the Council on further public enterprises that may be
privatized; (d) advice the council on the capital restructuring needs of the public enterprises to be
privatized; (e) carry out all activities required for the successful issue of shares and sale of assets of the
public enterprises to be privatized; (f) make recommendation to the Council on the appointment of
consultants, advisers, investment bankers, issuing houses, stock brokers, solicitors, trustees, accountants,
and other professionals required for the purposes of privatization; (g) advice the Council on the allotment
pattern for the sale of the shares of the public enterprises set out for privatization; (h) oversee the actual sale
of the shares of the public enterprises to be privatized, by the issuing houses, in accordance with the
guidelines approved, from time to time, by the Council; (i) ensure the success of the privatization exercise
taking into account the need for balance and meaningful participation by Nigerians and foreigners in
accordance with the relevant laws of Nigeria; and (j) perform such functions with respect to privatization as
the Council may, from time to time, assign to it." Similarly Section 14 provides that "the functions of the
Bureau in respect of commercialization are to: (a) implement the Council's policies on commercialization;
. (b) prepare public enterprises approved by the Council for commercialization; (c) advise the Council on
further public enterprises that may be commercialized; (d) ensure the updating of the accounts of all
commercialized enterprises to ensure fmancial discipline; (e) ensure the success of the commercialization
eJCercise and monitor, on a continuous basis for such period as may be necessary, the operations of the
public enterprises after commercialization; (f) review the objectives for which public enterprises were
established in order to ensure that they adapt to the changing needs of the economy; (g) ensure that public
enterprises are managed in accordance with sound commercial principles and prudent financial practices;
. (h) interface with the public enterprises, and the supervising ministries, to ensure effective monitoring and
safeguard the public enterprises managerial autonomy; (i) ensure that the board and management of each
COnunercialized enterprise and the Government of the Federation, keep to the terms and conditions of the
Performance agreements, if any, between the public enterprise concerned and the Government of the
::e~ation; and (k) evaluate and recommend to the Council whether or not a public enterprise is eligible for
ding through grants, loans, subventions or equity; and (1) perform such functions with respect to
COnunercialization as the Council may, from time to time assign to it."
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perpetual succession. 54 It does also have a common seal and may sue
. ',.,

be sued. 55 What makes this provision the more significant is that the Act
silent on whether the NCP has similar attributes. The anomaly is that the
may not ordinarily56 be amenable to suits while the agent is. An
ambitious Director General of the Bureau may also exploit this
apparent oversight to flout the directives of the NCP. The availability of the
Bureau as the clearinghouse, and with authority to bind the government on
issues of privatization is salutary. It provides the one-stop shop for the
foreign investor interested in the privatization program. 57

.. PUBLIC ENTERPRISES ARB ITRATION PANEL

Act creates an ad-hoc body known as the Public Enterprises Arbitration
which is responsible for effecting prompt settlement of any dispute
oen1JPl"n

an enterprise and the National Council on Privatization ("NCP" or

Council") or the Bureau of Public Enterprises ("BPE" or "the

. It is arguable that the Provisions relating the Public Enterprises Arbitration Panel enable NCP to bring,
to be subject to, proceedings in that panel.
However under the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act 1995 every enterprise in which a
has an interest has to register with the Commission.

'''ll;lllrner
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. This is by virtue of Section 28, which provides:
(1) The Panel shall have power to arbitrate(a) in any dispute raising questions as to the interpretation of any
of the provisions of a Performance Agreement; or
(b) in any dispute on the performance or non-performance by any
enterprise of its undertakings under a Performance Agreement.
(2) A dispute on the performance or non-performance by any of
the parties to the Performance Agreement shall, in the case of a
commercialised enterprise, lie to that Panel providing that such
reference may be made after all reasonable efforts to resolve the
dispute have been made and have not been proved.
(3) The ruling of the Panel shall be binding on the parties and no
appeal shall lie from a decision of the Panel to any court of law or
tribunal."

This is interwoven with the practice of making commercialized enterprises
sign performance agreements. The Public Enterprises Arbitration Panel is
~ thus the mechanism for resolving any disputes that might arise in connection

with the performance agreements. Two perceivable flaws exist in this
dispute settlement mechanism. First, it envisages that NCP could be a party
to proceedings before the Panel, since it represents the government. Yet,
NCP appoints members of the Panel. 59 The basic question of the fairness of

. any proceedings undertaken by such Panel may be implicated by this method
, :.i:

, of appointment. And this is not mitigated by the requirement of Section

$8

Section 27(1) of the Act

$98

.

ectton 27(4)
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·27(2) that "the Panel shall consist of five persons who shall be persons of
. . proven integrity one of whom shall be the Chairman." Absent a more
stringent and objectively verifiable qualification, or indeed a more
independent method of appointment, the Panel, if it is ever constituted,
would be dogged with questions of its impartiality. A better arrangement
would have been to subject disputes, relating to performance contracts and
other aspects of the privatization and commercialization program, to the
regular disputes settlement procedures including recourse to arbitration
under existing arbitration and other alternative dispute resolution systems.
Instead, curiously, the 1999 Act provides that "the provisions of the
Arbitration and Conciliation Act or any other enactment or law relating to
arbitration shall not be applicable to any matter which is the subject of
Arbitration under this (1999) Act.,,6o One feature of the military
governments, which initially passed the 1999 Act, is the distrust they had for
existing judicial institutions. As a result, they were wont to introduce parallel
judicial or quasi-judicial machinery. The Public Enterprises Arbitration
Panel and the provisions of the 1999 Act thereon are a relic of that
predilection on the part of the military. Yet, ifit was meant to signal a quick

-----------------60

See Section 30 of the 1999 Act; but brackets mine
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and simple dispute resolution mechanism, it also exhibits a tentativeness that
roay not be attractive to outsiders like foreign investors .
. f'

Besides, the provision that the ruling of the Panel shall be binding on the
parties and no appeal shall lie from a decision of the Panel to any court of
law or tribuna1

61

is constitutionally suspect. While the Public Enterprises

(Prlvatisation and Commercialisation) Decree remained a decree under the

military administration, which first passed it, such an ouster of the right to
appeal to the courts could be sustained. But with the transition to civilian
administration, and the automatic modification and even re-christening of

the law as an "Act", deemed to have been pas-sed by the National As-sembly,
such ous-ter of recourse to the courts- is unconstitutional.

Secondly, it will prove to be redundant because very few enterprises, if any,
.,

would invoke its jurisdiction. This will be an extension of the shortcoming
associated with performance contracts, to which we alluded in Chapter 4. It

will be rare for Managers- of enterprises- to drag the owner of the enterprise,

the government, to the Panel.

------------------61

•

SectIon 28(3)
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VI. METHODS OF PRIVATIZATION AND COMMERCIALIZATION
USED UNDER THE CURRENT PROGRAM
Utilizing the flexibility, which the Act has given NCP and, by extension,
BPE, the agencies have adopted several methods in the current privatization
program. The most popular method has been the core investo()f sale. This is

an innovation of the current program in the sense that it was not used in the
first exercise. Figure 1 shows that of about 101 privatizations conducted by
BPE, from 2000 to July 2006, 41 were done by the core investor sale
method.

62

The next popular method adopted by NCP and BPE is

ooncesslon. This- is- not really a privatization method strictu sensu. It is
similar to a long lease and does not involve divesture. As- applied by BPE,

"it is a contract that confers- the right to use services- of an asset over a
defmed period usually ranging from 10-25 years.,,63 The concessionaire uses
"

the asset at an agreed fee. They also undertake to grow the asset over that
~period.

About 22 enterprises were dealt with in this fashion. (Figure 1)

'Another method that has- enjoyed a fair amount of use by BPE is- asset sale .
,f

.About 9 enterprises have been dealt with in this fashion. This is applied
~

Examples of SOEs privatized in this marmer are: Benue Cement Co Pic to core investor Dangote
Industries Ltd (May 2000); Ashaka Cement Co. PIc. to core investor Bluecircle Industries Ltd (March
,2001); Cement Co. of Northern Nigeria to core investor Scancem (July 2000); West African Portland
, Cement Co. PIc to core investor Bluecircle Indllstries Ltd (October 2000)
tl

See Bureau of Public Enterprises, Privatisation Procedures Manual (March 2006) P. 22
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where the prospects for the enterprise do not look bright and it is deemed to

be more beneficial to sell its assets than to sell the enterprise as a whole. 64

Thus, the enterprise might be broken up into various parts, which are sold
individual1y.65 Also adopted by BPE is the method of public offer. This is
done through the Stock Exchange. Figure 1 shows that one enterprise66 was

sold by Management Buyout method.

LIST OF ENTERPRISES PRIVA TIZED (2000 TO JULY 2006)

SI
N

1

.

2
,;

..

:'j

-3

NAME
OF METHOD
ENTERPRIS OF
E
DIVESnTU
RE
FSB
Share
International
Bank
Flotation

NAL
Merchant
Bank

International
Merchant
Bank

DATE
OF
SALE

NAME
OF REMARK
INVESTOR
S

April

Nigerian
Transactio
individual and n
institutional
concluded
investors
.
Enterprise
handed
over
Nigerian
Transactio
individual and n
institutional
concluded
Investors
Enterprise
Nigerian
Transactio
individual and n
institutional
concluded

2001

Share

April

Flotation

2001

Share
Flotation

April
2001

-----------------Prlvatisation Manual supra note 63 at 22

6(

6S Privatisation

66 "'TO

l~lger

Manual supra note 63 at 22

Insurance PLC
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investors
se
Ashaka

" .-

cement
,

PIc
Ashaka
cement
Pic

,

Benue
Cement

Core investor March
Co. sale
2001
Share
Co. Flotation

April

2001

Core investor May

2000

Co.

Plc~

Bkuecircle
Industries Ltd
Nigerian
Transactio
individual and n
institutional
concluded
investors
Dangote
Transactio
Industries Ltd n
(Nigeria)
concluded

'"
i'l':!':

,
;..

.

'"

"

~r_

Benue
Cement Co.
PIc
Cement Co.
of Northern
Ple.
Cement Co.
of Northern
Nigeria PIc.

Share
Flotation

January

2001

Institutional
investors

Share
Flotation

Nigerian
Transactio
individual and n
institutional
concluded
investors

West African Core investor October
Portland Co.
2000
sale

Industries Ltd

"

n
concluded
Enterprise
handed
over

West African
Portland
Cement Co.
Pic
Unipetrol
. PIc

Share
Flotation

January
2001

Core investor May
2000
sale

,~",

,., ..
"

, 'i'

" ,," .:., ~

Scancem
(Norway)

2001

,

"

I"~ .~~.

Core investor July
2000
sale
April

(':,

Nigerian
individual and
institutional
investors
Ocean and Oil
. Ltd
N'
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Unipetrol
Nigeria PIc.

Share
Flotation

April
2001

Core Investor October
African
2000
Petroleum Pic Sale
Share
African
Petroleum PIc Flotation

National Oil
& Chemical
marketing
Co. PIc (now
CONOIL
National Oil
& Chemical
Marketing
Co. Pic (now

CONOILPlc)

Nigerdock
Nigeria Ltd

Assurance
BankPlc

May
2001

Core Investor October
2000
Sale

Transactio
Nigerian
Individual and n
Conclude
institutional
investors
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Sadiq
Petroleum
. Ltd
Nigerian
Transactio
Individual and n
Institutional
Conclude
d.
Investors
Enterprise
handed
over
Conpetro
Nigeria Ltd
,:

Share
Flotation

April
2001

Nigerian
Individual and
Institutional
investors

~

Transactio
n

Conclude

d.

Enterprise
handed
over
Core Investor Decembe Global Energy Transactio
n
r 2001
Co.
Sale
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
ParmexiGense Transaxtio
Core Investor March
c Consortium n
Sale
2002
Conclude
Ltd
d.
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.....

Calahar
Cement
Ltd

Liquidation
Co.

August
2002

Enterprise
handed
over
Mills Transactio
Flour
and Holcim of n
Spain
Conclude

d.

14

Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
Niger Cement Core Investor October Nigerian
Individual and n
2002
Sale
PIc
institutional
concluded
Investors
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
Management Decembe Management
Niger
n
Alliance
r2002
Insurance Pic Buy-Out
Group
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Core Investor October Hans Gremlin Transactio
Capital
n
Limited
PIc Sale
2002
Hotels
Conclude
(Ahuja
d.
Sheraton
Enterprise
Hotel)
handed
over
Transactio
77 Asset Sale on January UAC
Festac
Properties PIc n
2002
Competitive
Hotel
Conclude
basis
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
of
Sale
Nigeria
to
Assets
Hotels
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Ii':

different
investors
Ikoyi Asset Sale on October
(a)
Hotel Limited Competitive
2002
basis
Limited:

19

Beta
Consortium

(b) Caterers' Asset Sale on Decembe Relian{;e
r2002
Court, Lagos Competitive
Estates
basis

Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
n
Conclude

d.

Houses Asset Sale on April
2003
No. S & 9 Competitive
Lease Road, basis
Ikoyi, Lagos

Chyzob
Enterprises

(d)
Audit Asset Sale on April
Section,
Competitive
2003
Lagos
basis

Dangote
Group

20 (c)

,
'

,

"

Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transaction
Conclude

d.

(e)
Central Asset Sale on July
Hotel, Kano
Competitive
2004
basis

(f)

NPA Asset Sale on October
Competitive
2004
basis

Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
Broadfields
NAL n
and
Assets
Conclude
Management
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Labana Glover Transactio
Ventures
n
Conclude
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(g) Magajin Asset Sale on
Rumfa, Kano Competitive
basis

d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
n
Conclude

d.
Enterprise
handed
over

25 Electricity

Core Investor Decembe Dantata
Metre
Sale
r 2002
Investments
Company of
Limited
Nigeria, Zaria

51%
acqllired~

Transactio
n
Conclude

d.
; i:

Electricity
Metre
Company of
N' . Zaria
Savannah
Sugar
Company
Limited

National
Trucks
Manufacturer
s, Kano

Core Investor Decembe Dantata
Sale
r 2002
Investments
Limited
Core Investor Decembe Dangote
Sale
r 2002
Industries
Limited

Enterprise
handed
over
An
additional
17%

Transactio
n
Conclude

d.

Core Investor Decembe Art
Sale
r 2002
Engineering
Limited

Enterprise
handed
over
51%
acquired.
Transactio
n
Conclude

d.
Enterprise
handed
over
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29

30

Cote Investor April
National
2005
Sale
Trucks
Manufacturer
Kano
Core Investor Decembe
Nigeria
r2002
Sale
Reinsurance
Corporation

Art
Engineering
Limited

An
additional
24%

Reinsurance
Acquisition
Group

Abuja Asset Sale on April
MV
2003
of Competitive
(Vessel
Nigeria Unity basis
Line)

Simatech
Offshore
International,
Panama

Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio

West African Core Investor April
2004
Sale
Refmery
Company
Limited,
Sierra Leone

Daily Times Core Investor June
2004
of Nigeria PIc Sale

n

Conclude

.

d.

Enterprise
handed
over
Majestic Oil Transactio
Services
n
Conclude
Limited
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
Folio
Communicatio n
ns Limited
Conclude

d.

Ore-Irele Oil Core Investor Septemb
er 2004
Palm
Sale
Company
Limited

Sale

to

Enterprise
handed
over
Agric Transactio
CPL
n
Limited
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Kaduna State .36% sold
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Automobile
Nigeria
Limited
Steel
Delta
Company
Limited

35 Leyland
Nigeria
Limited

36

Central
Packaging
Limited

existing
shareholder

2004

Investment
Co.

Core Investor February Global
Sale
200S
Infrastructure

Revalidation
of Sale

April
2005

Core Investor June
Sale
2005

to investor

Only 30010
bid
of
price has
been
received.
Balance
70%
of
outstandin

Eba..Odan
Commercial
and Industrial

Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Gobesh (West Transactio
n
Africa)
Limited
cancelled
as
preferred
bidder
could not
complete
payment.
Negotiatio
n ongoing
with other
bidder to
be
concluded

by

Nigeria
Core
Bricks and Investor Sale
Clay
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37

(a) Ikorodu Core Investor June
2005
Bricks
Sale

Ibadan Core Investor June
2005
Bricks
and Sale
Clay

38 (b)

39
.

(c)
Enugu Core Investor June
2005
Bricks
and Sale
Clay

,

(d) Kaduna Core Investor June
2005
Bricks
and Sale
Clay

(e)
Kano Core Investor June
2005
Bricks
and Sale
Clay

Ihechiowa
Oil Palm

Core Investor July
2005
Sale

Only 10010
bid
of
price paid.
Balance
of 90% to
be paid as
agreed in
terms of
sale
Realstone
Transactio
Company
n
Limited
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Siljay Concept Transactio
Limited
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
Rahman
n
Brothers
Conclude
Limited
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Associated
Transactio
n
Partners
Limited
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Agrico
Transactio
Multiservices n
Limited
cancelled
Temtcorp
Limited
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as
preferred
bidder
could not
complete
payment.
Negotiatio
n ongoing
with other
bidder to
be
concluded
by

43 Afribank PIc

Share
Flotation

June
2005

44 National

Liquidation

August
2005

Fertilizer
Company of
Nigeria
(NAFCON)

Federal
Core Investor Septemb
er 2005
Superphospha Sale
te Fertilizer
Company
Limited

Nigerian
Concessions
Ports
Apapa Port
Terminals
(a)
Apapa Concession
Container
Terminal

May
2005

Various
Individual
Nigerian
Investors
O'secul
Nigeria
Limited

Transactio
n
Conclude
d
Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
Nigerian
Individual and n
Conclude
Institutional
d.
Investors
Enterprise
handed
over

AP Moller

Entry fees
paid. The
concessio
n fees are
209

,,",

to be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
conceSSlO
n
25
years~

Enterprise
handed
over
III
line with
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(b)
Apapa Concession
Port
(Terminals C)

May

2005

ENL
Consortium

Entry fees
paid. The
conceSSlO
n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
concesslO
10
n
years.
Enterprise
handed

over
line
(c)
Apapa Concession
Port
(Terminals
D)

May

2005

ENL
Consortium

III

with

Entry fees
paid. The
concesslO
n fees are
to be paid
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49 (d)

Apapa Concession

Port
(Terminals
A)

50

(e)
Apapa Concession
Port
(Terminals B)

October
2005

October
2005

and
spread
over the
duration
the
of
conceSSlO
10
n
years.
Enterprise
handed
III
over
line with
agreement
Flour Mills of Entry fees
Nigeria
paid. The
concesslO
n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
concesslO
n
25
years.
Enterprise
handed
over
in
line with
agreement
Flour Mills of Entry fees
Nigeria
paid. The
concessio
n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
spread
211

r-

over

51 (t)

Apapa Concession

Port
(Terminal E)

52

Port
Harcourt
Terminals
(a)
Port Concession
Harcourt
Terminal A

the
duration
the
of
concessio
25
n
years.
Enterprise
handed
In
over
line with
agreement
Entry fees
of paid. The
concessio
n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
conceSSlO
25
n
years.
Enterprise
handed
over
In
line with
agreement

October
2005

Dangote
Group
Industries

May
2005

and Entry fees
Ports
Terminal
paid. The
Operators
concessio
Limited
n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
212

spread
over the
duration
of
the
concessio
n

15

years-.
Enterprise
handed
over
ill
line with
53

(b)
Port Concession
Harcourt
Terminal A

May
2005

BUA

International
Limited

Entry fees
paid. The
concesslO
n fees are
to be paid
annually

and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
concesslo
n
20
years.
Enterprise
handed
over
in
line with

j

. !
:

.,

!

Tin-Can
Island Port
(a) Terminal Concession
A

Septemb
er 2005

Joseph Dam & Negotiatin
Sons Limited g tenns of
concessio
n still in

(b) Terminal Concession
B

Septemb
er 2005

Tin Can Island
Container
213

Termincll

concessio

Limited

n fees are
to be paid

annually
and
spread

o-ver

the
duration
the
of
concessio
15
n
years.
Enterprise
handed
over
in
line with

" '

,

56 (c) Terminal Concession
C

Septemb
er 2005

Sifax Nigeria Entry fees
Limited
paid. The
concessio

n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
concessio
n
10
years.

Enterprise
handed
.
over
In
line with
(d)
Roro Concession
Terminal

Septemb
er2005

APMoller

Negotiatin
g terms of
concessio
.
n still In
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Other Ports
Terminals
(a) Onne FL T Concession
B

October

2005

Intels Nigeria Entry fees
Limited
paid. The
concessio
n fees are
to be paid
annually

and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
concesslO
25
n
years.
Enterprise
handed
In
over
line with
60

(b)

FOTB

Onne Concession

October

2005

Intels Nigeria Entry fees
paid. The
Limited
conceSSlO
n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
the
of
concesslO
n
2-5
years.
Enterprise
handed
over
10
line with
215
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61

(c) Warri Old Concession
Terminal A

October

2005

Intels Nigeria Entry fees
Limited
paid. The
concessio
n fees are
to be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
the
of
concessio
n
25
years.
Enterprise
handed

over
line

62 (d)

Warri Concession

New
Terminal B

October

2005

in
with

Intels Nigeria Entry fees
paid. The
Limited
concessio
n fees are
to be paid
annually

and
spread
over the
duration
of
the
concessio
n
25
years.
Enterprise
handed
over
in
line with
Calabar Concession

October

Intels
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New

2005

Limited

Terminal A

paid. The
concessio
n fees are
to- be paid
annually
and
spread
over the
duration
the
of
conceSSlO
n
25
years.
Enterprise
handed
over
m
line with

,-,.'

~

\

Federal
Core Investor Septemb
er 2005
Superphospat Sale
e
Fertilizer
Company

Hekio
Consortium

Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over

(a)
Kuru Core Investor Septemb
er 2005
Quarry, Jos
Sale

Afrimines
Nigeria
Limited

(b)
Suleja Core Investor Septemb
Quarry,
Sale
er 2005
Suleja

Setraco
(Nigeria)
Limited

Negotiatio
n to be
concluded
with
preferred
bidder by
ber
Transactio
n
Conclude

I
I

I
J

I

I

I
r

I

I

d.

~
j

Enterprise
handed

I
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over

68

Nicon Hilton Core Investor October
2005
Sale
Hotel

Capital
Consortium

Core Investor October
Sale
2005

Assurance
Acquisition

Core Investor October
2005
Sale

Barbedos
Ventures

Nicon
Insurance PIc

69 Volkswagen
Nigeria
Limited

70 Ayip-Eku Oil Core Investor October
Palm
Company
Limited

Sale

2005

Interstate
Investment

Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Negotiatio
n ongomg
with
bidder to
be

concluded
by

71

Nigeria Sugar Liquidation
Company,
Bacita

October
2005

Oshogbo
Liquidation
Steel Rolling

Novemb
er 2005

Joseph Dam &
Sons Limited

Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Kura Holdings Transactio
n
Limited
Conclude
218
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Limited

d.
Enterprise
handed

over
73

Steel Liquidation
Jos
Rolling Mill

Novemb
er 2005

Zuma
Steel Transactio
West
Africa n
Limited
Conclude

d.
Enterprise
hand~d

over

14

Katsina Steel Liquidation
Rolling Mill

75 National
Aviation
Handling
Company

76 Eleme
Petrochemica
Is Company
Limited

Public Offer

Novemb
er 2005

Novemb
er 2005

NigeriaSpanish
Engineering
Limited
Various
Individual and
Institional
Investors

Core Investor Decembe Indorama
r2005
Group
Sale

Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Transactio
n
Conclude
d.

Enterprise
Nigeria Unity Core Investor Decembe Seaforce
Shipping
r2005
Line
Sale
Company
Limited

Nigeria
Machine
Tools

Core Investor Decembe Miramar
International
r200S
Sale
Limited

handed
over
Transactio
n
Conclude
d.
Enterprise
handed
over
Preferred
bidder
Miramar
could not
219
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pay.
Reserve
bidder

have
increased
their bid
Nt
to
billion
and have
so far paid
about
40%. To
be
concluded

79

Steyr Nigeria Core Investor Decembe Kaura Motor
Sale
r2005
Limited

Sunti

Sugar Liquidation

Co. Ltd

March
2006

Supertek Ltd

Transactio
n
concluded
as
preferred
bidder
could not
compete
payment.
Negotiatio
."
n ongomg
with other
bidder
Transactio
n
Conclude

d.

Niger Paper Liquidation
Mill, Jebba

May
2006

IMNLLtd

Enterprise
handed
over
NCP
approval
received
29th July
2006.
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Payment
be
to
concluded
September
2006

82

Other Ports
Terminals
Concession
Koko Port

May
2006

Gulftainer Bel Negotiatin
Consortium
g terms of
concessio
n still m
progress.
To
be
concluded
In

83

Calabar Port

Concession

May
2006

Ecomarine
Consortium

Negotiatin
g terms of
concessio
n still in
progress.
To
be
concluded
In

84

Warri Port

Concession

May
2006

Associated
Marine
Services

Negotiatin
g terms of
conceSSlO
n still m
progress.
To
be
concluded
in

,-~ . . . . ~c:

The Privatization act, with forward by Irene Chigbue, Director
of BPE, http:www.bpeng.orglrdonlyresIDA361996-D953-45CE5-32ACC753AE6110IPrivatizationAct.doc (visited 09/24/07)
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main thrust of the current commercialization program is to provide the
enterprises with operational autonomy.67 As under the first program, the
current commercialization program employs the device of performance
contracts, which is designed to govern the relationship between the
·

"

government and the commercialized enterprise. We had, in Chapter 4,68
explored the limitations of performance contracting as a reform tool in the
management of SOBs. Those constraints also apply to the use of
performance contracts in the current exercise of commercialization. The

point must be made however that commercialization seems to be a step in an
enterprise's journey towards privatization.69 For instance, some of the
enterprises privatized or slated for privatization under the current exercise
were those commercialized under the first exercise. 70
I

.;

,

"j

i

67 Others are to provide competitive remuneration system to be able to attract, recruit and retain suitably
qualified personnel; evolve a more result oriented and accountable management based on perfonnance
contract; strengthen financiaVaccounting controls at the enterprise level; upgrade the management
information system of the affected enterprises; ensure financial solvency of public enterprises through
effective cost recovery, cost control and prudent financial management; remove bureaucratic bottlenecks
and political interference through clear role defmitions between the supervising Ministry, the Board of
Directors and the Management of public enterprises. See Privatisation Procedures Manual published by
BPE, March 2006 PP. 253-255. These are the exact objectives of the 1988 decree with respect to
commercialization.

68

See Chapter 4

See Privatization Procedures Manual, P.253 stating that: "Commercialization, whether fuJI or partial, is a
dynamic process, which ultimately leads to eventual privatization or some fonn of public-private
J>artnership (PPP)."
69

70 These enterprises would include NITEL PIc., NEPA, Nigerian Power, Nigerian Marine Corp., NICON
Insurance PIc., and Nigerian Reinsurance.
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ASSESSMENT OF THE CURRENT PRIVATIZATION PROGRAM

strengths of the current privatization program are similar to the benefits
accrued from the earlier one. The government has realized money from
sales of its interests in the SOEs.71 The capital market continues to grow.
)-{i,

'~

irThe explosion in the number of telephone service providers is, perhaps, the
.i~'

'-jf

visible benefit from the reforms of which privatization is a part. The
.,
.,,',
'\

numlot:r

of people who have access to telephones rose exponentially from the

." ," '~

',\

?~

criticism that can be leveled against the current privatization program is

Ii.
,,"'/1
',.

,.

those running it have still not been able to carry the majority of the

: ,'I

,.,,'1-''''....

along. There is still considerable opposition to the program, several
after its commencement. For instance several suits have been

....... ~......u,""u.

mainly by labor, challenging different aspects of privatization or
Secondly, there have been

-4""&"U,J.VJ.,l;:)

of cronyism. The names of certain individuals, or of companies
with certain individuals, have been recurring in relation to

'1

See generally JOHNSON A. AKINBADE, PUBLIC ENTERPRISES AND PRIVATISATION IN
NIGERIA, 98 -100 (Macak Books Ltd, Lagos, 2004)
'. '12 For example

see a story, by Nkechi Onyedika and Florence Oretade, titled: Govt, workers clash over sale

ofUrban Development Bank, Guardian Newspaper June 06, 2007.
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of the SOEs. This is actually one of the reasons that the
to the program have endured. Recently, the outgoing
1.

administration sold the interest in the petroleum refineries,?3 which are like
. the crown jewels of the country, to entities that were alleged to lack the
technical competence in the area of petroleum refining and at a price that

.,

some considered a give away. The protestation against the sale was so
pronounced and loud that the administration that took over from the prior
government was forced to revisit the sale. In the end, and sensing that the
government might reverse the transaction, the purchasers of the interest
· decided to withdraw from the transaction.

Thirdly, one of the pitfalls of the earlier privatization program, and one of
the criticisms of privatization generally,74 was that it was not coupled with
robust and effective regulations. While governmental regulation has been
, 'j

· strengthened in certain sectors, such as communication, there is still no
comprehensive competition or antitrust regime in the country, and this

';'<;

almost twenty years since the inception of privatization in 1988. NCP and
73

See story, by Yakubu LawaI and Mathias Okwe, titled: Dangote, Otedola, Rivers buy Port harcout
Refinery, Guardian Newspaper May 18,2007; story, by Okey Ndiribe, titled: Uproar over FG's last minute
· privatization, Vanguard Newspaper May 25, 2007.
74

SeeEze Onyekpere, Challenges for the Privatisation Programme, in READINGS ON PRNA TISA TION

P.24 at 31
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BPE have attempted to fonnulate a competition bill, but such bill has not
seemed to be a priority for the legislature. So there is the real danger that
". ,.

public monopolies could become private monopolies, which are indeed more
deleterious to the economy.

Fourthly, the conception of the privatization program as a gradual process,
even though beneficial, has had the effect of drawing out the exercise. This
has had two effects. It has enabled the introduction of additional
bureaucracy. The NCP and BPE, even if they are effective, have assumed a

defocto permanence with all the trappings of a sustained bureaucracy. In
another vein, the gradualism has made the process so flexible that successive
governments see it AS another avenue for patronage. Thus we have had the
spectacle of enterprises, which were thought to have been privatized or
commercialized, but are still subject privatization or commercialization by
new administrations. Such administrations arrogate to themselves the power
to review and reverse what was done by prior administrations in that respect.
For instance, the Nigerian National Petroleum Corporation, was supposed to
have been privatized under the first program. It was also listed for
privatization in the 1999 decree. As if that confusion was not enough, the
cUtrent administration of Musa Yar'adua, which came to office in May

225

II

_]

2007, recently announced that it would unbundle NNPC and certain
committees of the National Assembly are gearing to pass new laws to
validate the "new policy". 75 No reference was made to the fact that the

NNPC is one of the SOEs slated for commercialization under the ongoing
program. Granted that NCP has the powers under the 1999 Act to modify the
lists for partial or full privatization and of partial or full commercialization.
Yet, it does not seem that the new government's announcement and the
legislature's seeming preparedness to pass a new law took cognizance of the
fact that NNPC is already covered under the existing reform framework.
NNPC is a national treasure and any government would like to, indeed
device a pretense, to meddle in it even if it is to provide for
commercialization already covered in existing law.

A more worrisome

aspect of this tendency is the preparedness to reverse completed
privatization transactions. 76 It is doubtful if the government actually has the
right to reverse these transactions. Absent collusion in fraud on the part of

.'

the Purchaser of the interest, it would seem that a new administration is
7.5

See story, by Paschal Nwigwe, titled: Reps prepare legal backing for new gas policy, unbundling of
NNpc, Guardian Newspaper September 14, 2007; In another report, the new Chairman of the Senate
C~rnmittee on Privatisation alluded to a decision to probe BPE following petitions from "concerned
NIgerians". He stated further: "if in the course of our investigation we found out that the process was not
tl'anst>arent, such exercise could be reversed. If we also discover that the benefiting organisatiion did not
right money for these enterprises, then they could be made to pay more. We have received some
Petitions from interested Nigerians asking us to examine the privatization of these enterprises. The one on
~y table right now is asking us to examine the privatization of NlTEL." See story, by Azimazi Momoh
LunOh, titled: Sale ofRefineries inevitable, says Senate Panel, Guardian Newspaper September 11, 2007.
~ See story, by Azimazi Momoh Jimoh, titled: Sale ofRefineries inevitable, says Senate Panel, Guardian
eWspaper September 11,2007 cited in footnote 75.

)lay the
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bound by a sale made by a previous administration, and any attempt to
reverse such sale is like compulsory acquisition or taking. At least that is
how it could legally be viewed, even though in actual fact the Purchaser may
/

be helpless.

That is the more reason that caution must be exercised by the government in
reversing sales of its interests in SOEs. These enterprises are usually big and
cost a lot of money. If purchasers of government's interests cannot be
confident on the security of the interests they are getting they would be
discouraged. This is especially the case with foreign investors. At a
minimum, the completed privatization of an enterprise should be immune
.,

from challenge based merely on the fact that a new administration would
prefer different purchasers. And even in cases of egregious misconducts on

the part of the privatization agency, any reversal should be preceded by due
process and the courts should retain the jurisdiction to adjudicate such
matters. The government is also better advised to adopt the process of legal
challenges if it must reverse any sale.

Another problem is that for all the orchestration about privatization, the
enterprises scheduled for privatization in the most strategic aspects of the
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economy have not been fully dealt with, almost a decade after the current
program started. Although NEPA has been unbundled, not all the spin off

entities from NEPA have been sold. 77

'II",

77

See story by Chidi Nnadi and Omodele Adigun, titled: BPE doubts completion ofprivatization in power
sector before may 29, Daily Sun Newspaper January 29, 2007.
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CHAPTER 6
FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN NIGERIA

I. MEANING OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

Foreign investment is broadly defined as ''the institutional, individual, or
governmental acquisition of assets in a foreign country. It includes both
direct investment and portfolio investment and encompasses both public
authorities and private firms."} There is a tendency to distinguish this broad
understanding from the narrower context of foreign direct investment, which
some see as "any investment in another country which is carried out by
private companies or individuals as opposed to government aid.,,2 Besides,
different countries may define foreign direct investment differently. But the
internationally accepted standard definitions of foreign direct investment are
rather technical and are contained in the Balance of Payments Manuae and
1

Osaheni Victor Iyayi, Foreign Investors' Perceptions ofNigerian Public Policy on Foreign Investment, 9,
1988, Ph.d Dissertation submitted to the Golden Gate University, San Francisco, on file with the Golden
Gate University Library; See also Adebayo O. Olukoshi, Foreign Investment in the Nigerian Economy:
Problems and Prospects, 14 (Nigerian Journal of Policy and Strategy, Vol. II No.2, December 1987,
Published by the Nigerian Institute of Policy and Strategic Studies, Kuru) (defining foreign investment as:
''the act by which capital is exported by some persons or organization resident in one country to another
country for the purpose of earning a profit.")
2

lyayi supra note 1 at 10 (citing and quoting DAVID W. PEARCE, MACMILLAN DICTIONARY OF

MODERN ECONOMICS, 159 (1986), London, Macmillan)
1

Fifth Edition (BPMS) (Washington, D.C., International Monetary Fund, 1993)
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the Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct Investment. 4
According to the former, foreign direct investment refers to investment made

to acquire lasting interest in enterprises operating outside of the economy of
5

the investor. The World Trade Organization sees foreign investment in
similar light.

6

The foreign entity or group of entities that makes the

investment is called the "direct investor", while the unincorporated or
incorporated enterprise in which the direct investment is made is referred to
as a "direct investment enterprise.,,7 The direct investor's purpose is to gain
an effective voice in the management of the enterprise. Both the Balance of
Payments Manual and the Detailed Benchmark Definition of Foreign Direct
Investment suggest a threshold of 10% equity ownership as the stake
significant or sufficient to give effective voice in the management. 8 The

4 Third

Edition (BDS) (Paris, Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development, 1996)

See World Investment Directory Definitions, DescriptiOns and Discrepancies in the Data, http://
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites!dite/fdistats_files!WIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment
Directory")
5

6 See M.O.KAYODE AND O.A. OYERANTI, ATTRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT THROUGH
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSIDP: WHAT HOPE FOR NIGERIA, 8 (Development Policy Centre,
Ibadan, 2002) (Research Report No. 37) (stating: "The World Trade Organisation (WTO) (1996) observes
that FDI occurs when an investor based in one country (the home country) acquires an asset in another
country (the host country) with intent to manage the asset.")

7 World Investment Directory Defmitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http://
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites/dite!fdistats_fileslWIDdefinitions 1 a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment
Directory")

8

World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http://
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites/dite/fdistats_ fileslWIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment
Directory"); The percentage of the stock held by foreigners is a mere guide. It is not conclusive of control.
In fact in the Nigerian industrial Policy of 1988 foreign direct investments included those with foreign
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BD3 of the OEeD would exclude any 10% ownership if it can be proven

that it does not allow the investor an effective voice in the management of
the direct investment enterprise. Similarly, it would include a holding of less
than 10% ownership if the direct investor nonetheless maintains effective
voice in the management. 9 It is pertinent to note that effective voice in the
management of the direct investment enterprise does not tantamount to
control of the enterprise. Of course it is doubtful if ownership of 10%
interest in an enterprise is sufficient to vest control of the firm, unless the
other 90% is totally diluted, in terms of lack of homogeneity or cohesion
among its holders. The test is that of ability to have a voice. In most cases,
possession of 10% ownership would constitute the holder into a block that
cannot be easily ignored. Ownership of the requisite interest may be in the
nature of equity capital, the reinvestment of earnings and the provision of
intra-company loans. to

equity ranging from 4million Nigerian Naira. See Akomaye V. Agba, Foreign Direct Investment and
National Development: An Appraisal and Diagnosis, in 1.B. BELLO-IMAM, AA ADUBI AND AA
FAJINGBESI,
PERSPECTIVES
ON
NATIONAL
ECONOMIC
MANAGEMENT
AND
ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 56, 58 (NCEMA, Ibadan. 2004)

See World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http://
rO.unctad.orglenlsubsitesidite/fdistats_ files/WIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment

II

Directory")
10 See World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data,
http://
rO.unctad.orglenlsubsites/dite/fdistats_fileslWIDdefinitions I a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment

Directory")
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Portfolio investment is however not thought to entail any interest in the
management of the enterprise. Instead, the portfolio investment holder is
more interested in the returns and capital gains accruing from such
investment. II It is therefore considered to fall outside the purview of foreign
direct investment.

12

Portfolio investments take the form of new issue bonds

and debentures, sales and purchase of existing bonds and stocks as well as
medium and long. term lending. 13

On this account, some writers would exclude portfolio investment from

foreign investment. For instance, Sornarajah, in his excellent work on
international law of foreign investment, defines foreign investment as

II Akomaye V. Agba, Foreign Direct Investment and National Development: An Appraisal and Diagnosi.y,
in I.B. BELLO-IMAM, A.A. ADUBI AND A.A. FAJINGBESI, PERSPECTIVES ON NATIONAL
ECONOMIC MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION IN NIGERIA, 56, 57 (NCEMA, Ibadan, 2004)
(hereinafter "Agba, FDI and National Development'); See also LASZLO ARVA, DIRECT FOREIGN
INVESTMENT: SOME THEORETICAL AND PRACTICAL ISSUES 8 (NBH, National Bank of
Hungary, Workshop Studies, Budapest 1994) (asserting that: "the primary motive of portfolio investments
is therefore a profitable investment of savings, whereas in the case of direct foreign investment the investor
also intends to achieve objectives other than a profitable investment, in some of the cases through acquiring
partial or full control over the foreign companies."); IMF Occasional Paper No 33 titled, Foreign Private
investment in Developing Countries: A Study by the Research Dept. (lMF. Washington, DC, January 1985)
(stating that foreign direct investment can be "new equity capital, reinvested earnings, or net borrowing
from a parent company or its affiliates. A guiding criterion is that it is investment made to acquire a lasting
interest and an effective voice in the management of an enterprise, while portfolio equity investment does
not usually have such an aim.")

12 World Investment Directory Definitions, Descriptions and Discrepancies in the Data, http://
rO.unctad.orglenisubsites/dite/fdistats_fileslWIDdefmitions 1 a.htm (hereinafter "World Investment
Directory")
Il

Agba, supra note 11 at 57
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involving: "the transfer of tangible or intangible assets from one country into
another for the purpose of their use in that country to generate wealth under

the total or partial control of the owner of the assets.,,14 This exclusion is
said to be founded on the view that portfolio investment was not protected
by customary international law unlike foreign investment, which is afforded

protection under the principles of diplomatic protection and state
responsibility. IS It is stated that this differential treatment is informed by the
fact that in the case of foreign direct investment, the foreign investor takes
out of their home state resources, which could otherwise have been used to
advance the economy of the home state. Besides, the foreign direct investor
enters the host state with the consent of the host state. Hence, the home state
is justified in seeking protection for the resources or investment. 16
Accordingly, he argues that foreign investment (by which he excludes
portfolio investment) attracts the greater attention of international law for the
simple reason that it involves the movement of persons and property from

14 M. SORNARAJAH, INTERNATIONAL LAW ON FOREIGN INVESTMENT, 7 (Cambridge
University Press, West Nyack, NY, 2004, 2nd ed) (contrasting his notion of foreign investment with
portfolio investment which he sees as represented by a movement of money for the purpose of buying
shares in a company formed or functioning in another country and which couId include other security
instruments through which capital is raised for ventures. The distinguishing element is that in portfolio
investment, there is a divorce between management and control of the company and the share of ownership
in it.)
1$

16

SORNARAJAH supra note 14 at 8
SORNARAJAH, supra note 14 at 8
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one state to another and such movements have the potential for conflict
between two states.

I7

And because foreign direct investment frequently

involves such movement, it is possible to link it to the already existing norm
of diplomatic protection of aliens. IS

On the other hand, portfolio

investments can be made on stock exchanges virtually anywhere in the
world and, since the host state cannot know to whom the linkages are
created through the sale of shares on these exchanges, there can be no
concrete relationship creating responsibility. 19
',;,

,

:~

The difference in the treatment, by customary intemationallaw, of direct and
portfolio investment might be justified. Since direct investment aims at some
form of control or management, it invariably entails some form of presence
in the host country and, as such, is deserving of diplomatic protection.
Portfolio investment, by its nature, lacks that contact sufficient to implicate
diplomatic protection, but this does not make the latter any less an
investment. It simply means that they evoke different legal reactions. In
other words, although there is a difference between portfolio investment and
foreign direct investment, such difference does not detract from the
11

Ibid at 17

Ii

Ibid at 17

19 Ibid

at 8
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"investment" nature of portfolio investments. Granted that customary
international law might not protect portfolio investment in the manner that it
protects direct investment. Yet, it does not mean that portfolio investment
should not be recognized as investment. It is just a different form of
international capital.

It has been noted that prior to 1945, portfolio investments constituted the

dominant form of international capital movement in the world economy. The
development of foreign direct investment arose with the rise of the modem
multinational corporations. 20 It is noteworthy, though, that although
multinational corporations are frequently associated with foreign direct
investments, they are not a prerequisite for foreign direct investments, which
can, indeed, exist without multinational corporations, as these corporations
are technically understood. 21 It is possible for a person, or a mere group of

20 Olukoshi supra note I at 15; Some even define foreign direct investment in terms of the role of the
multinational corporations. See MOSES M. IKIARA, FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT (FDI),
TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER, AND POVERTY ALLEVIATION: AFRICA'S HOPES AND DILEMMA,
3 (African Technology Policy Studies Network, Nairobi, Kenya, 2003) A TPS Special Paper Series No. 16
(citing Mallampally and Sauvant).

See, for example, A.Y. AGBA, DIRECT FOREIGN INVESTMENT AND NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF
PAYMENTS, 27(hereinafter "AGBA, FDI AND NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS" (stating that:
"The multinational corporation is any business organisation, which owns (in whole or part), controls and
manages income generating assets in more than one country. Indeed, there is the further condition that the
income-generating assets should be located in at least five or six countries. It is necessary to note that the
choice of the number of countries is rather arbitrary, and not based on any sound theoretical underpinnings.
In doing so, it engages in international production, namely production across national boundaries financed
by direct investment.")
21
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persons, in one country to establish an enterprise or acquire a controlling
interest in an enterprise in another country, without the vehicle of an existing
company in their home country. In such a situation, their interest is clearly a
foreign investment since they have some measure of control in the firm. But
the enterprise can hardly be described as a multinational corporation. This
point is not to underestimate the role of multinational corporations in foreign
investment,22 but simply to underscore the fact that foreign investment is not
coterminous with the concept of multinational corporations.

II. CLASSIFICATIONS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT

A foreigner may invest in a country by acquiring a controlling stake in an
existing company. 23 They may also do so by forming a new company. 24
Another method by which foreign investment may arise is where the
foreigner reinvests profits earned in the company or through long or short-

22 Indeed multinational corporations are central not only to foreign investments, but have proven to be
central players in the quest for development amongst developing countries. There are some who suggest
that they should be subjects of intemationallaw. The activities of some multinational corporations exceed
those of certain states. See generally SORNARAJAH, supra note 14 at 4 (asserting that: "The multinational
corporations themselves must be seen as distinct bases of power capable of asserting their interests through
law. Their individual economic resources far exceed those of sovereign states. Their collective power to
manipulate legal outcomes must be conceded.")
23
24

KA YODE AND OYERANTI supra note 6 at 8; ARV A supra note I J at 8
ld
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term net loans from the foreign to the host company. 25

Similarly, foreign investment may be classified by the motive on the part of
the investor or the driving force behind it. Three classes are generally
discussed. The first is what is called export oriented foreign investment.
Here, the foreign enterprise would be seeking for new inputs, such as raw
materials or component parts. 26 This is illustrated by the foreign investments
in the mining and petroleum sectors of Nigeria. Typically, the foreign
investor, usually a multinational corporation, extracts the raw materials. 27
The underlying motive on the part of the foreign investor is to reduce its cost
of production and enhance its exports. The availability of lower cost of labor
sometimes accentuates the export oriented foreign investment. A second
class of foreign investment is the market development oriented one. The
foreign investor's motivation is to produce for the local market in the host
country.28 The attraction is usually the size of the local market and its long
run potential and local production costS. 29 The third class is the government

16 AGBA,
27

28

FDI AND NIGERIA'S BALANCE OF PAYMENTS, P. 16

Agba, FDf and National Development, P. 59
Agba, FDI and National Development, P. 59

Agba, FDf and National Development, P. 59; Another approach, to the export oriented - market
development dichotomy, is the demand oriented - supply oriented classification. The demand oriented

29
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driven kind. The government of the host country might implement various
incentives to attract investments from abroad. 30 It does this because of the
perceived benefits of foreign investments. We shall return to the incentives
available in the case of Nigeria as well as the identified benefits of foreign
investments generally. The government initiated foreign investment is
common in Third World countries, which are struggling with the challenges
of development and have been persuaded that foreign investment is a
necessary ingredient in the development matrix.
I',

Other scholars identify another classification into three broad kinds. For
instance Anderson observes that: "three broad kinds of direct investment can

be identified: First, horizontal multi-plant enterprises with production abroad
of the same line of goods; Second, vertically integrated subsidiaries which
serve the purpose of enabling transfers of intermediate products; Third,
diversified affiliates which are neither horizontally nor vertically related to

foreign investment concentrating on the local market of the host country while the supply oriented foreign
investment exploits the local resources for export from the host country to the investor's home country or
even a third country. See NWABUEZE H. ACHIME, INVESTMENT POLICY ANALYSIS AND THE
NIGERIAN ECONOMIC SYSTEM, 10 (Zwei Consort Publications, Enugu, Nigeria, 1996). The demand
oriented foreign investment would seem to equate the market development oriented foreign investment
while the supply oriented foreign investment would equate the export oriented foreign investment.
30 Agba,

FDI and National Development, P. 59
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the rest of the organization."}! This classification is based on the relationship
or interaction amongst different parts of a multinational or, rather, the place
of an enterprise (located in a host country) in the multinational group. A
multinational company might comprise of similar enterprises, in different
countries, engaged in the production of the same or similar products. This is

the so-called horizontal multi-plant enterprise. Such enterprises, in most
cases, are drawn by market potentials in their locations. The second group,
according to this classification consists of enterprises, which are vertically
integrated but are located in different countries. Each enterprise might be
devoted to a certain aspect of the production process. They are, thus,
interdependent. The third group refers to multinationals engaged in different
lines of business or in the production of varied products and having affiliates
in different countries. The affiliates are neither horizontally nor vertically
integrated. The relationship among them is simply that they are affiliates of
the same multinational group. The problem with classifying foreign
investment in this manner is that its focus is on the multinational corporation
and not on the investment. As we noted earlier in this chapter, although
multinational corporations are deeply involved in foreign investments, the
latter can exist without the former. To that extent, the classification based on
THOMAS ANDERSON, MUL TINA TIONAL INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A
STUDY OF TAXATION AND NATIONALIZATION, 24 (Routledge, NY, 1991)
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among the affiliates of the multinational corporation
narrow.

IS

32

HI. DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS

Several factors affect and determine the decision on foreign investment. A
foreign investor may be motivated by one or a combination of these factors,
which sometimes are referred to as determinants of foreign investment. The
most important and most often discussed factor is the market size of the
economy.33 Indeed, this cuts both ways. The relative small size of the home
market, of the multinational corporation, in comparison to the size of the
multinational corporation, will invariably push the corporation, or indeed
any other investor faced with such scenario, to explore how to expand its
· .

'

market beyond what is available at home. The United Nations Conference

32 Another categorization of multinationals is into multinational producing enterprise (one that owns and
Controls production facilities in more than one country), multinational trading enterprise (one that
Specializes in selling domestically produced goods to individuals, groups or enterprises in other countries),
multinationally owned enterprise (one owned by nationals of different countries) and multinationally
Controlled enterprise (one controlled by the economic agents of many nationalities). See ACHIME supra
note 29 at 81-82
33 See Nasiru Musa Yauri, Foreign Direct Investment and Technology Transfer to Nigerian Manufacturing
Firms - Evidence from Empirical Data, Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review, Vol.
44/2 June 2006 P. 18 at 20; Anupam Basu and Krishna Srinivasan, Foreign Direct Investment in AfricaSome Case Studies, IMF Working Paper, WP/02/61 , P. 12 (published by the International Monetary Fund,

2002); Maria Pigato, The Foreign Direct Investment Environment in Africa, (hereinafter (FDI Environment
in Africa") PP. 3-6 (The World Bank); United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World
Investment Report 2006 (hereinafter WIR 2006), PP. 155-158
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on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) calls this a "push factor,,34, a term it
uses to describe any circumstance, in an investor's home country, that has
the consequence of prompting them to invest abroad. The corollary to this is
that once an investor is, as it were,

~~pushed"

abroad because of the small

size of the home market, it will be attracted to a country, or an economy, that
has a large market. The availability of the market thus becomes, in the words
of UNCTAD, a "pull factor". The role of market availability, of course,
depends on the type of the product and is enhanced when the country market
allows the exploitation of economies of scale. 35 This is one of the positive
factors in the Nigerian foreign investment equation. With a population
estimated to be over one hundred million, the country presents a huge
market for several products. It is worthy of note, though, that it is not only
the population of the country that determines the market size. Other
36
ingredients like the wage earnings and disposable income are relevant. But,
the sheer size of the population is an important consideration.

34WIR2006P.155
35

Basu and Srinivasan, supra note 33 at 12

36 WIR 2006 P. 155 (noting that: "Some product markets might be relatively large even in "small
economies" (e.g. because of per capita incomes in the case of consumer goods)")
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Another frequently discussed determinant is the cost of production. 37 Again,
this can be a "push" or "pull" factor depending on where the advantage lies.
Cost of production is expansive, and will include labor costs, transportation
and ancillary aids to production. A foreign investor will weigh all the costs
and the relative weight one investor would attach to anyone factor would of
, course vary depending on the line of production. If the cost of production in
the home country is high, it acts as a push factor and will likely make the
investor to look abroad. In doing so the investor will look to the countries
that have low costs of production, and in this case it will be a pull factor,
attracting investment. The question of cost of production is the more
important if the investment is export-oriented.38 In the case of labor it has
been noted that the important thing is not just the availability of cheap labor
but also, the availability of highly productive labor. 39 The reduced cost
might also be in the nature of natural resources or other inputs. This explains

37 Yauri supra note 33 at 23; Pigato, FDI Environment in Africa, supra note 33 at 3; WIR 2006 supra note
33 at 155; Basu and Srinivasan. supra note 33 at 12
38

Basu and Srinivasan, supra note 33 at 12

39 Yauri supra note 33 at 23 (noting that: ''the reality in most African countries is that lower labour costs
though widely prevalent, is not a sufficient inducement for the inflow of FDI, as labour productivity in
most of these countries is usually low.")

242

the prominence of foreign investments in the mining and petroleum sector in
Nigeria and other developing countries endowed with natural resources. 40

Others identify country conditions as yet another determinant. 41 This would
be a generic term to cover the question of how open the country is.42
Whether openness of the economy will conduce to more foreign investments
depends on the kind of foreign investment. Export seeking investment would
be attracted to an open economy since the perceived openness will inure to
the benefit of the investor who can easily sell their products abroad. 43 On the
other hand, market oriented investment would more easily be attracted to a
less open economy, since the restrictions on importation would ensure a
greater availability of the local market.

Other considerations would be

whether there are infrastructures, such as social services that are necessary
and conducive to investment operations in the country. "A high level of
economic development as reflected in the availability of adequate
infrastructure, both physical and human, and a relatively high per capita

A greater percentage of the foreign investment that goes to Africa go to mainly resource endowed
countries.

40

41

Basu and Srinivasan, supra note 33 at 13

42

Some writers use the term "openness". See for e.g. Yauri supra note 33 at 21

43

Yauri supra note 33 at 22
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income would be expected to be beneficial for foreign investment.,,44 The
existence of supportive institutional structures such as well functioning
banking and financial system and a reliable legal system also attract foreign
investment. 45 A World Bank study found that government instability,
political violence, policy volatility and uncertain enforcement of laws all
have a negative impact on foreign investment and that the two factors that
reduce investment most are corruption and the absence of a credible rule of
law. 46 The World Bank's Country Policy and Institutional Assessment

(CPIA) , which assesses the quality of countries' policies and institutional
frameworks, shows that African countries scored poorly compared with
other developing countries. 47 A similar performance is reflected in the
International Country and Risk Guide Index (ICRG)48, prompting a
suggestion that overall it would appear that Sub-Saharan Africa continues to

44Basu and Srinivasan, supra 33 at 13 (citing Kravis and Lipsey (1992), Wheeler and Mody (1992), Mody
and Srinivasan (1998»
45

Basu and Srinivasan supra note 33 at 13

46 AYMO BRUNETTI AND BEATRICE WEDER, INVESTMENT AND INSTITUTIONAL
UNCERTAINTY: A COMPARATIVE STUDY OF DIFFERENT UNCERTAINTY MEASURES (The
World Bank, Technical paper No.4 by the 1FC, Washington, DC, 1997)
47 Miria Pigato, Foreign Direct Investment in Africa: Old tales and New Evidence (hereinafter, "FDI in
Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence"), 9 (World Bank, Africa Region Working Paper Series No.8,
November 2000) (noting that: "the CPIA shows that Africa's rating have marginally improved since 1997
but remains the worst compared with other developing countries.")

the period 1987-1998, Nigeria scored annual averages of 48.5 in ICRG political risk index, 31.9 in
ICRG corruption index, and 37.5 in ICRG rule oflaw index. The maximum attainable score was 100. See
Miria Pigato, FDI in Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence, supra note 47 at 32.

4! For
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be viewed as a risky investment location.

49

Corruption and other social ills

often discourage investors because they increase the cost of doing business.
So does a perception of insecurity, both of person and property. These tend
to have a negative impact on the flow of foreign investment.

An important new determinant is the availability of information
technology.5t} The world is gradually becoming a global village courtesy of

the Internet and information super highway. Unfortunately, some developing
countries are not yet fully wired into almost monolithic super highway. Such
situation is a major constraint on the inflow of foreign investment.

49 Miria

Pigato, FDI in Africa: Old Tales and New Evidence, supra note 47 at 11

50 Tony Addison and Almas Heshmati, The New Global Determinants of FDI Flows to Developing
Countries: The Importance oj leT and Democratization, (United Nations University, World Institute for
Development Economics Research, Discussion Paper No. 2003/45, May 2003) (arguing that

democratization and information and communication technology (lCT) increase foreign direct investment
inflows to developing countries and that more assistance should be given to poorer countries to help them
adopt ICT and to break out of what they term their present 'low equilibrium' trap); The issue of democracy
is not an entirely new determinant, and is interwoven with the rule of law and protection of property.
Investors are wary of going into countries that do not have well functioning legal institutions or where
property rights are not respected. It must be noted that even absence a democratic setting, foreign investors
do go into countries if the profit margin can cushion the adverse effects of lack of democracy. It is assumed
that that explains the continued presence of many multinational corporations in Nigeria during the military
administrations. Some even suggest that the multinational corporations collude with the dictatorial
governments to further suppress the people. Nonetheless, democracy continues to be a predominant
consideration in the decision of foreign investors. See Jo Jakobsen, Does Democracy Moderate the
Obsolescing Bargain mechanism? An empirical AnalYSiS, 1983-2001,65 (Transnational Corporations, Vol.
IS, No.3, December 2006) (probing the nexus between democracy and foreign investment and noting that
"evidently democracy and international capital flows are compatible.")
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IV. ARGUMENTS FOR AND AGAINST FOREIGN IN-VESTMENTS

There is hardly any phenomenon in international law or economics that is
whole-heartedly accepted without controversy. For most of the twentieth
century the world was divided along ideological lines, essentially between
the pro capitalist west and the socialist leaning countries of the old Soviet
Union and East Europe. Thus, most concepts were viewed through
ideological prisms. Foreign investment was no exception. The West
championed and trumpeted it, while socialist inclined countries lampooned
the notion as exploitative. It is pertinent to note that even the orchestrated
fall of the Berlin Wall and the celebrated end of the cold war have not
completely eradicated the ideological divide. Granted, countries of the
former Soviet Union and the eastern bloc have embraced market economy
and opened their economies to foreign investment. Yet, scholars are still not
agreed on the utility of foreign investment. That is the reason we examine
here the common arguments for and against foreign investment. We start
with the perceived benefits. It must also be noted that foreign investment
involves two countries or, at least, entities in more than one country: the
country recipient of the investment (host country), on the one hand, and the
country, which is the source of the investment (home country), on the other
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hand. And true to capitalism, the interests of the home country, or of the
foreign investor, and those of the host country, do not necessarily coincide.
Our emphasis is on the benefits accruing, and drawbacks applying, to the
host country. This is especially so, as the subject of our study is not only a
net recipient of foreign investment but is also a developing country.

A. Benefits of Foreign Investments

Foreign investment is a source of capital. sl Most developing countries are
said to suffer from poor or insufficient capital for development. Thus, they
have to resort to foreign aid or borrowing to supplement their capital base.
But the latter two have dwindled in recent years and foreign investment is
increasingly stepping up to the plate. 52 It is argued that foreign investment is
preferred to borrowing because borrowing requires regular repayments and
saddles a country with debt servicing burdens for a long time. 53 On the other
hand, foreign investment does not entail any regular repayments by the host

LOUIS N. CTETE, DETERMINANTS OF FOREIGN INVESTMENT IN NIGERIA, 1 (NISER, Ibadan,
1998) (NISER Monograph Series No.7, 1998)

51

IMF, FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A Study by the Research
Department, Occasional Paper, No. 33, P.2 (IMF Washington DC, January, 1985)

52

IMF, FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A Study by the Research
Department, Occasional Paper, No. 33, P.l (IMF Washington DC, January, 1985)
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country. Instead, the foreign investor acquires equity, and shares in the risks
involved in the investment. 54 They can only be paid if the investment earns a
positive return. Besides, it is said that foreign investments have longer-tenn
beneficial impacts on the host country's development than do debts.

Furthennore, it is contended that in addition to the capital, encapsulated in
foreign investment, the host country's public revenue is also improved by
the taxes associated with the investments. 55 The foreign investor brings not
only capital but also pays royalty which add up to the revenue base of the
host country. 56

The most controversial benefit associated with foreign investment,
especially in the developing world, is the claim that it facilitates the transfer
of technology.57 It is axiomatic that developing countries lack technology

54 IMF, FOREIGN PRIVATE INVESTMENT IN DEVELOPING COUNTRIES: A Study by the Research
Department, Occasional Paper, No. 33, P.9 (IMF Washington DC, January, 1985)
55 Tony Addison and Almas Heshmati, supra note 50 at 2; M.I. OBADAN AND F.A. DIMOWO, ESSAYS
ON NIGERIAN ECONOMY, 41 (Mindex Publishing Coy, Benin City Nigeria, 2000); ACHIME supra
note 29 at 73; G.E. EDAME, DEVELOPMENT ECONOMICS AND PLANNING IN NIGERIA, 138 14() (hannony Books, Benin City, Nigeria, 20(1)
56 Hassan A. saliu, The Politics of Foreign Investment, in HASSAN A. SALIU (ED), ISSUES IN
CONTEMPORARY POLITICAL ECONOMY OF NIGERIA, (Sally and Associates, llorin, Nigeria, 1999)

"Technology is defined as any tangible or tangible resource that can generate economic rent for the host
country firms by, for example improving total factor productivity." See IKIARA , supra note 20 at 8 (also
noting that "technology is generated by R&D, most of which is conducted in industrialized countries,
making technology transfer very important for economic prosperity of countries with weak R&D and
57
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and that they badly need to acquire that, one way or the other. Essentially,

they have to develop theirs or receive it from the West by purchase. Unlike
non-proprietary assets such as finance, capital goods and intermediate
inputs, which can be obtained from the international market, proprietary
assets like technology can be obtained only from the firms that make and
possess them. 58 To purchase technology will of course be very expensive.
Similarly, the multinational corporations, who may own the technology,
might be reluctant to license because of the fear that such licensing might
dissipate the technology. 59 As an alternative, they prefer to internalize
technology transfer through foreign investments. 60 They do this by
establishing affiliates in other countries. That way they can still control their
technology. This also allows the developing countries to have the benefit of
the technology. At the same time, this may result in the development of
technology in the developing countries through the so-called spillovers.

innovation capacities", and further that "in the 16th and 17th centuries, for instance, deliberate technology
transfer policies of King Henry VIII made Britain a leading manufacturing nation.")
58

WIR2006 P. 184

59

IKIARA supra note 20 at 9

60

IKIARA supra note 20 at 9
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Vertical Spillovers refer to the effect of a foreign investor's technology and
know how on their local subsidiaries.

61

Essentially, the foreign firm makes

its technology available to the local affiliate, and this enhances the affiliate's
production. Horizontal spillover refers to the effects of the foreign investor's
use of technology on other domestic firms, usually in competition with the
foreign investor, in the host country.62 The interaction between a foreign
finn and domestic finns takes different forms and at each level, the belief is
that, the foreign firm's technology rubs off on the local firms. Domestic
finns can watch and imitate the way foreign affiliates operate. There may
also be a labor turnover, where employees of the foreign firm may move to
domestic firms bringing with them the knowledge of the technology
acquired while at the foreign firm. The acquisition of technology, on the part
of the local firms, might also be spurred by the competition from the foreign
firm through its affiliates. In order not to lose their market share to the
competition from foreign firms, the local firms are forced to be more
efficient in using existing technologies and resources or to introduce new
technologies by themselves. 63 The spillover might also result from training

6\

Yauri supra note 33 at 26

62

Yauri supra note 33 at 26

63

Yauri supra note 33 at 27
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and collaboration under joint venture arrangement between a foreign firm
and a local firm, or from backward and forward linkages. 64

The next major argument advanced in support of foreign investment is that it
provides employment.

65

Foreign investment, in essence, is a new business

being brought to the host country. Like all businesses, it would need to be
staffed. It would not be realistic for the foreign investor to bring in all the
staff for the firm from the home country. Even if they could do so, there are
usually host country immigration or other restrictions. So, the foreign
investment would have to be staffed by employees from the host country.66

It is noted that this benefit particularly applies more to host developing
countries than it does to host developed countries, and is especially manifest
in the manufacturing sector. 67

It is also pointed out that whether foreign

investment generates employment depends on several factors: the nature of
the investment, trade and industrial policies of the host nation and the labor

64 Yauri supra note 33 at 28 (explaining that foreign affiliates may be forced to engage in transactions with
local suppliers and customers and thus may provide technical assistance and training to local suppliers)
65

Saliu supra note 56 at 297

Saliu supra note 56 at 297; see also EDAME, supra note 55 at 140 (asserting that: "the importation of
capital creates more employment in the urban sector. This leads to the migration of surplus labour from the
rural to the urban sector. The pressure of popUlation on the land is reduced and disguised unemployment
may disappear. This the social gain offoreign capita!.")
66

67

WIR 2006 P. 192
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institutions of the host country. 68 Other benefits attributed to foreign
investment are that: it leads to the production of better quality goods at lower
COSt,69

it enhances competition70 and that it leads to development. 7 }

B. Arguments Against Foreign Investments

Against the practice of foreign investments, it is argued that they make the
so-called developing countries perpetually dependent on the sources of the
foreign investments and this deepens their state of underdevelopment. 72
Scholars of this dependency school note that foreign investment is motivated

68 Pigato, FDI in Africa: Old Tales and New EVidence, supra note 44 at 8 (noting that: "employment
generation of FDI is normally higher in green field FDI, while M&As often lead to labor shedding. It is
also higher within export-oriented regimes with abundant cheap labor.")

C.T. Tyokase, The PoliTical Economy o/Foreign Capital in Nigeria, in S.A ADESINA, S.S OGBONNA,
R.A ADETORO AND C.T. TYOKASE, REFLECTIONS ON THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF
NIGERIA, 107 (Goad Educational Publishers, Abeokuta, 1999); A. Fabayo and lA. Alade, Foreign
Private investment in Nigerian Cotton Textile Industry: An Impact Analysis, 47 Quarterly Journal of
Administration, Vol. XVIII Nos. 1& 2 October 1983/January 1984; KAYODE AND OYERANTI, supra
note 6 at 9
69

70

Fabayo and Alade supra note 69 at 47-48; IKIARA supra note 20 at 4

71

Olukoshi supra note 1 at 15

72 SaHu supra note 56 at 298; Olukoshi supra note 1 at 15 (asserting that: ""But against orthodoxy, scholars
working within the underdevelopment/dependency school have argued that the real problem faced by
developing economies is not the shortage of capital as such but the draining away of their meager resources
to the West by foreign investors. Far from being a factor necessary for the development of the 'Third
world', foreign investment is, in fact, a major burden the overall effect of which is to reinforce the
underdeveloped state of these countries. In evidence, many dependentistas have conducted studies showing
the negative balance of payments effects of the activities of foreign investors on Third World economies.";
WIR 2006 P. 195 (noting that "if a large share ofFDI originates from one particular country, it may create
a perception in the host economy that it has become too dependent on and dominated by the home economy
concerned. ")
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by profits and are motivated to invest in an economy by the prospect of

higher returns, and it would seem contradictory that they would sacrifice
their capital in order to develop a country far removed from their home
countries. They deny that foreign investors bring in capital. Instead, they
raise the capital within the host economy and then declare huge profits,
which enable them to repatriate the capital and thereby worsen the balance
of payments equilibrium of the host country. 73 Opponents also note that
when it is asserted that foreign investment offers employment, it is forgotten
that the jobs that foreign investment offers are only those that further
entrench the foreign investors in the host country and therefore intensify the
country's dependence on the foreign investor. They note that the foreign
investors do not offer substantive, and decision making, positions to the
locals. 74 Indeed, most of the decisions are made in the home countries or
headquarters of the foreign investors.

There is no denying the tension between foreign investors and the host
country.75 Both are motivated by interests that seem at odds with each other.

73

Saliu supra note 56 at 298

74

Saliu supra note 56 at 299

75 See also J" Ade Oyelabi, The Developing Countries' Point of View:!, in DON WALLACE, JR "' AND
HELGA ROUF-KOCH, INTERNATIONAL CONTROL OF INVESTMENT (The Dusseldorf Conference
on Multinational Corporations), 101 at 106 (Praeger Publishers, NY, 1974) (asserting that: "It has become
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Yet, that is the core of the capitalist or liberal economic system to which
these developing countries aspire. The solution to the seeming contradiction
lies in the freedom to negotiate, or market forces, which is the hallmark of
economic liberalism. Thus, advocates of the Bargaining Schooe6 argue that
a country has bargaining strength vis-a-vis foreign companies and should be
able to negotiate an agreement in which the social profitability of the
proposed foreign investment is substantia1.77 The host government seeks to
protect its interests through the use of laws and regulations and by direct
negotiations with the foreign investors. The real problem is that these
mechanisms are often times subverted and the process remains skewed in
favor of the multinational corporations. Sometimes, the public officials who

generally recognized that the primary objectives of the multinational corporations are to make profits and to
grow. Ifwe accept these objectives as perfectly rational and legitimate - and there is no good reason not to
• then it becomes clear why one must assume that the relationship between LDCs and MNCs is one of
inherent conflict. Unhappily, the conflict is no more one in which a poor solitary foreign investor is
maltreated by an ungrateful host country. Rather, it is one where a nation-state is virtually at the mercy of
one or more giant MNCs")
76 Other schools of thought on the issue are the pro-foreign investment school (which believes that national
and foreign private sector enterprises operating in competitive market conditions offer the best possible
prospects for speedy national economic growth in developing countries), dependency school which rejects
the arguments of the pro-foreign investment school, and maintains that foreign investments lead to
dependence, on the part of the host country, on the foreign investors), and the structuralists school, which
challenges the optimism of the bargaining school) See S.A. Olomola and T.O. Akinbobola, Foreign Direct
Investment and Economic Growth in Nigeria: Is there a Long -Run Relationship? The Quarterly Journal of
Administration, Vol XXXI, Nos. 1&2, September J999/January 2000, PP. 59-71
77 S.A. Olomola and T.O. Akinbobola. Foreign Direct Investment and Economic Growth in Nigeria: Is
there a Long =Run Relationship? The Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. XXXI, Nos. 1&2
September 1999/January 2000 P. 59 at P.64 (also noting that the bargaining school discovered that ''the
cleavage between the host government and foreign firms remain very deep and that the former do seek,
with ever greater levels of success over time, to extract increasing significant gains from multinational
corporations (MNCs)")
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are supposed to enforce the regulations become compromised directly or
indirectly by the foreign investors, thereby essentially leaving the
corporations to do as they please. 78 So, the fault is not in the notion of
foreign investment, per se. Instead, the challenge should be how best to
regulate and, in the view of the bargaining school, negotiate the admission of
foreign investors in such a way to ensure optimum benefit for the host state.

In a direct attack on the role of foreign investment in the development of the
Third World, critics argue that foreign investors bring in outdated and
inappropriate technology 79 and they do not even try to pass the technology to
the locals. Sometimes they fail to adapt the technology to local
circumstances. Technology is such a prized possession on the part of
foreign investors that it is a little ambitious to expect that they would easily
transfer it to the developing countries. Indeed, we saw earlier that one of the
reasons the multinational corporations resort to foreign investments is to
control their technologies. Otherwise they can simply sell or grant licenses

78 It has been noted that this situation is "compounded by the practice of public servants retiring into
multinational corporations as directors in which capacity they serve only a little more than as
intermediaries." See OBADAN AND DIMOWO supra note 55 at 41 - 42
79 J.A. Alade, The Role of Multinational Corporations in Economic Development: The Nigerian
Experience, Quarterly Journal of Administration, Vol. XXV Nos. 3 & 4 April/July 1991 P. 291 at 293
(asserting that: "it has been observed that little technology is being transferred by the M~Cs. More often

than not the technologies being transferred are inappropriate to the local conditions prevalent in the
LDCs."); Fabayo and Alade supra note 69 at 48; IKIARA supra note 20 at 5
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for the developing countries to use them. But they are reluctant to do this.
Some theorists actually contend that the reason a foreign firm can compete
with local firms is that the former have certain attributes such as technology,
which kind of counteract the obvious advantages enjoyed by the local firms.
Such advantages on the part of the local firms include knowledge of the
local conditions. So, by its very nature, the expectation that foreign investors
would bring their technology and transfer it to the developing country is not
entirely realistic. In most cases, where they are forced to undertake to train
local staff, they pay lip service to that undertaking. This is not to deny the
impact of foreign investment in the acquisition of technology, but only to
underscore the point that its role is marginal. Realistically, the developing
countries can pick some aspects of the technology indirectly through
interaction with the foreign firms as discussed earlier. Outright and
deliberate transfer from the foreign investors to the local firms seems a tall
order.

A similar criticism is that foreign investments encourage alien tastes. It is
alleged that multinational corporations encourage inappropriate and alien
patterns of consumption.80 One wonders why this criticism can legitimately

so Alade supra note 79 at 293; OBADAN AND DIMOWO, supra note 55 at 43
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by leveled against foreign investment. It is true that the introduction of
foreign investment leads to the introduction of different or foreign ways of
life. But the influence of the alien pattern of consumption is dependent on
the people.

The

developing countries understand their state of

underdevelopment vis-a-vis the developed ones, and essentially see the
march towards development as a march towards the ways of the West. This
seems to pervade all aspects of life. The penchant for alien tastes is not
necessary the fault, or even the result, of foreign investment. It is more the
result of the interaction of the citizenry with people from outside. If such
social and commercial intercourse leads to a quest for alien patterns of
consumption, foreign investment is not to blame.

Another criticism directed against foreign investment is that it leads to
"decapitalization of the host country through the transfer of enormous
amounts

of the

nation's

economic

surplus

abroad

for

foreign

development.".81 It is also alleged to lead to a marginalization or
displacement of domestic

firmS.

82

This is the perennial dilemma. The

unleashing of foreign investment entails that the foreign firms will compete

81

OBADAN AND DIMOWO supra note S5 at 43; Alade supra note 79 at 292

82

Alade supra note 79 at 293; Obadan supra note 5S at 43; KAYODE AND OYERANTI supra note 6 at 10
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with the local finns, and given the fonner's superior technology, they are
more likely to do better than the local finns. Depending on the extent of the
competition, the local firms might be crowded out. It is also stated that
foreign investment fosters neocolonial domination83 and leads to uneven
income distribution. 84

V. HISTORY AND OVERVIEW OF FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN
NIGERIA

It is noted that foreign investments date back to time in memoriam, and is

not peculiar to the developing nations, but was also a feature of the
developing process of the advanced countries.85 It must be observed, though,

8:;

Tyokase supra note 69 at 108, 109 & 110, Obadan supra note 55 at 43. In the same vein the foreign firms

are accused of protecting their subsidiaries by avoiding competition with them. Thus they produce only for
the local market and this hurts the host country's balance of payments. See Alade supra note 79 at 292.
84

KAYODE AND OYERANTI supra note 6 at

to

See Edame, supra note 55 at 138 (stating: "In the 17m and ISm centuries, England borrowed from
Holland. The rapid growth of America had been due to large supplies of men and money from Europe in
m
the 19 century. This is also true of the USSR. The development of Russia has been in no less degree to
liberal supplies of capital during 1890-1914 by Western Europe. Though the Russian economic
development followed the October Revolution, the ''take-off'' goes back to the years preceding the First
World War", and further that: "It is generally contended that the Western European nations including
England received little foreign capital for their development during the "take-off". But this is not a correct
view. In actuality, by exploiting their colonies, these countries extorted a kind of involuntary aid from
them."); FOREIGN DIRECT INVESTMENT. P. 11 (A Publication of the International Finance
Corporation and Foreign Investment Advisory Service, Washington, DC, 1997) (hereinafter simply referred
to as "IFe, FOI") (noting that the story of development almost every where involved foreign direct
investment and that itt the early 20th century a large part of the world's ittfutstrUcture WllS developed
through foreign investment); The publication further noted that by 1914, the world stock of foreign direct
investment was estimated at $15billion. The UK was the largest source followed by the US and then
Gernany, while the US was the largest recipient. But after World War II, the US became the largest source
of foreign direct investment and manufacturing investment became most prevalent. See PP. 11-12.
85
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that such investments lacked the sophistication of present day transnational
investments. Nonetheless, in their basic forms of capital moving from one
country to another, those transactions cutting across countries could clearly
be classified as foreign investments. Pre- colonial Nigeria was made up of
distinct groups. There was certainly some form of trading and other
commercial activities among the several groups. Whether one would
categorize those as foreign investments would depend on one's view of the
status of those entities. Besides, the prevalent commercial activity was
trading. Be that as it may, the history of foreign investments in Nigeria is
traced to the advent of Europeans, to the place now called Nigeria, sometime
in the 19th century. 86 Of course, the activities of the traders from Europe
were a precursor to the full-scale colonization of the country. As we saw in
Chapter 1, the infamous Berlin conference, on the partition of Africa,
allotted the territory of Nigeria to Britain, an allotment that Britain initially
maintained through the Royal Niger Company. As we saw in chapter 2,
colonial economic system was mercantilist. And all over the world, in the
height of colonialism, investment was largely made in the context of

Olukoshi supra note 1 at 16; Olomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66 (asserting that: "the
Development of Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) started with the flrst contact of Nigerians over a century
ago with European traders in the coastal areas of the country and Trans-Saharan caravan routes with the
Arabs in the north.")
86
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colonial expansion.

87

Nigeria's expenence was no different. With the

colonial conquest, and the integration of Nigeria's legal system into the
British legal system, which protected the foreigners, the flow of foreign
investment began in earnest.88 The main beneficiaries were British, as most
of the foreign investment came from Britain. 89 It has been noted that of the
102 firms that were operating in Nigeria by 1921, 94 were of British origin
and ownership, and 5 others had joint British owner.90 Some of the
prominent multinational corporations that operated in Nigeria during the
colonial era were the United African Company (UAC) of Nigeria Limited;
John Holts; A. O. Leventis; Patterson Zechonics (PZ); CFAO and SeOA
(which were French firms); UTe (a Swiss firm); Aluminum Limited of
Canada (ALCAN); and Pfizer (a USA drug company).91 Initially, most of
the foreign investment was in mining and resources extraction. 92 Later, the

SORNARAJAH supra note 14 at 19 (observing that in consequence of the colonial context in which the
investments took place, the investments did not need protection as the colonial legal systems were
integrated with those of the imperial powers and the imperial powers gave sufficient protection for the
investments which went into the colonies); Somarajah noted further that where investments were made in
areas which remained uncolonized, a blend of diplomacy and force ensured that the states did not interfere
with foreign investors too adversely. See SORNARAJAH supra note 14 at 20.
U Alade points out that "the colonial administration adopted a laissez faire policy towards the operation of
multinational enterprises in the country" and "that although the enterprises were to operate within the
framework of government regulations, in actual practice, government regulation of business activities were
virtually absent." See Alade supra note 79 at 294
87

89

QJukoshi supra note 1 at 20

90

Ohlkoshi supra note 1 at 20

III

01omola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66

92

Olomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66

~6()

emphasis shifted to manufacturing following the development of import
substitution.93 This focused attention away from imports to the
manufacturing of consumer goods. However, most of the multinationals
merely changed from importing finished goods to importing parts. This is
the reason they are sometimes accused of subverting the development of
local industries. Instead of adapting the production of consumer goods to use
local raw materials, they still used foreign parts in the production of what
were local consumer goods.

Amongst the newly independent countries, the prevailing sentiment
following independence was that of nationalism as reflected in antagonism,
at least rhetorically, against any appearance of continued foreign
domination. This skepticism was extended to foreign investment.

94

The

post-colonial era in Nigeria began in 1960. Although the feelings of

Olukoshl supra note 1 at 22 (noting that "it was only in the period from about 1945 that an appreciable
level of foreign capital began to go into manufacturing activities in Nigeria to mark the commencement, in
eamest, of import-substitution industrialisation in the country")

93

94 Mulatu Wubneh, Patterns of Foreign Investment in Africa, 1970-1988, in REXFORD A. AHENE AND
BERNARD KATZ (Eds), PRIVATIZATION AND INVESTMENT IN SUB SAHARAN AFRICA, 55, 65
(Praeger, NY, 1992) (noting that foreign investors were often viewed as extensions of colonialism in the
early years following independence" and that "nationalization of foreign-owned companies was extensive,
and where there was no outright expropriation, foreign investors were required to accept minority state
participation") lFC, FDI supra note 85 at 12·13 (noting that during the 1950s and 1960s most developing
countries pursued "inward-oriented" development strategies which emphasized the growth of domestic
industries and that most governments were wary of foreign direct investment and did not want to create
economic dependency. It also noted that even though such policies deterred foreign direct investments, they
also made foreign investors to shift production into the countries instead of trying to export to them.)
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nationalism were no different than in other emergent African states, it would
seem that Nigeria embraced foreign investments since it continued the open
door policies inherited from the colonial administration. 95 It also introduced
many incentives aimed at attracting foreign investments. 96 The country also
signed on to the Convention on Settlement of Investment Disputes,97 in
1965, and thereby signaled its intentions with respect to the protection of

private foreign investments in the country. 98 The period immediately
following independence also witnessed the broadening of the sources of
foreign investments in Nigeria, to include sources in the United States of
America and other European countries, in addition to Britain.99 The
emphasis remained on the commercial and mining sectors, with the latter
given added impetus by the discovery of oi1. 1OO But the political upheavals

95

Alade supra note 79 at 294; Olomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 66-67

96 Some of these were income tax relief (t958); import duty retiefon raw materials and components (1957);
exchange and investment guarantees; the provision and continued expansion of economic and social
overhead capital. See Alade supra note 79 at 294.

97 This Convention provides a mechanism for the settlement of investment disputes between states and the
nationals of other countries.

91 Alade

supra note 79 at 295

Olukoshi supra note 1 at 20 (noting that: "at the time of independence in 1960, the British still accounted
for well over 50 percent of all private foreign investments flowing into the Nigerian economy. It was only
in the period from the mid-1960s that the British hegemony began to be challenged by American and other
West European private investors.")

99

100

Otukoshi supra note t at 22
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and resultant civil war of the late 1960s took a toll on foreign investments.

IOI

This picked up again after the war.102

However, the single most monumental policy of the 1970s, relating to
foreign investment, was the enactment of the indigenization decrees, titled,
Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decrees of 1972 and 1977, the latter
amending the former. 103 The decree restricted the participation of foreigners
in businesses in Nigeria. It did this by creating three schedules of businesses.
Those in Schedule 1 were reserved exclusively for Nigerians, meaning that
foreigners could not participate in them. Schedule 2 contained businesses in
which foreigners could not hold more than forty percent ownership. Thus, a
minimum of sixty percent ownership was guaranteed Nigerians in Schedule
2 businesses. Foreigners could hold no more than sixty percent interest in
Schedule 3 businesses, meaning that Nigerians must hold not less than forty
percent stake in those businesses. It has been suggested that it was the
euphoria of the oil wealth that gave Nigeria the confidence to promulgate the

lOl

Olomola and Akinbobola, supra note 76 at 67

IOl

Ibid

lOJ For a detailed analysis of the political economy of the decrees see THOMAS 1. BIERSTEKER,
MULTINA TIONALS, THE STATE AND CONTROL OF THE NIGERIAN ECONOMY (princeton
University Press, Princeton, NJ, 1987); Biersteker argues that the state did not initiate the fIrSt decree (the
1972) decree, but rather collaborated with local capital in its formulation but that the second decree (1977
decree) was written with the experience of the first decree in mind and this time the state was the initiator.
See PP. 52 and 159.
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indigenization decrees, the motive of which was to reduce the scope of
foreign participation in the country's economic development efforts. 1M
There is no denying the fact that the discovery of oil and the resulting boom
of the early 1970s fortified the desire of the state to take its economic
destiny in its own hands, as the indigenization policy was thought to
represent. It would appear though that the exercise was borne out of fear of
neocolonialism. Ironically, though, given the level of the country's
technological development, the discovery of oil entailed the need for both
foreign capital and expertise required for exploration and mining. Maybe,
the indeginization decrees were an attempt to balance the clear need for
foreign investments and the fear of foreign domination of the economy.
Whatever the true motivation, the indigenization decrees had the effect of
reducing foreign investments in the country. 105 Many foreigners, however,
devised ways of circumventing the decrees by using local fronts, and it is
still thought that the economy is dominated and controlled by
multinationals. 106

104

Saliu supra note 56 at 296

lOS

Otomola and Akinbobola supra note 76 at 67; Achime supra note 29 at 50 and 88

106 Olukoshi argues that "it was the inability of the Nigerian state to compel foreign investors and their
indigenous collaborators to create a more internally balanced domestic economic base that provided the
background to the economic crisis of the 1980s," and that "the consequenceof the crisis was mademore
severe by the fact that Nigeria was almost solely dependent on oil exports for the sustenance of domestic
economic activities." See Olukoshi supra note 1 at 34·35
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The decline in resources and the oil glut of the early 1980s added urgency to
the country's need for foreign investment, if only to alleviate the resulting
economic crisis. Thus, the restrictions on foreign investments were relaxed
by the continuous amendment of the indigenization decrees. t07 Similarly, the
government started a debt equity swap program, which aimed to convert
debts to investments, and to increase the level of foreign investments in the
country.l08 The introduction of the structural adjustment program (SAP), in
1986, aimed to liberalize the economy and that has been the thrust of the
country's policies to date. That objective encourages foreign capital and
indeed has the attraction of foreign investments at its core. 109 It must be
noted though that despite the country's deliberate efforts to attract foreign
investments in the 199Os, a combination of the political instability that
prevailed within the period and the displeasure of the West over the political

107 There were the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Decree 1987 and the Nigerian enterprises Promotion
Decree 1989. Currently the restrictions have almost all been removed. By the Nigerian Investment
Promotion Commission Act 1995.
lOS

Olomola and Akinbobola, supm note 76 at 67

109 The International Finance Corporation notes that developing countries are now courting foreign direct
investment, shifting the criterion for measuring the value of foreign direct investment from its direct
contribution to local value to its longer-ten» consequences for the competitiveness of domestic resources
and capabilities. See IFC, FDI supra note 85 at 14.
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and other situations in the country negatively impacted the foreign
investment situation in the country.IIO

A conspectus of the economic terrain reveals that foreign investments have
been rising in Nigeria. The country was one of the five highest recipients of
foreign direct investment in Africa in 2005. 111 The inflow of foreign
investments was more than $3 billion for that year, the country being one of

only three African countries to receive more than that amount. 112 The
dominant field remains mining, and especially oil. 113 Between 1980 and
2005, Nigeria concluded more than 20 Bilateral Investment Treaties. 1I4

Table 1: Inflow of Foreign Private Investment into Nigeria, 1965-1985
(million Nigerian naira)
Years
1965
1966
1%7
110

Total Inflow
176.0
101.2
107.0

SaIiu supra note 56 at 301-302

III WIR 2006 P.4I; The country was the highest recipient in West Aftica, accounting for 7oo/o of foreign
direct investment inflows into that region, and 11 % of foreign direct investment into Aftica. See P. 42.

III Others

were South Africa and Egypt. See WlR 2006 P.42

113 Oil represented too/o of the country's foreign direct investments in 2005. See WIR 2006, P.4S See WIR
2006, P.45. Occasionally the manufacturing and processing sector dominate. This was the situation in 1990,
1991 and 1992. See SaUu supra note 56 at 302-303
114

WIR 2006 P.49
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1968
1969
1970
1971
1972
1973
1974
1975
1976
1977
1978
1979
1980
1981
1982
1983
1984
1985

106.4
150.6
251.0
489.6
432.8
577.8
507.1
757.4
521.1
717.3
664.7
704.0
786.4
584.9
2193.4
1673.4
1385.3
1423.5

Source: J.A. Alade, the Role of Multinational Corporations in Economic
Development: The Nigerian Experience, Quarterly Journal of
Administration, April/July 1991, Vol. XXV Nos 3 and 4, P. 291 at 306

Table 2: Foreign Direct Investment in Nigeria, 1990-2007 (millions of
dollars)
1990..2000 (Annual Average
2003
2004
2005
2006

1477
2171
2127
3403
5445

Source: World Investment Report 2007
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VI. INCENTIVES FOR FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN NIGERIA

It must be pointed out, from the outset, that a foreign company is required to

register under the Companies and Allied matters Act before it can do
business in Nigeria. us Generally, Nigeria is a member of most of the
multilateral trading and fmancial institutions of the worId. 116 It makes a
deliberate effort to attract foreign investors. As a result, it provides several
forms of incentives geared toward the attraction of foreign investments. As
discussed above, initially, the Nigerian Enterprises Promotion Act had put a
limit on the percentage of shares, which a foreigner might hold in a Nigerian
firm. This has been relaxed. Subject to a few exceptions relating to sensitive
issues of national security, a foreigner may now wholly own a Nigerian
company.1l7 Besides, the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act
1995 has provisions assuring the protection of investment by foreigners. 118
By that Act, no enterprise shall be nationalized or expropriated by any
Government of the Federation and no person who owns, whether wholly or
in part, the capital of any enterprise, shall be compelled by law to surrender
liS Section 54 of the Companies and allied Matters Act; Section 56 of the Act provides for exemptions in
respect of certain foreign companies.

116

Such as World Trade Organization, United Nations International Monetary Fund, ICSlD etc

117

Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act, 1995, Section 17

liS

Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act, 1995, Sections 25 and 26
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their interest, in the capital, to any other persons. Similarly, the Federal
Government may not acquire an enterprise unless the acquisition is in the
national interest or for a public purpose under a law which makes provision
for (a) payment of fair and adequate compensation and (b) a right of access
to the courts for the detennination of: (i) the investor's interest or right, and

(ii) the amount of compensation to which they are entitled. Such
compensation shall be paid without undue delay, and authorization will be
given for its repatriation in convertible currency where applicable. Aliens
may bring money into the country through authorized dealers and obtain a
certificate of capital importation. 1l9 Such capital is guaranteed unconditional
transferability and repatriation of funds with regard to both earnings and
capital. In conjunction with the privatization exercise, these incentives open
Nigeria to foreign investment and, all things being equal, promote capital
inflow to the country.

The Act also establishes the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission
(NIPC) to replace the Industrial Development Coordination Committee. The
NIPC serves as a one"stop forum for coordinating with all the approvals
required of a foreign investor. One of the problems of previous investment

119

j

Foreign Exchange (Monitoring and Miscellaneous Provisions) Act No. 17 of 1995
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r
agencies was that their roles tilted more to enforcement of investment laws
and regulations, and less to promotion of investments. The NIPC is
conceived to be more of a promotion agency. It is responsible for granting
business permits and expatriate quotas.

The Commission undertakes

proactive investment generation programs and embarks on image building as
part of its promotion functions. In addition, it provides other forms of
services to investors.

Nigeria also offers a series of tax incentives to foreign investors. For
instance tax holidays are available to qualified companies, mainly
companies in industries, which have been designated to have pioneer status.
The basis for such classification could be the nature of the industry or the
location. There could also be tax relief for research and development. This
renders deductible, for tax purposes, the cost of conducting such research
and development. There are numerous other tax incentives available to
foreign companies in Nigeria.
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CHAPTER 7
IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN
NIGERIA

I. FOREIGN PARTICIPATION IN PRIVATIZATION

Some contend that the dominance of SOEs in any economy is not friendly to
foreign investments. l This is because, in a sense, SOEs were created to avoid
what was perceived to be the domination of the economy by foreign
interests. At the inception of self-rule, most developing countries especially
in Africa were faced with a shortage of private capital. They thus faced a
dilemma - fully embrace foreign capital or forego the urgent developmental
needs confronting them. Being apprehensive that an unrestrained embrace of
foreign capital would result in neocolonialism, the states sought a way to
undertake their developmental projects without surrendering the economy to
foreign interests. A way out was in the establishment of many SOEs. As a
result, the states became the engines of development. Thus, the view that
state domination of the economy is not foreign investor friendly arises from
both the antecedents of the SOEs as well as the conventional wisdom that

1M. o. KAYODE AND O.A. OYERANTI, ATIRACTING FOREIGN INVESTMENT THROUGH
PRIVATE SECTOR PARTNERSHIP: WHAT HOPE FOR NIGERIA? 28(Development Policy Centre,
Ibadan, 2002) (Research Report No. 37)
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state control of the economy

IS

antithetic of free markets, under which

foreign investments thrive.

It is therefore not surprising that there would be a certain ambivalence

toward the participation of foreign investors in the privatization of state
enterprises. Most of the enterprises are seen as national patrimonies. "Thus,
the sentiment often is that these enterprises belong to the people and should
not be given away to foreign interests, amounting to 'selling the family
jewels. ,"2 And, while the developing states are persuaded of the benefits of
privatizing them, they may still be unsure of the wisdom of involving
foreign investors. The same nationalistic sentiments that led to the creation
of the SOEs seem to be present still. Foreign investors' participation in
privatization programs is, therefore, politically sensitive.3 The governments
thus face a quagmire. They generally acknowledge the benefits of foreign
participation, but oftentimes succumb to political pressure and thus skew the
process against foreign investors. 4 Some do this by imposing a limit on the
percentage of shares that could be sold to foreigners or by prescribing
Kally Megyery and Frank Sader, Facilitating Foreign Participation in Privatization, 3 (The World Bank,
Washington DC. 1996)

2

Frank Sader, Privatizing Public Enterprises and Foreign Investment in Developing Countries, 1988-1993,
13 (The World Bank, Washington, DC)

3

4

Megyery and Sader, supra note 2 at 3
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minimum number of shares that must go to nationals or domestic firms. That
is the reason initially most privatization programs in Africa had scant foreign
participation.

Nonetheless, the initial reluctance to involve foreign investors in
privatization has softened, and there are appreciable reasons in support of
foreign investors' involvement in privatization programs in the developing
countries. First, it is said that foreign investors' participation in the
privatization program raises the degree of competition in the sell-off process
by increasing the number of bidders. 5 Absent foreign bidders, the local field
may not offer sufficiently competitive prices for the SOEs. The result would
be that the enterprises might be undersold. But the participation of
foreigners, in the privatization program, increases the options available to
the government by improving the number and enhancing the quality of
offers available to the government. Besides, it increases the probability of a
successful privati71ltion and ensures that the government would receive the
maximum prices for its SOEs.

5

Sader supra note 3 at 13

6

Megyery and Sader, supra note 2 at 4

6
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.,
Secondly, and more important, sometimes foreign investors are best suited
to solve the problems of the SOEs. Most ailing SOBs need the injection of
substantial capital and the introduction of technology. In some cases, only
such steps can revamp the SOB or make its privatization worthwhile. So if it
is sold to a foreign investor, it can more easily be turned around. Despite this
obvious advantage, some countries instead use the privatization program as a
mechanism to develop its domestic private sector. This might further the
cause of domestic accumulation, but it hardly aids the overall developmental
cause. Rather, the local capitalists would continue running the enterprises in
the same manner as the government had done.

While the participation of foreigners improves the odds that a privatization
program would be successful, a privatization program also improves the
inflow of foreign investment. 7 This symbiotic relationship is reflected in two
ways. Foreign investors' purchases ofSOEs, in and of themselves, constitute
inflows of foreign investments. This would primarily be by the device of
foreign direct investment. Such involvement might also be in the nature of
portfolio investments. In a World Bank study on privatizing public
enterprises and foreign investments in the developing countries, covering the

7

See generally Sader supra note 3
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period 1988-1993, it was found that sixty-nine privatization transactions
involving foreign investors were completed through portfolio equity
investments for a total of $10.6 billion dollars. 8 Foreign direct investments
accounted for six hundred and nineteen such transactions for the same
period, although in Africa the number of portfolio investments were said to
be few owing to the inadequacy of the capital markets in that region.

The second mechanism by which privatization enhances foreign investments
is through what is called the signaling effect whereby foreign investors tend
to gravitate towards states that have very good privatization programs. They
do this not necessarily to participate in the privatization programs
themselves (even though that is sometimes also the case) but to invest in
other sectors of the economy outside the privatization program. The
rationale is that an effective and successful privatization program entails the
effective withdrawal by the state of those impediments which militate
against a proper functioning of free market.

The other sense in which a successful privatization program might facilitate
the inflow of foreign investments is that it creates a conducive infrastructural

8 Sader Supra Dote 3 at 16.

275
I

environment for businesses, or indeed investments, to thrive. This is
especially apposite in the developing countries in Africa where the
infrastructural facilities are usually within the domain of SOEs. Usually
those infrastructures are dilapidated or even nonexistent. Thus the successful
privatization of those SOEs will render them more efficient in discharging
their functions of maintaining the infrastructures. The result is that foreign
investors realize that a successful privatization invariably means the
improvement of the business and other infrastructures in the country in
question. It seems a fairly and widely accepted logic that there is a
correlation between privatization and the inflow of foreign investments in a
country.

II. IMPACT OF PRIVATIZATION ON FOREIGN INVESTMENTS IN
NIGERIA
The intentions reflected in the privatization program are lofty. However, the
Nigerian experience reveals that the theoretical and legal frameworks are but
a starting point in using privatization to attract foreign investment. Other
important variables must be present before privatization can have the desired
positive effect on foreign investment. Among these variables are political
stability and democracy. As indicated in Chapter 4, the military
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administration in Nigeria first started the privatization exercise around 1989.
In 1990, the exercise resulted in sixteen million dollars revenue. 9 This
increased to thirty five million dollars in 1991 10, one hundred and fourteen
million dollars in 1992,11 five hundred and forty one million in 1993 12 and
then declined to twenty four million in 1994. 13 There was virtually a
complete absence of any foreign investors in the first privatization program
(the 1988 version).}" The data for the years 1995 through 1998 are not
available. For those familiar with the political history of Nigeria, one recalls
that the latter years were the height of the military dictatorship and
represented a period during which the country suffered the worst
international isolation, owing to the repressive regime that ran its affairs.
The lesson is that absent a credible and stable polity, privatization laws and
programs are not worth the paper on which they are written.

9

Privatization in Sub-Saharan Afiica (Region Fact sheet),
http://www.ipanet.netfdocumentsfWorldBankfdatabases/plinkifactsheets/SSA.htm

14 Frank Sader, Privatization and Foreign Investment in the Developing World, 1988-1992,42 (The World
Bank, Washington, DC)
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For the exercise, which started in 1999, foreign investors have lately had a
15

modest involvement in the program. Although there has been a reasonable
improvement in foreign participation, the number is still few relative to the
volume of privatization already concluded. It would seem that initially,
foreigners were still wary of the political climate in the country. This was
not helped by the various crises, which the country witnessed shortly after
the inception of civilian administration in 1999,16 The president embarked
on numerous trips overseas with the declared purpose of wooing investors.
Yet, it would seem that the latter were still cautious. The Director General of
the Bureau of Public Enterprises lamented that foreign investors were slow
in participating in the exercise. 17 The privatization exercise took a long time

15 These foreign investors include: Scancem (Norway) (which acquired interest in the cement sector),
Holcim of spain (which acquired interest in the cement sector), Simatech Offshore International, which
acquired interest in MV Abuja (Vessel of Unity Line), AP Moller (which acquired interest in the ports),
ENL Consortium (which acquired interests in the ports), Hekio Consortium (which acquired interest in the
fertilizer sector); Lafarge of France (which acquired interest in the cement sector), Flour Mills of Greece
(which acquired interest in the ports), Global Energy CompanylMcDermott (which acquired interest in the
ports), Indorama of Indonesia (which acquired interest in the petrochemical field), Rusal Aluminum
Smelting of Russia , M1N of South Africa, and Celtel of Netherlands. This listing is based mainly on
correspondence the author had with the Privatization agency, Bureau of Public Enterprises (BPE) dated
May 30, 2007.
16 There have religious crises and tensions regarding the introduction ofsharia in some parts of the country;
there have also been ethnic crises in the Niger delta region; in 2002, the Miss World beauty pageant which
had commenced in the country had to be moved to the United Kingdom where it was completed.
17 See interview published in the Guardian newspaper Sunday April 27, 2003, where the Director General,
Mr. Nasiru el Rufai stated: "I clearly want to see new monies coming into the Nigerian economy, which is
one of the objectives of the programme. But you see, you cannot force that, because President Obasanjo has
gone on several foreign trips to woo foreign investors, that has not forced foreign investors to come. So
what are you going to do? Are you going to say because I have no foreign investors I will not do
anything?"
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to find core investors for the three most prominent SOES. 18 The electricity
company NEPA was embroiled in controversy. The opposition of its
employees to the exercise was sufficient to discourage any foreign investors.
No one would like to use their capital to acquire a controversy. The Bureau
received a bid from a "foreign finn" for the telephone company, NITEL.
Yet, the prospective core investor could not pay up, and the Bureau claimed
it had forfeited its deposit, which was actually sourced from a local Nigerian
bank. In the interim, the Bureau entered into a contract with a firm 19 for the
management of NITEL pending its privatization. The Nigerian Airways
issue illustrates the problem of administrative fight for turf. The supervising
Ministry for that SOE and the Bureau both laid claims to the authority to
privatize the Nigerian Airways.20 One wonders how foreign investors were
to be attracted to such a finn.

The privatization program enunciated by the 1999 law, that is the second
legislation on privatization of SOEs, resulted in an overall gross revenue of

18

NEPA, NITEL and Nigeria Airways

19 Dutch fIrm Pentascope International, but this may not be treated as foreign investment, since the fIrm is
just to tum NITEL around and perhaps make it more attractive to investors
20 This factor of lack of cooperation from bureaucrats and politicians is not an insignificant problem. Ernst
&Young warn that: "Between the possibility of war and civil disorder on the one hand, and heavy handed
government interference on the other, lies the possibility that local politicians will treat privatization as
political football in order to further their own ends to the detriment of the investment. See ERNST &
YOUNG, supra note 12, 63.
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60.2 billion naira and an overall net proceed of 58.04 billion naira as at the
end of 2002.21 This was with the conclusion of the second phase of an
anticipated three-phased exercise. Significantly, of the 43 enterprises
privatized under the two phases, none was acquired by a foreigner or other
foreign entity. The nearest was the failed attempt by a "British" firm to
acquire NlTEL.22 That firm lost its deposit when the sale could not go on,
and it was discovered that the deposit was actually sourced locally. Even if
the deal had materialized, it would still not have marked a true foreign
investment being a foreign acquisition only in principle. The sad conclusion
then is that on the first of the two dimensional nexus between privatization
and foreign investment, that is the direct injection of foreign capital through
direct acquisition by foreigners of the SOEs, the first two phases of the
Nigerian exercise did not have any positive impact. However, the third
phase witnessed a smattering of foreign investors. 23 The result is that the
only inquiry left is whether the privatization program has indirectly boosted
foreign investment in Nigeria.

21

Unofficial report from the Bureau of Public Enterprises

22 BPE is in the process of again putting forward NITEL for sale. See News report titled "NITEL for Sale
Next Month, Says BPE Chief', Guardian Newspaper, August 17, 2004 (quoting the Director of BPE as
stating that BPE will put NlTEL up for sale in September 2004)
23

J

See the list at footnote 15
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This second aspect of the inquiry is hamstrung by the paucity of data on
these investments. The National Investment Promotion Commission is the
agency charged with promoting investments in the country. 24 Ideally, as part
of its statutory duties, the Commission should keep record of and track
foreign investment inflows into the country. Therefore, it should be a ready
and available source of authentic data on foreign investment trends in
Nigeria. Unfortunately, statistics and data-keeping do not seem to be a prime
issue for the agency.25 Happily, there are other sources and available records
showing that until 1960 over ninety percent of total investments in Nigeria
were under foreign ownership.26 With independence and the nationalism
surrounding the new status, local participation continued to increase. This, of
course, led to a reduction in the percentage of foreign investments in the
country. In 1967, the value of total cumulative foreign direct investment in
Nigeria was 64.2 million naira. 27 This continued to increase, and by 1977,
the value was 519.7 million naira.28 By 1978, it was 323.9 million naira, and

24

See the Nigerian Investment Promotion Commission Act. 1995. Section 4(e).

This writer made several attempts to collect such data from the agency but was only advised that the
agency registered 119 foreign companies since 1999 with a total of $586 as of May 2003; See email from
NlPC on file with author.
25

16 1.K.

ONOH, THE NIGERIAN OIL ECONOMY, 4 (1983)

Id at 13, citing the Central Bank of Nigeria, Economic and Financial Review Vol. 6,00.2, December
1968; vol. 14 no. 1 Match 1976; and vol. 17, no. 2, December 1979
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by 1981, the inflow of direct foreign investment in Nigeria was valued at
492.8 million naira. 29

From 1985 -1995 the annual average of direct foreign investment in Nigeria
39

was $921 million. By 1998 the value had increased by 14 percent to $1051
miIIion.

31

Ironically, 1999, which was the year of the reinvigorated

privatization program, witnessed a reduction with the foreign direct
investment inflow to Nigeria declining, by 4.4 percent, to $1005. n This
decline continued in 2000 with the country receiving $930 million worth of
33

foreign investment

,

a 7.5 per cent decrease in the value received in 1999.

Significantly, the next two years, 2001 and 2002, saw increases of 18.7
percent in 2001 and 16 per cent in 2002. The value of foreign direct
investment in 2001 was $1104 million and $1281 million in 2002. 34 The
values offoreign direct investment in Nigeria in 2003,2004,2005 and 2006

29 THOMAS J. BIERSTEKER, MULTINATIONALS. THE STATE AND CONTROL OF THE
NIGERIAN ECONOMY, 262 (1987), Princeton Press, NJ.
3()
United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, World Investment Report 2003;
www.unctad.orglfdistatistics

31

id

34

id
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were $2171 million, $2127 million, $3403 million and $5445 million
respectively.35

A pertinent comment on the data is that although the inflow of direct foreign
investment into Nigeria suffered a decline somewhat in the year that the
privatization program was re-Iaunched (1999) and the immediately
succeeding year (2000) following such reinvigoration, it seemed to improve
substantially in the third and fourth years (2001 and 2002 respectively). It
is, therefore, arguable that although foreign direct investment in the nature of
acquisition of the privatized firms remained unaffected by the privatization
program, the latter has continued to exert a positive impact in the broader
area of general foreign investment in the country. Critics may charge that the
improvement could be owed to the return of democracy in the country in the
same year as that during which the second privatization program was
instituted; and that the increase seen in 2001 and 2002 reflected a gradual
return of international confidence in the Nigerian polity. Such an assessment
may not substantially detract from the influence of the privatization
program. This is because the deregulation, contained in the economic
policies of the civilian administration, is but one strand in the over all reform

35

UNCTAD World Investment Reports 2007
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of the political economy of Nigeria. The privatization program is a
concomitant strand, which complements the deregulation program. Besides,
it is a well-accepted notion in international economics that international
agencies act as catalysts for foreign investments. In other words, the attitude
of such agencies toward a particular country provides a barometer on the
suitability of investments therein. The World Bank:, the International
Development Agency, the United Kingdom Department for International
Development and the United States Agency for International Development
have actively participated in the Nigerian privatization program. 36 They
have not only provided substantial grants for the smooth and efficient
implementation of the program, but have also assisted with technical
resources and manpower. Foreign investors are known to track the activities
of multilateral agencies and those of the leading developed countries such as
the United States and the United Kingdom. Such investors allow their
investment decisions to be informed substantially by the activities or attitude
of such prominent agencies, or at the very least they take such attitudes into
consideration when deciding whether or not to pursue an investment in a
country. It does not, therefore, require complicated analysis to conclude that

36 For instance in 2001 the World Bank made available a grant of$1l4 million to support the privatization
program. See World Bank Endorses BPE, Others, hUp:/www.bpeng.orgilO/news-item last visited
09/13/04. The UK Department for International Development made $10 million grant to BPE; the United
States Agency for International Development made a $1 million grant in 2000 and $8.2 million in 2001.
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the pronounced and active support of the World Bank and other agencies
toward the privatization program in Nigeria has been interpreted by
investors as a positive, even if tacit, endorsement of the exercise and of the
broader economic climate in the country. Thus, the surge in foreign direct
investment in Nigeria in the second and third years (2001 and 2002,
respectively) following the reintroduction of the privatization program is not
surprising. In consequence, the answer to the question, whether the
privatization program has had any impact on foreign direct investment in
Nigeria, is in the affirmative. It has provided a positive and enabling
environment, which has conduced to improved foreign investments in
Nigeria, even though such impact on investments in the privatized
enterprises have been relatively modest.

Perhaps one way that foreign interest can be significantly aroused in direct
acquisition of the SOEs is for the government to reconsider the approach of
partial privatization. Given the controversies inherent in government, and
among departments, foreign investors may not be comfortable with an
arrangement in which they are partners with such disorganized body.
Similarly, the regulatory framework such as competition rules or regulations
on standards should be introduced or strengthened. Unfortunately, Nigeria
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still lacks a competition regime. Although both the Bureau and the Council
are working hard to push an antitrust statute, their proposed bill is still a
draft and is yet to make it to the National Assembly almost two decades after
the country started the privatization program. One cannot overemphasize the
need for a coherent and effective competition law. It should be at least an
adjunct, if not a precursor, to a successful privatization exercise. Had such a
regime been in existence, the initial opposition to the privatization program
could have been substantially softened.

Foreign investors are comfortable

with a predictable and stable environment. They are aware that the absence
of clear and tested standards will, in the future, entail a posteriori, ad hoc
and, indeed, ad hominem regulations. Such retrospective enactment and
application of rules will detract from the assurances contained in the laws
and distort the economy.

CONCLUSION
The above discussion reveals that although privatization is controversial, it is
necessary for revamping the Nigerian economy. The structural and
institutional frameworks established by the Nigerian government for
achieving that objective appear sound. However, those frameworks are but a
first step in the long journey of attracting foreign capital by transferring

1
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SOBs into private hands. The implementation of the arrangement is equally
important.

The economic crisis that faces Nigeria cannot be solved only by adopting
policies. The real crisis has been that of leadership. The existence of SOEs
was based on developmental needs. Those needs have not been fully met,
even though one cannot say that all the SOEs have not lived up to their
responsibilities. But the solution does not necessarily lie in selling them. It
lies in an honest leadership willing to hold the SOEs accountable every step
of the way. Unfortunately, such leadership seems to have so far eluded
Nigeria, hence, the seeming acceptance that privatization is not only here to
stay, but that it is also desirable.

Having embarked upon the program, Nigeria seems to be making giant
strides. Initially, foreign investors were hesitant to be involved in the
program. Later, they seem to be persuaded on the prospects of the program.
Thus the increased foreign participation witnessed in the third phase of the
second privatization program. The country has still not completely allayed
the reservations of foreigners, and there is need for increased foreign
confidence in it.
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If confidence is lacking in it, or if it is mired in unnecessary controversy, the
lofty objectives may remain a will-o-the wisp. In this respect, other
fundamental factors, apart from the integrity of the process, relate to social
and political stability. The government should act promptly to resolve
outstanding controversies regarding some of the SOEs. In addition, it should
strengthen regulations. Above all, it should improve the security situation in
the country. These are desiderata if the privatization program is to have the
desired goal of attracting foreign investments into the country. With the
transition in 2007 of the civilian administration to another such
administration37 it is hoped that the international community will now banish
every misgiving about politics in Nigeria. Finally, the most populous
country in Africa is ready, able and willing to take its position in the comity
of free and stable nations. This should give foreigners additional assurance
on the viability, durability and profitability of investments in Nigeria.

37 Some critics however charge that the transition was fraught with electoral fraud and that the ruling party
is on the verge of making Nigeria a de facto one party state.
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